During the press conference given by the Minister of the Armed Forces, Florence Parly, and by the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces, General Lecointre, the latter specified that all of the missiles launched by the French forces had reached their targets, and that none had been intercepted. He added that according to his information, the missiles fired by the British and the Americans had also all hit their targets.
Beyond public statements by the Syrians and Russians concerning a very high number of intercepted missiles, showing photos of Syrian soldiers posing in front of the carcass of a missile supposedly shot down and which turns out to be a Russian AA-8 Aphid missile, it is obvious that the Syrian anti-aircraft defense did not shineby its performance. What can we deduce about the performance of Russian anti-aircraft defense systems?
Syria is today one of the countries where the concentration of anti-aircraft defense systems is the highest, with two S-400 batteries and two S-300 batteries operated by Russian forces, supported by an undetermined number of batteries. BUK medium-range missiles and around sixty Pantsir-1 short-range defense systems.
Despite Russian and Syrian ranting before the strikes, these systems did not intercept any missiles launched by Western forces. Several factors explain this fact:
- Russian forces stood “away” from this strike, and no Russian missiles attempted to intercept Western missiles.
- Among the Syrian anti-aircraft systems, only the approximately 40 Pantsir-1s delivered by Russia to Bashar Al Assad's forces had the capacity to intercept cruise missiles. To do this, they should have been deployed around the objectives to be protected. The absence of losses among the Syrian forces and Western missiles shot down shows that these systems were not deployed to protect the targeted objectives.
- Russia claims to have detected the British and American forces, but not the French forces, suggesting that the French intervention was simulated, which is obviously grotesque. It is, however, possible that the profile of the French attack, using low-signature aircraft like the Rafale, and Stealth SCALP EG and MdCN cruise missiles, launched from a safe distance, did not allow Russian radars to detect and track the French attack. Indeed, a Rafale, even equipped with SCALP missiles and canisters, has a reduced Frontal Radar Surface, allowing the devices to get close enough to launch their missiles and return without being detected. SCALP EGs also have a very reduced radar and infrared signature. Associated with a grazing flight path using the terrain to mask their arrivals, it is very possible that the Russian radars did not detect anything, unlike the British Tornado or the American B1-B Lancer, which are not optimized for radar discretion.
What can we therefore take as a lesson from this strike?
On the one hand, we know that Syria did not protect its chemical sites, and had even evacuated them, and therefore allowed the West to strike without putting up the slightest resistance. We also know that the West, and in particular France, have demonstrated their ability to strike Syria when they wish, with convincing operational results. Note that Western devices, and in particular Rafale French, know whether or not they were actually detected by Russian radars; information that will probably never be disclosed.
