To say the least, Germany has been sending very contradictory signals in terms of cooperation and defense commitments in recent months.
On the one hand, Me Merkel and her runner-up, Defense Minister Ursula von der Leyen, tour capitals to sign Defense agreements and commitments, promising the growing role of Germany in the Defense Europe as in NATO. The two German leaders do not hide, moreover, the country's ambition to become the pivot of this European defense, and many countries in Northern and Eastern Europe, are sensitive to this discourse. At the same time, they engage in serial bilateral cooperation, whether with France, but also with Netherlands, and several countries in Eastern Europe.
But this proactive official external discourse is largely undermined by the reality of actions and internal discourse in the country. Thus, while the Chancellor had agreed to respect France's export wishes within the framework of the SCAF and MGCS programs, the German authorities continue to pose obstacles to European exports to countries judged negatively by its public opinion, like Saudi Arabia, Egypt, or Indonesia. An article from the Tribune reveals that the French Arquus has great difficulty obtaining export licensesfor mechanical spare parts from the German authorities, within the framework of the DONASS contract with Saudi Arabia. Likewise, the British from MBDA were refused these same export licenses for elements of the European METEOR missilehaving to equip the Typhoon Saudis.
Germany's operational commitments also face the harsh reality of the dilapidated state of German forces. So, according to the daily die Welt, German units are forced to vampirize among themselves to achieve the minimum formats for the rapid European intervention force, of which Germany is in command this year. Other reports in 2018 pointed to the very low availability naval units, submarinesou German airlines.
Finally, the commitment made by Chancellor Merkel, to bring the country's defense budget to 1,5% of GDP in 2025, is also largely questioned by the Minister of Finance, while German growth has proven to be disappointing and expectations for the years to come are just as disappointing.
There is therefore a profound dichotomy between the speeches of the German authorities on the international scene, and the reality of its own capacities to respect these commitments.
This can be explained by several concomitant factors, such as the weakening of Angela Merkel's CDU during the last elections, leading the Chancellor to announce that she would not seek a new mandate following this one. . Furthermore, in Germany as everywhere in Europe, social tensions lead to a certain form of radicalization of political discourse, even within the Alliance governing the country. Finally, Germany considers, above all, Defense Europe as a tremendous opportunity to develop and consolidate its own Defense industry, even though the new European standards risk weakening its positions on the automobile market. The major international discourses are therefore replaced by very concrete, and much more pragmatic, economic interests. It can be noted that if Germany is reluctant to grant export licenses to Egypt, it does not hesitate to sell your corvettes there, any more than it is reluctant to sell 6 Type 214 AIP submarines to Turkey, even though it declares refusal to modernize the Leopard 2 Turkish A4.
It is very risky to speculate on what Germany's position will be on defense issues in the next decade, and even more so on the one after that. But we cannot ignore the fact that Germany will be the critical point of a possible effective European Defense initiative.
It is therefore essential to consider collaboration, particularly Franco-German, by considering the possible, and even probable, reversals of Berlin in the years to come. Above all, it will be up to France to constitute this pillar capable of supporting these variations, and keeping the project on track. In fact, the more militarily and industrially powerful France is in Europe, the less German procrastination will have consequences on the construction of Defense Europe. It is even probable that they will be fewer in number and less powerful, since the expected effectiveness, from a political as well as an industrial point of view, will be attenuated.
Defense Europe will be built around the Franco-German couple, but must not be built on the strength of the couple, otherwise, and despite the deep aspirations of the current leaders of the two countries, it will be extremely fragile in the duration.
