While large national defense groups are, for many, engaged in consolidation processes on a European scale, many SMEs in the sector, ensuring a very significant part of the BITD's technological and economic production, fear for their future. It is in this context that MP Didier Baichère, co-chair of the study group on the defense industry of the National Assembly, proposed the creation of a “European Task Force” intended to support French SMEs in Brussels, during European calls for tenders.
Indeed, unlike other countries, the French BITD still relies heavily on a galaxy of SMEs and ETIs acting as subcontractors of large industrial groups, but independent of these same groups. In fact, these SMEs do not have the relays that the German subcontractors of Rheinmetall, or the Italians of Leonardo, can boast of, very often incorporated into these large groups, or sharing direct or indirect capital links. In fact, creating a state economic and commercial entity whose function would be to support these SMEs on site undoubtedly makes sense.
But this measure would miss the real weaknesses of this French subcontracting fabric, namely its capital weakness, on the one hand, and the very natural temptation of large contractors to favor their internal industrial capacities.
The case of the merger of Rheinmetall and KMW into the KNDS group is a very explicit example. Indeed, Rheinmetall controls a significant number of SMEs and mid-caps acting as subcontractors of the group, particularly during Defense contracts. When it has taken control of KMW, which is now inevitable, and will therefore be on an equal footing with Nexter in KNDS, the German group will be able to give priority to its subsidiaries in the award of subcontracting contracts, arguing that it greater financial solidity, as well as contractual arrangements between the players, naturally favoring the internal know-how of the two groups. In fact, the French subcontractors, who today supply Nexter in the construction of VBMR and EBRC, are likely to be ignored in favor of their German counterparts, all in the strictest respect of industrial sharing agreements. work between countries.
The observation is the same concerning aeronautical programs like SCAF, Airbus DS which can rely on the scale of internal subcontracting of the Airbus group, much greater than that of Dassault Aviation, Thalès and Safran.
This point is all the more critical as the subcontracting fabric largely conditions the budgetary effectiveness of Defense investment in the Country. Indeed, of the 27 jobs generated[efn—note] See Defense with Positive Valorization[/efn_note] per million euros invested annually in the Defense industry by the State, 10 are direct jobs within industrial players major, 9 are due to subcontracting, and 8 are consumer jobs resulting from the 19 jobs previously created. In fact, subcontracting alone conditions 13 jobs out of the 27 created, and therefore 45% of the tax and budgetary return generated. If today 1 million € generates 1,4 million € in revenue and budgetary savings for the State, this same million will only generate 800.000 € if the national subcontracting network disintegrates, not to mention the destruction of more 100.000 jobs throughout the country.
It would therefore be relevant, even beneficial, to take advantage of the dynamic created by Mr. Baichère, to undertake a global reflection on the consolidation of the BITD subcontracting network, so as to give these SMEs/ETIs the necessary weapons to impose itself in the deep end of consolidation and European contracts. And, why not, consider global national consolidation, so as to create a world leader in the defense industry, like a BAe in Great Britain, a Leonardo in Italy, and 'a Rheinmetall in the making in Germany.
