Recently, faced with the threat, France unveiled its new “offensive” space doctrine.
But what threat are we talking about?
Bargain “Land”
For a long time, the space domain remained beyond the reach of any offensive threat.
Armies have taken advantage of this “safe zone” to deploy equipment that is key to their success but is vulnerable, making it possible to concentrate costs on the core functions of the equipment while simplifying its complexities.
- GPS
- Imaging, Cartography, ISR (Intelligence [Intelligence], Surveillance & Reconnaissance)…
- Communication, Telecommunications, Listening, anti-Radar monitoring…
Over time and with this safe zone, satellites have become a range of essential tools in all stages of Defense: from monitoring to guidance, including identification and communication.
“Land” of bargain, it is continually considered for new weapons:
- Anti-ballistic missile shield
- High energy electromagnetic or laser strike satellite
- Designation satellite (“JTAC”)
- Hacking, jamming…
But the situation suddenly changed:
The end of a world...
It had become unacceptable to allow these weapons to act with impunity.
And, in recent years, 3 threats have emerged:
- Parasitic satellites:
Anti-satellite satellites (responsible for spying on or jamming a satellite) began to appear, sometimes requiring the parasitized satellite to be put to sleep in order to safeguard the integrity of data and missions. - Signal jamming:
In 2018, during Exercise Trident Juncture, Russia would have taken advantage of the opportunity to play its role of preventing people from going in circles and test and validate a GPS signal jamming solution, severely disrupting the NATO exercise.
Beyond the Russian Retex, this served to remind NATO forces of their absolute dependence on one system (GPS) and the handicaps associated with the loss or disruption of the signal. - “Ground-to-space” missiles:
In 2007, China destroyed one of its satellites with a missile launched from their territory.
More recently (2018), India in turn announced that it had destroyed a satellite in low orbit using a shot launched from the ground.
With these 3 proven threats, the entire model of doctrines based on satellite solutions is collapsing, forcing the forces with such a model to rethink it…
Counterattack
With its new space doctrine, France is (in turn) launching its counter-offensive.
If the methods of action remain to be specified, there is one under study for several years which should certainly be considered:
Faced with out-of-service satellites and other debris, various orbit capture and/or diversion solutions are currently in the development or testing phases.
Diverted from its primary application, this type of solution could present certain advantages compared to satellites present in higher orbits.
Another of its advantages is the fact of not dispersing debris and therefore not polluting the space in which your own satellites circulate.
But beyond this example which could constitute a 4th mode of anti-satellite action, a whole new field of possibility is opening up...
… A field also including offensive actions from satellites, as mentioned previously. And a field of possibility necessarily containing axes aimed at protect your own satellites against possible threats.
A strategic model to rethink
But these threats in fact only point the finger at an abscess, and this dependence on vulnerable satellites is a block of faults:
- Ensuring the full protection and integrity of its satellites is not viable:
- It is not for existing satellites;
- As for “arming” the next ones to make them resistant to threats, this would imply an evolution of design (and costs) calling into question the relevance of their solution.
- Although offering advantages due to their high position, satellite solutions are not without weaknesses:
- Thus, satellite communications offer a lower data rate than other modes (multi-band radio, etc.), which conflicts with the exponential evolution of data volumes.
- Less throughput, these modes are also less secure, as demonstrated by the Trident Juncture 2018 exercise.
- Certain operational capabilities are entirely dependent and even affiliated with satellites, with no alternative solution, or even possible redundancy.
These limits in a space that is now threatened require us to rethink a number of operational aspects.
In this context, certain solutions have emerged or resurfaced in recent years:
- Micro-satellite constellations:
Weighing a few dozen kilograms, or even a few kilograms, these satellites with a simplified design both ensure redundancy and also make them more difficult to thwart (due to their number and size).
With a limited lifespan, they represent a bit of the role of “disposable” or “fixed-duration” satellites. - Airships and stratospheric balloons:
As a substitution or local redundancy for satellites.
Easily deployable over time at a modest cost, they make it possible to provide a response adapted to needs, in a limited space-time. - Inertial navigation systems:
Abandoned in favor of GPS, these systems (which can rely on the stars, the magnetic field, gyro systems, or now with AI shape recognition, etc.) allow, depending on the case,:- To know your absolute position (Astro-Inertial Navigation System), in the same way as GPS
- Or know your position relative to your known point [typically: the starting point], taking into account the different movements (speeds, durations, accelerations) orchestrated throughout the route
- Multi-band radio transmissions:
With the new theater doctrines in intra-connected eco-system, the satellite is no longer essential to concentrate the data, which can pass through local “repeaters”, such as SDT and/or MALE dones.
In addition, multi-band mode offers a very high level of security while allowing a higher data rate. - ISR aircraft:
By on-board pilot or remotely controlled (drones), these aircraft play an increasingly important role.
Thus, MALE ISR drones have become essential and are increasingly carrying out continuous missions, as when French hostages in Africa were spotted by a US drone on a routine mission. Unfortunately, they too are increasingly under threat.
For their part, #U2 spy planes are returning to the forefront of the media scene, a sign of the return to favor of this ISR vector, facing MALE drones and satellites, both with increasingly exposed vulnerabilities.
Finally, #LockheedMartin unveiled a few years ago a TR-X program aiming to replace the current U2s with High Altitude drones, while #NorthropGrumman would work on the #RQ180.
It’s an entire strategic model that is falling out of its orbit.
On the other hand, MALE tactical drone solutions also turn out to be more vulnerable than expected.
… Between 2, the stratospheric layer, where the U2s are already evolving and where the balloons, as well as the hypersonic missiles, could slip, seems to constitute today the new air domain to invest in to maintain its supremacy…and which the #SCAF project must take into consideration…
Julien Maire
