Barely days after taking office, Air Marshal Bhadauria, Chief of Staff of the Indian Air Force, made a point of clarify the acquisition strategy of the Indian Air Force in terms of fighter aircraft in the coming years, and this calls into question a lot of hopes and certainties...
Firstly, the equipment strategy will be based on two major competitions, the program Multi-Role Fighter Aircraft, sometimes presented as MMRCA 2, already launched, and aiming to build 114 devices to replace the Mig21 and Mig27 still in service, with a versatile and modern device. THE Rafale from Dassault, which won the first MMRCA competition in 2012, is opposed to the F16V, called F21 for the occasion, from Lockheed-Martin, the Gripen E/F from Saab, the Typhon from Eurofighter, the F18 E/F from Boeing, and the Russian MIG35, with uncertainty over the participation of the Su-35. Planning provides that 4 squadrons of this type of aircraft will have to be operational in 2025, and that the 6 squadrons will have to be operational in 2032.
The second competition is the program Advanced Medium Combat Aircraft, a fifth generation aircraft intended to replace the Mig29, Mirage 2000 and Jaguar in service. The competition has not yet launched, but the IAF plans to have at least one operational squadron in 2032 equipped with the new aircraft. This program was previously an Indo-Russian cooperation started in 2007 around a device derived from the PAK FA, the FGFA program. But faced with technology transfer problems and tensions between New Delhi and Moscow, India withdrew from this cooperation in 2018. But recent operational advances around the Su-57 program, and Moscow's aggressive export policy towards it, could well lead the Indian authorities to reconsider this solution, in a program in which they have already invested more than a billion $. Also note that on the Russian side, it is asserted that India never officially withdrew from the program, and that it was just delayed at the request of the Indian government.
Meanwhile, Air Marshal Bhadauria clarified that the ongoing modernization of the IAF Jaguars, with a view to extending their operational life till 2030, was canceled following the cancellation of their re-engine, and that the squadrons will begin to be withdrawn from service from 2021, which will not be without creating a deep operational deficit in terms of combat squadrons. Indeed, in the decade ahead, the IAF will lose its squadrons of Mig21, Mig27 and Jaguar, as well as a good part of its Mirage 2000 and Mig29, i.e. nearly 240 aircraft, while at the same time, it will only receive 36 Rafales, the 83 Tejas Mk1A and Mk2, the 114 MRFA as well as 21 Mig29 and 12 Su-30MKI, or 266 devices. This will not make it possible to absorb the deficit of 10 squadrons out of 40 theoretical squadrons that it faces today. In fact, even assuming that all programs are effectively implemented without delay and in full, which is rarely the case in India, the IAF will still be short 7 squadrons in 2032 to reach the 40 squadrons deemed necessary for protection. of the country against Pakistan and China.
As always, this statement must be put in the very specific context of Indian Defense policy. Thus, if Air Marshal Bhadauria clarified, following a journalist's request, that there was no plan other than the MRFA program for the acquisition of Rafale additional, this statement must be understood "in the official procurement program of the IAF today". However, these negotiations, which would relate to the acquisition of 2 new squadrons of Rafale over the counter in Paris and New Delhi, are, according to several consistent sources from India and France, well advanced. And it is unlikely that the IAF would pout if President Moodi granted it the acquisition of these 36 new Rafale in 2022, to partially compensate for the early withdrawal of the Jaguars.
It is also likely that, over the next decade, the AMCA program will advance faster than identified in the schedule presented by the IAF Chief of Staff. Indeed, if the Rafales, the Su-30MKI and the 114 MRFA will be sufficient to contain the modernization of the Pakistan Air Force planned so far, with entry into service of JF-17 Block III equipped with modern avionics, and the modernization of the F16 C/D by Turkey, it is quite different compared to China, which will receive, during the coming decade, at least 600 new modern aircraft, including several hundred 5th generation aircraft. In addition, we can perfectly imagine that Pakistan will also seek to equip itself with an export version of a Chinese 5G device, or from the Turkish T-FX program which should enter service in 2026.
It is nevertheless striking to note the lack of evolution in the industrial policy of Defense equipment in India, and its chronic lack of anticipation, while the country, even if it has a nuclear deterrent, is threatened on several fronts by adversaries who are rapidly modernizing and strengthening. Thus, the insistence of the authorities vis-à-vis the Tejas, a device which is obviously ill-conceived, inefficient and very expensive compared to other light devices, and in particular the Gripen E/F which Saab wishes more than anything to position in India, gives an idea of the political environment which conditions decisions in New Delhi. Unfortunately, in these conditions, and in the face of much more methodical adversaries, the chances of seeing India emerge victorious from a confrontation are increasingly slim, while the risk of seeing a conflict degenerate towards the use of nuclear weapons are increasing.
Unlike in 1962, Russia, which is no longer the Soviet Union, will not be able, this time, to impose restraint on China, any more than the United States or the Europeans will be able to do so. It will probably take other clashes like that of February 2019, between the Indian air forces and its neighbors, for the insufficiency of the resources devoted to it and the lack of anticipation in this area of the entire Indian political class, be highlighted. A situation which, in fact, is reminiscent of that of European countries…
