The question of replacing aircraft lost by accident or in combat (mainly rotary wings) is rarely raised. This is in addition to the extremely worrying rate of availability of recent equipment, like the Tiger (entered service in 2005 and has an average fleet age of seven years) or NH 90 (entered service in 2010 in its marine version and in 2011 in its land version), which shows very low technical availability rates, amounting to 25% for the Tiger, 37% for the NH 90 in its land version and 41% in its marine version. [efn_note]Senate report dated December 11, 2019 : the army helicopter fleet: soaring maintenance costs, chronic unavailability, efforts that must be extended[/efn_note]
In addition to the Cougar lost off the coast of Gabon in 2009 causing the death of 3 crew members and five operators of the 13th RDP, the Indelimane crash which led to the death of 13 pilots and commandos destroyed a second Cougar and a tiger. This is a third Tiger lost in combat. The first was in Afghanistan, another was seriously damaged at the very beginning of Serval in 2013. In the Sahel, the ALAT therefore lost two Tigers, a Cougar, a Caracal and at least three Gazelles. As for the air force, it would have lost two Mirage 2000Ds of which an MK3, an MQ-9 Reaper and several CASA 235s were damaged.
However, a single H225M Caracal was ordered to replace the aircraft lost in 2018 by the Air Force. The ALAT fleet is undergoing attrition, otherwise statistically predictable, induced by the intensive use of its helicopters in combat or in preparation for combat.
The Military Programming Law provides for a target of 2025 reconnaissance and attack helicopters by 147, i.e. 67 TIGRE + 80 GAZELLE, as well as 115 maneuvering helicopters composed of 70 NH 90 Caïman, 11 PUMA, 26 renovated COUGAR and 8 CARACAL. It is therefore necessary to question, from now on, the relevance of such a target given our current commitment contracts and the projection of these contracts into the future if the lost equipment is not likely be replaced. In addition to replacing the oldest equipment with modern aircraft, as is the case with the NH 90 Caiman replacing the Puma, or the future H160M Guépard to replace the ALAT Gazelle (among others), it becomes necessary to restart take into consideration, in the forecast models, accidental attrition as well as combat attrition so that the armed forces are able to have over the long term the format deemed necessary by the Programming Laws and other White Papers.
Note that attrition and anticipated wear and tear of equipment, like the personnel who use it, due to effective operational pressure, do not only affect the helicopter fleet, even if this is often cited as a reference. The entire air fleet, but also armored vehicles, artillery systems, or more prosaically communication systems, night vision or force armaments are experiencing a very notable acceleration in their unavailability, and the reduction of the fleet, due to this pressure. Thus, less than half of the Army's 77 Caesar self-propelled cannons are today in firing capacity, due to their intensive use in Iraq and Syria, while only 5 cannons were permanently deployed there.
We therefore understand the repeated messages from the Chiefs of Staff of the 3 armies, as well as from their leader, General Lecointre, to alert both the political authorities and the National Representation on this subject. It seems essential that an in-depth, independent and objective reflection, relating to the evolution of future threats and the format of the armies necessary to respond to them, be carried out ahead of the presidential elections of 2022, so as to provide the general staffs with broad understanding of current issues.
Roland Pietrini and Fabrice Wolf