According to the Oryx website , which refers to the losses documented by both sides since the start of the conflict, the Russian armies have lost more than 550 heavy tanks to date, more than half of which were destroyed by anti-tank missiles, artillery strikes or by opposing tanks. The observation is essentially the same concerning armored combat vehicles (350 including 150 destroyed) and infantry fighting vehicles (600 including 350 destroyed), which represents half of all front-line armored vehicles deployed by the Russia around Ukraine before the fighting begins. In fact, despite a supposedly blatant numerical and technological advantage, the Russian armies lost 25% of their total fleet of assault armored vehicles in two months of conflict, and the results are comparable for the Ukrainian armies, even if the losses are proportionally less significant. If no statistics are yet available as to the exact causes of this destruction, the study of documented photos concerning the armored vehicles identified as destroyed shows that a majority of them were destroyed by anti-tank weapons and artillery strikes. , despite their armor and the protection systems they had.
This vulnerability of armored vehicles, including heavy tanks, to modern weapon systems is not in itself new. Already, during the Nagorno-Karabakh war, the Armenian forces had lost 255 tanks, 146 of which were destroyed, and 160 front-line armored vehicles , or half of its armored fleet, in just 44 days of combat. We notice, in this respect, an obvious consistency concerning the losses in these two conflicts, in quality and quantity , once brought back on the same scale of duration and format of the armies. In fact, the vulnerability of armor observed in Ukraine is in no way a surprise, and does not seem to be linked to the offensive or defensive posture of the forces nor to the initial balance of power, but rather to the use of certain technologies and doctrines. . Indeed, the doctrine used by the Azerbaijani forces, although on the offensive during the Nagorno-Karabakh war, can be closer to that implemented by the Ukrainian forces against Russia, while the Armenian armies, in a defensive posture , for their part employed doctrine and tactics inherited from the Soviet era, comparable to those implemented by Russian forces in Ukraine.
This is therefore the second conflict which shows a significant vulnerability of front-line armored vehicles in the face of modern anti-tank weapons and artillery strikes directed by drone, as well as the vulnerability of the logistical lines supposed to supply these armored vehicles with ammunition and fuel necessary to the conduct of operations, since in both cases, a significant number of armored vehicles were abandoned by their crews after running out of fuel. And if the quality of the materials can be called into question, in comparison with the performance of modern armored vehicles used within the European and American armies for example, it however seems unlikely that these Western armored vehicles, if used within the same doctrine, have obtained better results against the Ukrainian or Azerbaijani armies, the Leopard 2 or the Abrams not resisting modern anti-tank missiles much better than the T72 or T80, as the Turkish forces had the bitter experience against the Kurdish fighters in 2019. The same goes for Western infantry fighting vehicles vis-à-vis their Russian counterparts. There is, however, in recent history, a significant counter-example to this vulnerability of front-line battle tanks and armored vehicles to modern anti-tank weapons.
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