An annexation of Taiwan by the People's Republic of China by 2027 now constitutes the working scenario for all American forces, which must quickly transform to meet the considerable challenge posed by the People's Liberation Army.
In March 2021, the Commander-in-Chief of US Pacific Forces, Admiral Phil Davidson, stunned his audience by announcing that, in his view, Chinese authorities were to be expected to initiate military operations to annex the island of Taiwan by 2027 .
According to the American officer, there was in fact a blatant dichotomy between the trajectory presented by Beijing according to which China was to become a world military power by 2050, and the reality of the effort observed, which suggested a crossover curves between the United States and China much earlier than that.
Furthermore, taking into consideration the benefits provided by the short distance separating the Chinese coasts from those of Taiwan, and the progress made in terms of naval interdiction by the Chinese armed forces, everything led to believe that Beijing would have a window of operational opportunities even before the end of the decade, that is to say before the effects of the modernization and expansion programs of American forces undertaken from 2017, can effectively weigh on the balance of power .
It seems that this 2027 deadline is now the working hypothesis for the entire US Navy. Indeed, the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Gilday, did not say anything else during his speech at a digital conference organized by the Atlantic Council.
According to him, everything suggests that Beijing is considering military action against Taiwan before 2027, namely the end of President Xi Jinping's new term. To support its predictions, the NOC specified that China had, until now, perfectly respected its ramp-up schedule , and that there was nothing to suggest that things would be different in the years to come.
And to add that this deadline of 2027 represented a high deadline, and that he had to anticipate a possible Chinese offensive against Taiwan today, and over this entire period.
The hypothesis raised by Admiral Gilday is far from meaningless, even if it implies very significant risk-taking on the part of China. Indeed, today, the Chinese armies are far from being effectively able to carry out a vast amphibious operation against Taiwan , and even less a naval blockade strategy, while the Chinese Navy only fields around thirty destroyers. modern, as many frigates, soon three aircraft carriers and around ten large amphibious ships, as well as around forty modern submarines.
In terms of air forces, Beijing can rely on a thousand modern fighters, including around a hundred new generation J-20 fighters, but less than twenty support aircraft (Awacs, in-flight refueling); while its land forces line up around fifty operational brigades, including eight amphibious brigades.
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