Neuron, E-MBT, SMX31…: Can we overcome the impasses of the future LPM for research and equipment for armies?

While the General Staff, the Ministry of the Armed Forces and the Elysée Palace are fine-tuning the final details of the future Military Programming Law which will cover the period 2024-2030, numerous more or less official echoes suggest that despite a very sharply increased budget, making it possible to reach a defense effort of nearly 2,3% of GDP in 2030, numerous research and development programs for defense equipment, as well as equipment for the armies, will have to be spread out or even purely and simply ignored, due to budgetary constraints. Indeed, under the joint action of a dramatic underinvestment in defense during the 20 years preceding the previous LPM 2017-2025, and the very rapid deterioration (from the public and political point of view in any case) of the security situation in recent years and months, budgets will be concentrated to meet the most immediate needs, and the most critical programs.

Due to the organization of its Defense industrial and technological base, or BITD, France depends considerably on its defense exports in order to maintain its own strategic autonomy, the national order, even in sharp increase, is not sufficient to reach the threshold. of activity necessary to maintain and develop all the technological and industrial know-how necessary in this area. By concentrating its budgetary efforts towards these critical programs, many of which have very little export potential such as the new generation aircraft carrier, the 3rd generation nuclear ballistic missile submarines, or even the airborne nuclear missile, and others in very competitive areas, such as in the field of drones, cyber, as well as light armored vehicles and frigates, this LPM can lead to a strengthening of the armies but also to a weakening, to term, of the BITD, due to the lack of highly attractive products and equipment in the catalog, as is the case today, for example, of the CAESAR or the Rafale.

One might think that the solution to such a critical problem lies exclusively with the State, and that it is up to it to release more credits to respond to it. However, this would be to ignore the situation of public finances today, which have been largely tested by the Covid crisis, and the very real effort that it is about to make within the framework of the LPM. Just as one might think that it is up to defense companies to assume the costs of R&D for equipment with high export potential. This would also be ignoring the fact that the export of defense equipment is very often linked to its use in national armies, and that it has a very important political component, whereas the recent initiatives of the BITD in this area have rarely gave rise to strong support from the State for the export of this equipment. Should we then resign ourselves to seeing France's strategic autonomy and industrial defense power disintegrate in the years to come? Not necessarily …

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