Since the start of the crisis which gave rise to the war in Ukraine, the Meta-defense site has been able to anticipate the strategic shifts in this conflict, sometimes several months in advance, and always going against the dominant idea. What are these pivots, and why is it important today?
Once is a coincidence. Twice is a coincidence. Three times is a pattern , This famous maxim of James Bond in Goldfinger, is often used, wrongly, to illustrate the famous rules of Moscow. But what about when, four times, the Meta-defense site was able to anticipate, sometimes several months in advance, the strategic pivots around the war in Ukraine?
Indeed, since the start of this crisis, on numerous occasions, regular readers of the site have been able to read argued articles, often going against the dominant idea of the moment, around this conflict and especially the major shifts to which it has been subject.
April 2021: The Georgian scenario and the Russian Maskirovka
The first critical pivot in this conflict took place not in February 2022, but in April 2021. On this date, the Russian armies undertook to deploy, under the cover of an exercise, nearly 100,000 men and their equipment, to the borders of the Donbass. At that time, a majority of analysts believed that this was, for Moscow, a gesture aimed at influencing negotiations around the price of gas to Europe.
For its part, Meta-defense put forward the hypothesis of a repeat of the 2008 Georgia scenario . Indeed, between 2007 and August 2008, the Russian armies had, on several occasions, deployed significant resources on the borders of Georgia, under the cover of exercises. Let us recall that on this date, Tbilisi, like Kyiv, had openly moved closer to NATO, to the great displeasure of the Kremlin.
Each of these deployments allowed the Russian armies to increase the device and heavy assets deployed along the Georgian border, but also to increase provocations against the armies of Tbilisi protecting the border.
It was in response to news of these provocations, through an effective Maskirovka led by the GRU, that the Georgian president, Mikheil Saakashvili, convinced of American and Western protection in the event of a conflict with Russia, undertook to recapture the town of Tskhinvali, held by Ossetian separatists supported by Russian forces, creating the casus belli expected by the Kremlin to unleash the 55th Army on Georgia.
For Meta-defense, the repeated deployments of Russian armies on the Ukrainian border aimed to reproduce this same strategy. 9 months later, at the end of a new deployment that began in November 2021, and a Maskirovka which this time failed , the Russian armies began their offensive on Ukraine.
November 2021 - February 223, 2022: the Russian offensive and the Ukrainian resistance
At the beginning of November 2021, Moscow therefore undertook a new massive deployment of forces around Ukraine. If the vast majority of European analysts, including within several intelligence services, were slow to see the beginnings of a major offensive against Ukraine , this was not the case for Meta-defense, which predicted the offensive, but also its date, and above all, the Ukrainian resistance, while everyone was convinced that in the event of an attack by Russian forces, the armies of Kyiv could only put up symbolic resistance.
For Meta-defense, the nature of the Russian deployment, its scale and its timetable surrounding the end of year holidays, could only lead to a very probable massive Russian offensive, including beyond the Donbass.
In addition, several articles anticipated that in the event of a Russian offensive against Ukraine, the Russian armies would encounter much more difficulties than otherwise anticipated .
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