GERAN-2, From low-cost missile to lurking ammunition
Article proposed by CERBAIR, the anti-drone fight specialist.
The Shahed 136, the origin of the Russian drone Geran-2, was designed in Iran, and entered service in 2020. This simple machine measures 3,5 m long and 2,5 m wide with a delta wing . It weighs a maximum of 240 kg and carries a military load of 50 kg.
Its composite honeycomb structure is powered by an MD 550, 4-cylinder 50 HP piston engine. Initially designed in Germany, this engine is now produced in China and Iran. A two-blade propeller ensures its propulsion. It reaches a maximum speed of 185 km/h and its autonomy, subject to doubt, would be 2500 km.
However, it demonstrated its ability to fly 1700 km during operation “Honest Promise” on the night of April 13 to 14, 2024. In terms of electronics, the Shahed 136 uses GNSS navigation and an inertial unit. Some sources suggest the presence of an optical sensor or radar receiver for better accuracy, but this remains unverified.
In reality, the Shahed 136, although often presented as a prowling munition, functions more like an economical cruise missile. It is launched only against fixed targets with coordinates programmed in advance.
Its very affordable unit cost is estimated between $10 and $000, depending on the sources and whether we are talking about its construction cost or its selling price. From September 50, the Shahed 000 will be exported to Russia, which will use it massively against Ukraine. It will quickly be produced under license in Russia under the name Geran-2022.
In this section:
The first Russian modifications of the Shahed-136 drone
Russian production quickly distinguished itself from Iranian models. First of all, the exterior structure is now made of fiberglass reinforced with interwoven carbon fiber, replacing the honeycomb structure. This modification is probably intended to facilitate large-scale industrialization. Then, several improvements were made to the electronics.
Notably, the satellite navigation unit has been replaced by a “Kometa-M” model operating with the Glonass constellation. Russian production quickly distinguished itself from Iranian models.
Honeycomb structure of Shahed 136
Then, several improvements were made to the electronics. Notably, the satellite navigation unit has been replaced by a “Kometa-M” model operating with the Glonass constellation. This model, produced in Russia, has antennas more resistant to jamming and is also used on the Forpost-R and Orlan-10 drones. Additionally, the flight controller was modified with the adoption of the B-101, also produced in Russia.
Fiberglass structure reinforced with interwoven carbon fiber on the Geran-2
Overall, the Russian version simplified the design of the original Shahed while improving the mass distribution of the electronic systems, which led to better flight stability. Some of the electronics have been upgraded with sub-assemblies produced in Russia, although some components still come from the West. The warhead has also been modified by Russia, adopting a more effective shrapnel charge against infrastructure.
Subsequently, the Geran-2 was covered with black paint, probably to make it less visible at night. Although significantly improved over the initial version produced in Iran, the Geran-2 remains a low-cost cruise missile. Relatively easy to bring down for ground/air defense, it nonetheless exhausts anti-aircraft defenses and can saturate them with its numbers.
New Geran-2 Improvements
From March 2024, a new version of the Geran-2 was found in Ukraine. The changes made are much more significant than on previous models. First of all, the military load increased from 50 to 90 kg. The repositioning of certain equipment made it possible to free up the space necessary for this larger military load.
This increase in payload is probably accompanied by a substantial decrease in autonomy. Although the extent of this drop is not known, it is likely that the Geran-2 will maintain a range greater than 1000 km. This remains more than enough to strike the entire Ukrainian territory, with no point in Ukraine being more than 600 km from an area controlled by Russian forces. This range also allows shooting at a good distance from the border, thus providing relative safety.
Evolution of the Geran-2 architecture to accommodate the increase in military load
Military charges have been adapted with the development of two specific types for the Geran-2: a thermobaric charge and a high-explosive fragmentation charge.
90 kg military load integrated into the Geran-2
Then, at the navigation level, in addition to the “Kometa-M” system which provides better resistance to GNSS jamming, it was discovered that GSM signal trackers with a SIM card from the “Kyivstar” operator are also used. This allows the Geran-2 to exploit geolocation based on the positions of mobile telephone antennas (GSM).
This geolocation method offers an accuracy of around 200 m in urban areas well provided with relay antennas, but it can be less precise, reaching several kilometers, in rural areas. This capability allows the machine to detect areas of jamming and “spoofing” of GNSS signals.
The information can then be sent back to Russian forces via the encrypted “Telegram” network using the built-in 4G modem. On some Geran-2s, the presence of a commercially available “PTZ” camera was also observed.
It would allow photos of certain areas to be sent directly via the “Telegram” network. It is not certain that this is a standard development, because not all new version Geran-2s seem to be equipped with it. This could only concern a few copies assigned to specific missions.
Installation of a “PTZ” camera under the wing of a Geran-2
In addition to a 4G modem, separate means of communication, of Russian and Chinese production, were also found. Among them, we find in particular the SFGT-HF0505UF and XK-F403E-150 transmission modules of Chinese origin, as well as the NWAVE TRX-8D of Russian origin. Their characteristics are similar:
| SFGT-HF0505UF | XK-F403E-150 | NWAVE TRX-8D | |
| Power | 5W | 2W | Adjustable: 0,01 / 0,1 / 1 / 5 W |
| Frequency | 1,4 GHz | 800 MHz – 1,4 GHz | 2Ghz – 2,5Ghz |
| Instant bandwidth | 1/2/5/10/20/40 Mhz | 3/5/10/20Mhz | 80/40/20/10/5 Mhz |
| Max transmission range | 250 km | 150 km | 240km at 50Mbps |
| encryption | AES 128 or 256 | AES 128 or 256 | |
| Modulation | OFDM and FHSS frequency evasion | OFDM | OFDM and FHSS frequency evasion |
| Weight | 800 g | 470 g | 300 g |
There are also video encoders allowing the camera feed to be transmitted in real time. The set is compatible with the “Set-1 Sector” control station of the “Supercam” drone. In practice, this makes it possible to maintain the data link up to 100 km from the control station, a distance which can be doubled by the use of an aerial relay drone.
Operational consequences
From a “poor man’s” cruise missile, the Geran-2 has been transformed into a lurking munition and an intelligence platform. The developments of the Geran-2 allow the Russians to map GNSS jamming and spoofing zones without fundamentally affecting the system, thanks to navigation by GSM positioning. By following their trajectory in near real time, Russian forces can also dynamically modify their route to avoid ground/air defense zones and adopt complex trajectories.
Complex trajectory of a Geran-2
4G connectivity also allows the Geran-2s to receive images from specific points, even deep inside Ukrainian territory, and thus feed their intelligence chain.
Thus, even downed Geran-2s provide valuable information on the presence of ground/air systems. The direct radio link allows them to be used as prowling munitions over a strip of territory 100 to 200 km deep, thus offering a tactical level allowing targeting objectives of opportunity.
Future developments
Artist's impression of a Geran-2 towing a decoy
The Russian press also mentions a study in progress: the possibility, for the Geran-2, of carrying a towed decoy made of a Lüneberg lens, making it possible to increase the radar signature. By attracting the missiles to the decoy, it would reduce the effectiveness of Ukraine's anti-aircraft defense. These Geran-2s would be used at higher flight altitudes to force defenders to use more efficient anti-aircraft systems, and therefore more expensive missiles.
The underlying idea is to cause a more rapid depletion of missile stocks for ground/air defenses by reducing the probability of hitting the Geran-2s thanks to this towed decoy.
The war in Ukraine marks an evolution. After SEAD (Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses) and DEAD (Destruction of Enemy Air Defenses), which showed their limits in the face of dense and numerous defenses, we are perhaps witnessing the emergence of ADD (Air Defense depletion).
The Russian Geran-2 no longer has much in common with its parent the Shahed-136, retaining little more than the engine and aerodynamic configuration. For the rest, Russian engineers have transformed it into a versatile platform capable of serving as both a “low cost” cruise missile, a lurking munition and a target to exhaust ground/air defense.
Although the platform has become more complex, the production process adopted by Russia should help limit the increase in costs. By adopting an industrial production model with mass manufacturing, it is planned to build 8 of these machines in 000.
The unit cost should remain in the range of 20 to 30 thousand dollars maximum. It is even possible that this cost will decrease with an increase in production. If the automobile industry is capable of producing hundreds of thousands of the same vehicle each year, we can envisage the same thing for the Geran-000.
In addition, it is not certain that all Geran-2s are equipped with all the equipment. Some likely remain simple, inexpensive cruise missiles, sufficient for deep strike and saturation missions. The Geran-2 has become, in its own right, a range of vectors which, although simple in design, makes it possible to cover a set of complementary needs.
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