The two major Franco-German defence cooperation programmes, SCAF for the design of a new generation combat aircraft and its air combat system, and MGCS, which has the same objectives, for combat tanks and heavy tracked armoured vehicles, have always met with a more than mixed reception in defence circles on both sides of the Rhine.
It is above all political determination, in particular that of the two supervising ministers, the Frenchman Sébastien Lecornu, and the German Boris Pistorius, who managed to relaunch these initiatives, deeply mired in industrial opposition, and even in specifications, until recently. However, neither one nor the other has gotten rid of the concerns and reluctance surrounding them, since their launch, in 2015 for MGCS, and 2017 for SCAF.
While the two programs have seen their international base expand, to Spain and Belgium for SCAF, Italy possibly for MGCS, there remain many questions and concerns as to their chances of reaching completion, and of justifying the technological, budgetary, but also programmatic investments, for the armies of the two countries.
So what are the threats that, objectively, are, or will be, capable of derailing SCAF and MGCS? And can they be quantified, to determine the chances that these programs have of going to completion?
In this section:
A specific and identical architecture for the two Franco-German programs SCAF and MGCS
Apart from their Franco-German origin, the SCAF and MGCS programmes share a global architecture, making them both very close in their articulation and closely linked in their management and application.
Thus, both were designed as peacetime programs, while the hypothesis of a possible confrontation, especially with a major and symmetrical adversary, such as Russia, was simply not envisaged in the short or medium term.
Since then, they have been articulated like many key post-Cold War programs, with very high technological ambitions, and a particularly spread out schedule, bringing entry into service to 2040, or beyond.
To achieve this, both are designed in four phases: a preliminary study phase to define the operational and technological specifications, a phase to design the technological demonstrators, a prototyping phase, and a production phase. After seven years, both are still in Phase 1, with the SCAF being slightly more advanced in Phase 1B, from preliminary study to the design of the demonstrators.
The two programs have also seen their industrial scope expand over the years, with the arrival of Spain, then Belgium, in SCAF, and the announced arrival of Italy in MGCS.
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reading the latest articles about the F5 and the new engines from Safran and others, we can think that the SCAF is already buried, on the French side. in any case the Germans did not want an on-board version which is mandatory for our aircraft carriers. the F5 will be very good for us and as I have already pointed out, stealth becomes secondary when we assume that it is the drones that come in first.
The probability of the realization of these two projects is indeed low. But one can have the feeling that our two countries are in the same bed where each one pulls the blanket to itself, even if Germany seems to pull harder. When the Americans speak of the old Europe, it is not only in reference to history but also the outdated side of the European Union which if the size has grown the strategy has hardly changed. Without going to a federation, it becomes more and more important to have a common awareness where we will talk about European interests before national interests or even instead, and there is still a lot of work to do, too bad because the second world economy that Europe represents is in fact today only a paper tiger.
In short, it is more than likely that there will be neither SCAF nor MGCS.
For SCAF, it is not a problem: it is enough to trust Dassault and provide it with the necessary funds which will be used well.
The real problem, if we believe in the future of heavy armored vehicles, is the successor to the Leclerc.
The topic has already been covered here
I would be curious to know the latest state of Marc Chassillan's thoughts on the subject.
In a previous article, you yourself suggested cooperation with India or the Emirates, satisfied users of Leclerc in Yemen…
Marc is more or less on the same line, namely that we should reinvest in the heavy segment, in intermediate generation, and that we can, for this, turn to other partners, like the UAE.
What is surprising when reading this excellent article is that there is no mention of the other Franco-German programs that failed over the previous decade because of the German governments or parliament, not to mention the abandoned modernization programs, leaving France and Spain high and dry.
We can also recall the programs called Euro-something, Trojan horses of Israeli or American industries in Europe, led by... Germany.
And while we're at it, let's not forget the anti-missile programs of which Germany has proclaimed itself leader, doing everything to prevent France and Italy from participating despite their joint successes. Aster
Certainly we are talking about the Machiavellian domain of international politics and we owe consideration and respect to the leaders designated by universal suffrage, but when will French leaders understand that not only do the Germans want no cooperation with France but that they also only want to absorb and seize French skills?
Many people who are totally opposed to cooperation with the FRG have absolutely no ideological proximity, it seems, to the nationalist parties but are concerned about the national interest and the future of the French BITD.
That's right, but so are Franco-British programs, for example, and to a lesser extent Franco-Italian programs. Also, I have no idea how to model/serialize this parameter to make it an objective threat criterion.
Finally, is it really necessary, when we are already flirting with a probable failure rate of almost 80%?
The information about the F5 and the Emirates comes from Michel Cabirol (La Tribune) who is generally very well informed. I have already had the opportunity to clarify my skepticism about the future of Franco-German military projects which seem to me doomed to failure given the conflicting interests of the defense industries and the Germans' addiction to Coca-Cola.😊
I hadn't seen it pass by. Yes, I know Michel well, and he only writes when he is sure of himself. So the information is valid. WELL SO MUCH THE BETTER!!!
Hello and thank you for this new insight.
The likelihood of these two programs seeing the light of day seems even lower to me after reading you.
For SCAF, would the alternative not be found on the side of the United Arab Emirates and India?
I read elsewhere that the Emirates could be associated with the F5 standard with its drone. I don't know if the information is good, if it can come to fruition, but why not continue with these two countries for the successor of the Rafale ?
No one knows who will be in power in 5 years, let alone in 10 years, but the Germans in this matter do not seem to me to be more reliable than the Indians or the Emiratis, and their needs are further removed from those of the Indians: it would be surprising if the Germans acquired an aircraft carrier, the Indians already have two, perhaps three in a few years and they will, like us, need navalized aircraft.
At present, there is no indication that another country may participate in the Rafale F5 and its Loyal Wingmen drone. The hypothesis would not be absurd, however, because it would guarantee new exports for both aircraft. Thus, the 80 Rafale ordered by Abu Dhabi were to the F4 standard. If they were to participate, eventually, in the program, this would tend to confirm an additional order to come, and not a small one. We cannot exclude anything, today, on this subject. But nothing confirms it either.