The growth of the Chinese military fleet over the past ten years is sometimes rightly compared to the American naval industrial effort during the Second World War. Indeed, Chinese shipyards produce each year one or two large aero-amphibious ships, aircraft carriers or helicopter carriers, about ten cruisers, destroyers and frigates, three to four submarines, including at least one nuclear-powered, and about twenty secondary or support ships.
For Beijing, this is about quickly equipping itself with a fleet capable of containing the all-powerful US Navy, potentially supported by some of its allies, particularly in the China Sea. Above all, Beijing wants, without the slightest doubt, to have a fleet capable of leading, at the request of the authorities, a naval blockade of the island of Beijing, from 2027, and is producing the naval units necessary for this.
In the last two years, however, a particular effort has been observed in Chinese production, marking a significant shift in this area. Indeed, where shipyards did not produce a large aeroamphibious ship every year, or every two years, they now have three large ships of this type in the process of being finished or tested: the new 80.000-ton aircraft carrier CV18 Fujian, a fourth heavy LHD of 40.000 tons Type 075, the Jiangxi, and the new Type 076 assault drone carrier of 48.000 tons, whose name remains unknown.
In addition to this significant acceleration of Chinese efforts in the area of force projection, there is the recent observation made concerning the construction of a new assault helicopter carrier type ship, more compact than the Type 075. Even more surprisingly, this one was built, very quickly, by the Guangzhou shipyards, until now specialized in the production of commercial and support ships for the Chinese Navy.
However, by its observable characteristics and its industrial choices, this new helicopter carrier could well become, in the years to come, the spearhead of the Chinese aeroamphibious fleet, to lead an assault operation against Taiwanese ports.
In this section:
Beijing wants to be able to implement a naval blockade of Taiwan as early as 2027 if necessary
Over the past three years, a consensus seems to have emerged among specialists in Chinese naval power: Beijing, and the Chinese Navy, have been actively preparing for a military operation against Taiwan for the past decade, and it could happen. from 2027, in the form of a naval blockade of the island and its ports.
Originally set by Admiral Phil Davidson in 2021, when he commanded the Pacific Command of the American forces, this deadline is now called " Davidson window", and has become, for two years, The obsession of American military planners, to the point that the US Armed Forces have, since that date, favored investments aimed at strengthening their short-term response capabilities to more distant programs.
It must be said that this prediction did not appear in the coffee grounds, or in the observation of Saturn in the house of Aries, but in the comparative analysis of the means at the disposal of the Chinese and American naval and air forces, in this theater, from this deadline.
By having focused the bulk of its industrial effort on the production of surface combat ships, cruisers, destroyers and frigates, on non-oceanic AIP Type 039A submarines, and on long-range heavy combat aircraft, J-20 and J-16, Beijing has, in fact, integrated a military trajectory in which its available means, to conduct a naval blockade of the autonomous island, from 2027, would not only be possible, but probably successful in repelling US military intervention, if applicable.
Furthermore, the hypothesis of a naval blockade has been considerably reinforced by the Chinese military and naval manoeuvres which have become recurrent around Taiwan, notably through Joint Sword exercises, launched each time Beijing considers that Taipei or Washington are encroaching on its prerogatives on the island, considered a secessionist Chinese province by the Chinese authorities.
The Chinese Navy will not have sufficient means for an air-amphibious assault on Taiwan at this time.
On the other hand, the hypothesis of an aeroamphibious assault against Taiwan, once presented as imminent, is now relegated to more distant hypotheses, and unlikely in the short term, including by the Pentagon.
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I was thinking about this: https://jamestown.org/program/ramping-the-strait-quick-and-dirty-solutions-to-boost-amphibious-lift/
via https://warontherocks.com/2022/10/mind-the-gap-part-2-the-cross-strait-potential-of-chinas-civilian-shipping-has-grown/ et https://warontherocks.com/2021/08/mind-the-gap-how-chinas-civilian-shipping-could-enable-a-taiwan-invasion/ (other interesting readings on the dual use of ferries)
The use of ferries and roros to conduct amphibious operations is extremely theoretical, and above all extremely constrained. Of course, ships can drop amphibious armored vehicles in calm seas. To conduct an offensive using an amphibious armored vehicle, you must drop them close to the coast, a few km at best. It worked in 1952; much less today, in a world saturated with guided missiles and drones. Above all, we can be certain that the approaches to beachable areas will all be mined by the Taiwanese, as the Ukrainians did.
If you can get close enough for your roro to drop VBAs, it means that LSTs can beach. And precisely, the observation of the article is that LSTs can no longer beach, and that it is necessary to do otherwise.
Imagine the time it would take for a RORO to drop twenty armoured vehicles, or a company? It would take at least 40 minutes, while standing still. It would be impossible for it to survive that long. Already in the Falklands, the British LSTs, which had not been beached, had a hot meal. Today, it is simply unrealistic.
Finally, it is not enough to launch armoured vehicles into the sea to carry out an amphibious operation. It is necessary to ensure logistical support for the troops landed, evacuate the wounded, bring in ammunition and food, as well as reinforcements. None of these actions can be carried out by a roro at sea.
The most obvious solution for the PLA is to take two or three ports, to create as many axes of progression, with real logistical support following behind, to keep the initiative and not give the adversary time to reorganize, to bury itself, and to freeze the conflict. because if the conflict gets bogged down, it is certain that the PLA will have very, very difficulties.
You have somewhat forgotten in the analysis the possible use by the PLA of large civilian Ro-Ro ferries, some of which weigh 45.000t, which are built with high fire standards and which are designed to be used in the second wave, or even in "1+". They could anticipate the window!
Not at all. To use these ferries, you have to take the ports. and the whole analysis is based on taking the 4 major ports on the western coast of Taiwan.