US Air Force Considers Using B-21 Raider for Air Superiority
For the American armed forces, air superiority, ensured by the US Air Force and the US Navy, is the essential prerequisite for the implementation of its military doctrines and tactics, both to ensure that air support is available when required, and to eliminate threats and support points of opposing forces.
Until recently, the Pentagon had no doubts about its ability to ensure this air superiority, which is a multiplier of forces, regardless of the theater or the adversary, having numerical superiority, with almost 3500 modern combat aircraft, and technological superiority, with almost a thousand 5th generation F-22 and F-35 fighters.
These certainties have been largely undermined in recent years. First in Ukraine, by the effectiveness of air defenses, and then by China, with the PLA very quickly closing the numerical and technological gap that separates it from the American air forces.
The NGAD program has paid the price of this awareness, its projected price being considered too high to effectively respond to the digital challenge of the Chinese air forces. However, the reboot of this program risks undermining the potential of the US Air Force to ensure air superiority, particularly in the Taiwanese theater, for which the F-22 and the F-35 are handicapped by too little autonomy.
It is in this context that a new idea has just emerged within the US Air Force to fill this specific operational weakness. It would involve using the brand new Northrop Grumman B-21 Raider strategic bomber to ensure long-range air superiority missions.
In this section:
Lessons from the air war in Ukraine require a new vision of the air superiority mission
Although the rise in power of the Chinese air force has been anticipated for several years by the Pentagon, the lessons of the air war in Ukraine have upset many certainties in this area.
Indeed, since the beginning of the conflict, both Ukrainian and Russian air defenses have proven to be so effective that it is impossible for the air forces of both belligerents to seize air superiority, to deploy close air support, or to strike the enemy in depth.
To do this, both Moscow and Kyiv are now forced to use long-range munitions, cruise or airborne ballistic missiles for deep strikes, and gliding bombs for strikes on the line of engagement. These two munitions allow, in fact, the carrier aircraft to launch them before entering the interception bubble of the enemy's ground-to-air defense.
In addition, the use of these long-range munitions prevents enemy fighters from intercepting carrier aircraft before they launch their munitions, which considerably increases the vulnerability of Ukrainian troops, who for several months have been very exposed to the Russian air force and their 1000 combat aircraft, now that they are massively equipped with this type of munitions.
Taken together, these two main lessons concerning the air war in Ukraine have something to worry the Pentagon about. Indeed, China has a multi-layered air defense, at least as dense and effective as that implemented by the Russian armies.
There is no doubt, moreover, that the Chinese air force has also adapted its doctrines and industrial efforts to integrate these same lessons, particularly with regard to the implementation and stocks of stand-off munitions.
With NGAD program more uncertain than ever, US Air Force without solution over Taiwan
To meet this specific need, the US Air Force was betting, until recently, on the technological superiority that its NGAD program would guarantee, which is supposed to replace the F-22 by 2030.
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The attribution of the role that the B21 could play in Rafale seems rather utopian to me since the range of the device is limited in smooth configuration (the most stealthy).
It would require a change to a larger cell with better internal load and therefore a new study for a new device.
But… Isn’t that what Dassault did with the SCAF program aircraft?
What is sticking is the estimated delivery date of the first devices: 2040 at best...
In terms of combat capabilities the Rafale F5 will indeed have some welcome feature extensions, but not to the extent discussed in the article unfortunately.
The article does not say that the F5 will be the equivalent of a B-21. It says that, depending on the classification and criteria that define the 6th generation, it could qualify.
Afterwards, we must keep in mind that the extension is especially a key capacity in the Pacific. In Europe, we do not need to fly four hours to reach the engagement zone. So the need is different. A Rafale F5 supported by its combat drone(s), leaving from Saint-Dizier, can easily join a line of engagement in Poland, in the Baltic States, or in Romania if necessary. In addition, there would be a question of adding tanks compliant with the device.
That said, indeed, a deep retrofit of the cell of the Rafale, could have a lot of interests to increase its autonomy, stealth and carrying capacity. but that is the Super hypothesis Rafale, already mentioned several times on this site.
I think it's a bit daring to base the multi-layer defense on the Ukraine retex. The S300s are being picked off by drones and planes from the 70s (we even saw the 400 explode). I don't see a world where they survive Western planes.
A long-range strategic fighter-bomber that pilots drones: to what extent is homothety of the Rafale wouldn't it do?
After all, Dassault was able to do it in 3 years between the Mirage III and IV… And with a study of the Mirage IV on board, in addition.
Good evening, it would be wiser for Dassault and the French state to put all the funding into the development of the F5 than to chase two hares at once. Let's leave the Germans with the SCAF, since they are already eyeing the English for their drone, which they are supposed to develop on their side in the SCAF. Do they have design problems?