What would be the consequences if China and North Korea were to benefit from transfers of Russian submarine technology? As we know, the Pacific theater is currently the Pentagon's obsession, and the US Navy is here on the front line to contain the rise in power of the Chinese, but also North Korean and Russian armies, which cooperate throughout the Western Pacific.
If naval air power represents the US Navy's preferred tool for asserting itself on the high seas in the Pacific, for approaching the coasts, it can only count, as a first resort, on the technological and numerical superiority of its submarine fleet, which aligns almost fifty SSNs against a dozen Chinese and Russian ships of the same type.
In this area, the US Navy can rely on significant technological assets, particularly against China, whose Type 09III SSNs still lack performance and reliability, to oppose its Los Angeles, and especially its Seawolves and Virginias.
This advantage could, however, quickly deteriorate if Beijing and Pyongyang were to receive transfers of submarine technology from Russia, the latest Russian nuclear submarines, such as the Iassen, being considered very powerful and dangerous by American analysts. This is exactly what Admiral Sam Paparo, who commands US INDOPACOM, the unified Indo-Pacific command of the American armed forces, fears and anticipates.
In this section:
US Navy Bets on Submarine Superiority in Pacific
To counter the US Navy, the Chinese People's Liberation Army's naval and air forces developed doctrine and equipment designed to keep large American carrier battle groups at bay.
Thus, the PLA now has several batteries of DF-26 intermediate-range ballistic missiles with anti-ship capability, with a range of 4500 km, designed specifically to strike large American naval and amphibious ships, supported by a fleet of H-6J long-range bombers armed with anti-ship cruise and ballistic missiles, with a range of up to 6000 km.
These two vectors also rely on significant advanced detection means, whether satellite, aerial or naval, designed to locate American fleets and, if necessary, to coordinate strikes.
In other words, it will be difficult for the American surface fleet to approach within 2000 nautical miles of the Chinese coast, or at a distance sufficient to come to the aid of Taiwan, or even Japan and South Korea, without being subjected to a barrage of Chinese missiles. At least, at the beginning of the conflict, as long as these first-strike means have not been neutralized.
To achieve this, the US Navy has another asset, and it is a significant one. Indeed, it currently has around fifty nuclear attack submarines of the Los Angeles, Seawolf and Virginia classes.
Both very fast, very discreet and with significant firepower, both anti-submarine and anti-ship and land strike, these ships are technologically very superior to Chinese models, such as the SSN Type 09III/A/B, which are also few in number in the Chinese Navy, which only has seven of these ships today.
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I still don't understand how a DF26 at mach 20 can sink a moving target... I've looked everywhere but I can't see... without nuclear power, obviously.
This has long been a question mark, because it was thought that the thermal protection cone and the plasma prevented the homing of a missile. Now, we know that the plasma does not deploy in front of, but around the missile, and that certain materials with high thermal resistance let certain radar frequencies pass. It could also be possible to do a kind of guidance by rear satellite reframing. In short, what was thought impossible 5 years ago is now possible.
but how does the mach 20 missile resist a change of direction?
the physical constraints are colossal
the missile does not go at mach 20 for the entire duration of the flight. The aerodynamic forces are indeed enormous, but on the other hand, at these speeds, a very small variation is enough to cause significant corrections. Another solution, like the Aster, is to use force control, which is independent of the aerodynamic forces.
Sam Paparo could indeed be seen as a resemblance to the captain of the USS Nathan James.