France to develop anti-radiation munition for Rafale from 2025, finally!

Following the withdrawal of the last Jaguars equipped with the AS37 Martel anti-radiation munition at the end of the 90s, the French air force no longer had any munitions dedicated to destroying enemy radars.

This need has been repeatedly highlighted by specialists on the subject and by the French air force itself, even if the latter have been able to rely on alternative solutions, such as guided bombs or cruise missiles, occasionally. However, the development of this type of munition, designed to eliminate air defense radars, has never been integrated into French military planning, which for a long time was almost exclusively conditioned by asymmetric engagements, for which the need did not exist.

The war in Ukraine, and the mutual and almost total neutralization of the air forces by Russian and Ukrainian air defenses, has sounded like a cruel reminder to the Ministry of the Armed Forces: If the air forces want to be able to support their land and naval forces, they must now have the necessary anti-radar munitions.

It is precisely the development of this ammunition, called AASF, which has just been announced by the same Ministry of the Armed Forces which judged this need unnecessary, just three years ago, to arm the future Rafale F5, and its Loyal Wingmen combat drone.

Anti-radiation ammunition for the Rafale : a long-identified need

Unlike a conventional precision air-to-ground munition, which sends back a laser beam, which hits precise coordinates using satellite guidance, or, in rarer cases, which has a radar or infrared homing device, an anti-radiation munition is designed to send back the electromagnetic beam of a radar, to destroy it.

In the West, the American AGM-88 HARM missile is most often used for this mission. With a range of 150 km, it can be launched by the carrier aircraft to track a radar beam and destroy it using a guided explosive charge of almost 70 kg. The HARM currently equips eight NATO air forces, including Germany, Italy, Spain and Poland.

The British ALARM missile, designed by MBDA, is a lighter alternative to the HARM, in service only in the United Kingdom and Saudi Arabia. France, for its part, used the AS37 Martel missile for this mission, until the end of the 90s. Far from equaling the much more modern HARM and ALARM, it was however capable of going back a radar beam over a hundred kilometers, to eliminate, mainly, the imposing Soviet surveillance radars.

The withdrawal of the Jaguar led to the withdrawal of the AS37, and with them, anti-radar competence for the French air force. At that time, France believed that the Rafale, its SPECTRA self-protection system, and its laser-guided and then GPS-guided precision munitions, will be sufficient to neutralize the few threats of this type that could emerge, while the country was firmly anchored in the period of the benefits of peace, and the reduction in defense credits that it entailed.

In 2021, Meta-defense published an article on this subject calling for the design of a Rafale dedicated to missions of suppression of enemy air defenses, or SEAD, as well as dedicated anti-radiation munition, based on the rapid evolution of air defense and access denial means, especially in Russia and China.

The article was relevant enough to convince the Seine-Saint-Denis UDI MP JC Lagarde to question the Minister of the Armed Forces, Florence Parly, on this subject. The ministry's response came a few months later, in January 2022.. As expected, it ruled out any such option, arguing that the company's SPECTRA self-protection system Rafale, French precision munitions, and inter-allied cooperation were largely sufficient to control this threat.

The war in Ukraine has shown the indispensability of SEAD missions to maintain sufficient freedom of maneuver.

It would be hard to have been more out of time for the Ministry of the Armed Forces on this subject. Indeed, less than two months later, the Russian military special operation against Ukraine began, which would have the effect of an electroshock within the Western air forces and their supervisory ministries.

Indeed, not only did high-intensity, even very high-intensity warfare reappear in Europe, but Ukrainian air defenses proved so effective for almost two years that they neutralized a major part of the means of action of the all-powerful Russian air force and its thousand combat aircraft.

If, for the Russian and Ukrainian armies, which had very significant land firepower, the absence of air support did not represent an operational catastrophe, this was not the case for the Western forces, much more lightly equipped (at the time), in terms of field artillery and multiple rocket launchers, to provide the essential fire support to the land forces in contact, and to strike the depth of the adversary.

Certainly, Western air forces, and French in particular, had long-range precision munitions, known as "Stand-off", but these were both expensive and time-consuming to produce, and were only available in small quantities, insufficient to support a conflict such as in Ukraine.

It is hardly surprising, therefore, that the subject of anti-radiation munitions is back in the news in France, while Paris and the Ministry of the Armed Forces have engaged in a real effort to strengthen the resources of the French armed forces, in the event of a high-intensity conflict, including against Russia, and its extraordinarily dense multi-layered air defense.

Anti-radiation munition developed from 2025 for the French air force

Indeed, the documents accompanying the 2024 finance bill for the armed forces mention an envelope of €41 million, intended for preliminary studies within the framework of the AASF program, for Future Air Surface Armament, an air-to-ground munition intended, according to its description, for the suppression of short and medium range ground-to-air defenses. In other words, an anti-radiation munition.

For the time being, the program is only in its infancy, with no budget, no definitive schedule, and obviously no prime contractor. Two French companies can produce a munition of this type: the MBDA missile company, on the one hand, which can, in particular, rely on its perfect mastery of the kinematics of airborne missiles and their control, and Thales, for its unrivaled skills in radar.

It is likely that, in the long term, the two manufacturers will be called upon to cooperate in this area, to produce the expected system as quickly as possible. Because, in fact, time is running out. Thus, for a growing number of European intelligence services, the risks that Russia has sufficient means to begin a military operation against certain European countries are once again high, with a deadline estimated at 2027 to 2030, depending on the sources and the assumptions used.

However, for the French air force, the largest in Europe, numerically speaking, it is essential to be able to quickly have the necessary resources to carry out SEAD missions, in order to ensure a certain freedom of maneuver, in support of the forces engaged on land, if necessary.

Let us recall, on this subject, that two years ago, a report from the British General Staff estimated that the air forces carried 75% of the firepower within NATO. Russia having accumulated a great deal of experience in Ukraine, to correct the weaknesses that were its own, in terms of organization and implementation of its powerful air defense, the elimination of the radars, which direct this DCA, proves to be a priority to any action of support to the forces engaged on the ground.

An essential ammunition for Rafale F5 and its Loyal Wingmen combat drone

Although it is not specifically mentioned in the annexes to the PLF, it is very likely that this new anti-radiation munition is, above all, intended to arm the new combat drone that will accompany the future Rafale F5, from 2033.

Indeed, an anti-radar missile is a passive weapon, meaning that it does not emit any electromagnetic radiation. In doing so, it is perfectly suited to arming a stealth combat drone, specially designed to infiltrate the enemy radar mesh, precisely to map it, or even destroy it, without ever revealing its position.

Furthermore, unlike GPS/inertial guided weapons, such as the SCALP-ER or the A2SM Hammer, which require precise location of the target before firing, an anti-radiation munition can be launched with very little notice, as soon as a radar beam is detected, making it a very effective retaliatory weapon, for engagements at an increasingly sustained tempo.

However, if the future AASF will, indisputably, be the essential effector for the SEAD missions of the French combat drone, it will most certainly be able to arm other devices, including Rafale F5, and future developments of the parallel branch of the Rafale F4.1.

Indeed, carrying a missile of this type constitutes a very effective life insurance to force an enemy firing radar to stop its pursuit of its target by turning off its emission, in an attempt to make the anti-radar munition fired against it lose its location. In doing so, the radar can no longer transmit information to the firing systems, giving the aircraft time to move away from the dangerous area.

Thus, for more than a year now, the Su-30, 34 and 35s, sent close to the Ukrainian lines, almost systematically carry an anti-radiation missile like the KH-31MP, for self-defense purposes, and not for a SEAD mission.

A Jamming Pod Still Essential, But Still Ignored

Naturally, one can only be satisfied with the indirect announcement of the development of AASF anti-radiation munitions, within the framework of the programme Rafale F5, this obviously meeting a flagrant capacity need for the French air force.

Furthermore, with the export success of the Rafale, in recent years, it is very likely that the export market will be there for this ammunition, as is already the case for the MICA missile, the SCALP-ER and the Hammer propelled bomb, so as to expand the range of ammunition for the French fighter.

However, the observations published in the article of June 15, 2021, on Meta-defense, remain valid, and have even been considerably reinforced by the rich lessons of the war in Ukraine. However, these relied on three complementary capabilities, to effectively conduct SEAD operations and to challenge the air defenses of a powerful adversary, such as Russia.

In addition to the anti-radiation missile, the overall capability relied on an accurate and up-to-date database of the electronic assets deployed by the adversary, as well as the design of a powerful electronic warfare pod, to extend anti-radar protection beyond the carrier aircraft alone.

The mapping of the adversary's electronic means is the responsibility of the Archange program, of the French Air and Space Force, three Dassault Falcon 8x aircraft, loaded with electronic sensors, intended to replace the C-160G Gabriel, in this mission. The first Archange is due to enter service in 2025, and will bring new very useful and essential capabilities in this area to the French air force, as well as to the French BITD manufacturers.

On the other hand, the design of a jamming pod is not mentioned so far. An electronic warfare (and cyber) pod carries different jammers intended to alter the signals of enemy radars, so as to render them inoperable.

Unlike the SPECTRA system, whose function is to ensure the self-defense of the Rafale itself, a jamming pod is likely to provide a much more extensive electronic defense, likely to encompass other devices that would not be protected by the very effective SPECTRA.

This is particularly the case for the Mirage 2000D of the Air and Space Force, which will remain in service until 2035, even if the electronic defense capabilities of these aircraft have been improved as part of the ongoing MLU modernization. This is also the case for other very vulnerable aircraft, such as non-stealth drones, but also support aircraft and helicopters.

France's allies, as well as customers of its defense aeronautics industry, also operate fleets composed of non-stealth aircraft, and not equipped with a powerful self-protection system, as is the case with the Rafale.

In this context, and notwithstanding the problem of electricity production, mentioned in the 2021 article, an electronic warfare pod would very effectively complete the operational range of the Rafale, particularly to respond to the reality of threats observed today.

In this respect, an international partnership, within the framework of the Club Rafale, as negotiated with the UAE for the F5 and the combat drone, could be the perfect support for such a development, in order to reduce costs, while expanding the potential future market, to increase budgetary sustainability.

Conclusion

The announcement of the start of study work for the development of AASF anti-radiation ammunition, within the framework of the program Rafale F5 and its combat drone will certainly fill the last capability requirement that the French fighter was lacking.

In addition to the needs of the French air force, the missile will undoubtedly quickly meet with significant international success, based on the 300+ Rafale exported or ordered for export to date.

And while it is regrettable that this development is not accompanied by that of a jamming pod, it nevertheless constitutes an excellent capacity step to perfect the operational range of the Rafale, and the air forces that implement it, or will implement it.

The fact remains that the announcement of this development by the Ministry of the Armed Forces, less than three years after it rejected the hypothesis without consideration, because it came from an opposition MP, raises questions about the way in which military planning is conceived, and especially about the way in which it is applied, with an obvious political dogmatism, outclassing operational pragmatism.

This blatant failure should call on the Ministry of the Armed Forces to be more open in this area, and certainly to give its operational staff greater freedom of speech, including in the face of the national presentation, in a public setting, especially with regard to capability issues, for which they are clearly best placed to respond, and to explain what their needs are.

This would in no way undermine the scope of political and budgetary arbitration, of the responsibility for execution, in this area, but it would certainly tend to present a less distorted discourse, by the obligation of solidarity imposed on the military, when it comes to commenting on the defense policy concerning them.

Article from October 24 in full version until December 6, 2024

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