Beyond the resentment it generated in France, after the cancellation of the SEA 1000 contract, the SSN AUKUS program, at the heart of the first pillar of the AUKUS alliance which brings together Australia, Great Britain and the United States, has been the subject of many questions, particularly in Australia and the United States, since its launch.
This is particularly the case within the US Congress, where several influential members of the Senate and House Defense Committees have expressed doubts about the sustainability or effectiveness of this program, particularly in the current period of tension.
It is in this context that the Congressional Research Service, one of the two independent audit and validation bodies of the American Congress, has just published a report that is, to say the least, critical of this SSN-AUKUS program, its terms, and the way in which it was negotiated, announced and then validated.
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The SSN AUKUS program is increasingly being questioned, due to its costs and planning.
Since its initial announcement in 2021 by Joe Biden, Boris Johnson and Scott Morrison, the SSN AUKUS program, which is to equip the Royal Australian Navy with eight nuclear attack submarines, or SSNs, has raised many questions from American parliamentarians.
Thus, in 2023, two reports from independent bodies linked to Congress, had asked several questions, which remained unanswered, on the SSN AUKUS program, its sustainability and its Genesis. The first, produced by the Congress Budget Office, or CBO, concerned the sustainability of the US Navy's industrial plan for the coming years, and in particular the costs, and additional costs, generated by the production of the 3 to 5 additional Virginia-class SSNs to replace as many ships sold to Australia.
The second report, this time by the Congressional Research Service, or CRS, questioned the US Navy's commitment to increase SSN production to 2,33 ships per year by 2030, the threshold set by Congress to allow for the sale of the US Virginia SSNs to Australia from 2032 to 2036.
Despite these challenges from independent bodies of Congress, the SSN AUKUS program has continued on the same trajectory as initially announced, with the executives of the three countries concerned having once again committed to giving it substance, according to the promised timetable.
Congressional Research Service Releases Vicious Report on AUKUS SSN Program
A year later, it is once again the CRS which is going on the offensive in this matter, with the publication of a new update of its summary document on the production of Virginia class SSNs, on the first pillar of the AUKUS alliance, and on the SSN AUKUS program.
This American analysis file confirms all the criticisms established by Fabrice Wolff for years.
We can congratulate Fabrice, but I would especially like to congratulate American pragmatism. There are few countries where people dare to draw the real lessons from a hasty decision.
Now, between that and the NGAD, the American major equipment programs all become illegible at the crucial moment when it would be necessary to restart the production lines. It could become dramatic…
This is clearly not their priority for the next 2/3 years. The US military is currently focusing on improving equipment availability, training forces, hardening infrastructure, and modernizing the defense industry. We see in the priorities of the FY2025 budget that they are taking the risk for 2027/2028 very seriously.
That said, it is true that the United States, and especially Congress, enjoys a freedom of investigation and publication on defense issues that one might envy.
Reply to Fabrice. The British would still have to resolve the problems that put their SMs at the dock before developing a construction program with the Australians who will not help them in any way due to their lack of experience in this area. Bojo is in no way a guarantee for a winning operation. Kind regards.
Worse still, in the hypothesis mentioned, one could doubt the support of the United States for the British Poseidons. It would therefore be necessary, quickly, to transfer the British SSBNs to M51.
Frankly, at this level, I would not be surprised to learn in a few years that all this is the result of a plan of influence smoothly carried out by the Chinese. This would have allowed them to weaken the USA and Australia in a significant and effective way both from an operational, industrial, and diplomatic point of view for the resentment created with France.
Of course I have nothing to back this up, it's just a personal guess.
Perhaps in the future this affair will be remembered as the explanation for an American defeat a few years later in Taiwan (wrongly, since history is not monocausal, but we like to have precise reference dates)
I agree that we need to go "beyond resentment" and think coldly and pragmatically, without "bias", about the reality of a given geopolitical situation.
But it would be a mistake to see resentment as nothing more than a sulking or an exacerbated expression of hurt national pride.
I would like to recommend reading the work of historian Marc Ferro, entitled "Resentment in History" which shows to what extent resentment, particularly between France and Germany, or France and the United Kingdom, or France and Algeria, is a major explanatory factor of historical events over a long period of time.
The "Australian affair" is not a commercial or contractual difficulty but rather a reflection of the vision that the Anglo-Saxons have of France and the behavior that should be adopted towards it, again over the long term.
The US, UK and Australia have shown what members of the Five Club can do to (against) a "friend" and an "ally"
No point in counting on them in case of conflict.
Only the "specificity" of the executive in office at the time led to attenuating, ignoring, euphemizing the seriousness of the acts committed against France.
It is quite obvious that Naval Group will not waste rare and costly human resources in a pseudo-negotiation in Canada whose results have already been decided in Washington.
Let us not add ridicule to the lack of dignity: a few positions within NATO do not justify selling off the soul of a thousand-year-old nation.
It seems agreed that British SSNs should be built in Australia. Naval Group had "dared" to express doubts about the ability to have a network of Australian subcontractors capable of collaborating in the construction of the Attack class, which had created controversy. This controversy, plus the one that seems to be brewing over the construction of Hunter frigates in Australia, plus the one that also seems to be brewing over their new Arafura patrol boat, built in Australia.... Do the Australians really still have skills in the construction of warships? Wouldn't the construction of SSNs in Australia, even of purely British design, be a somewhat exaggerated project?
They have no skills and no naval arsenal available. They are starting from scratch and that is why the Barracuda was so expensive to manufacture at home.
I hesitated for a long time, but it seems to me that in this story, there will only be KAUKUS😉
For now, the British have nothing to lose. They are getting Australian and US subsidies to develop their SSN NG, they know they are going to sell at least 3 SSN AUKUS to Australia, and it costs them nothing at all... Remember that this project was imagined by Boris Johnson.
I suggest that Boris Johnson rolls up his sleeves and starts building his famous Aukus submarines immediately. I just hope we don't go back to Australia after the dirty trick they pulled on Naval Group.