CAESAR is the most effective mobile artillery system in Ukraine

Since its arrival in Ukraine in the summer of 2022, the CAESAR mobile artillery system from the French KNDS has established itself as one of the most effective systems in this theater of operations.

Significantly outperforming the systems inherited from the Soviet era in terms of mobility, precision and range, it has become, in a few months, The nightmare of Russian gunners, in their own words.

Since then, many other Western self-propelled systems, from the German Pzh2000 to the American M109, have been delivered to Ukraine. However, recent statistics, emanating from internal documents of the Ukrainian army, show that the CAESAR outperforms, in many aspects, these other systems, to the point of highlighting certain conceptual weaknesses which, today, tend to change the expressions of needs of the armies in this area.

Automation and armoring, at the heart of the expressions of need concerning mobile artillery systems, until now

Indeed, before the war in Ukraine, certain criteria appeared almost systematically in the needs expressed by the armed forces, concerning the acquisition of new mobile artillery systems.

Automation of the firing chain, and in particular automatic shell and charge loading systems, represented the bulk of the requests, in order to guarantee high rates of fire, with a reduced crew. In addition, models offering an armoured turret, to protect the crews, were favoured in calls for tenders, and competition criteria.

Obviously, these two criteria require heavy systems, with tracked platforms, or 8×8 or even 10×10 carriers, often to the detriment of mobility.

In this context, the French CAESAR, a system of barely 17 tons in combat mass, mounted on a 6x6 truck, equipped with a semi-automatic loading system and lacking a protected turret, was perceived, most of the time, as an anomaly, having sacrificed everything to air transportability, and especially intended for theaters of lesser intensity.

Lessons from Ukraine on the effectiveness of Western mobile artillery systems

In the field of artillery, the war in Ukraine has profoundly shaken many certainties, often inherited from Cold War doctrines. And the French CAESAR, the first Western-designed system to join the Ukrainian armies in the summer of 2022, and the combat performance that this atypical system has demonstrated since then, has a lot to do with it.

52-caliber tube is essential for the survivability of mobile artillery systems

First, this war demonstrated the significant added value of artillery systems equipped with a 52-caliber tube over systems equipped with a 39-caliber tube. Although they wear out more quickly, these tubes make it possible to reach targets at 32 km with conventional shells, more than 40 km with gliding shells, and more than 50 km with shells with added propulsion, compared to 22, 25 and 33 km respectively for 39-caliber tubes.

As a reminder, the "calibers" represent the length of the tube expressed as a function of the diameter of its tube. Thus, a tube of 155 mm / 52 calibers, has a length of 8,06 m, against 6,05 for a tube of 155 mm / 39 calibers. The longer the tube, the longer the shell will benefit from the thrust, linked to the compression of the gases during propulsion, and the shock wave which precedes it, and therefore, the higher its initial speed at the exit of the tube, for a range, in fact, increased.

However, it seems that this extra range is rarely used by the Ukrainian armies. Thus, statistics indicate that less than one in five CAESAR shots uses 5 or 5 explosive charges, precisely to achieve the maximum range.

In Iraq, the Tass Force Wagram fired 70% of its shells with 5 or 6 charges, therefore at maximum range. In addition, the average distance from the line of engagement, during firing, is between 10 and 15 km, which explains, in particular, a large part of the losses of CAESAR, hit by Russian loitering munitions.

One may wonder about the low use of the maximum firing range of CAESARs in Ukraine. Several hypotheses can be put forward on this subject, such as the persistence of Soviet doctrines in the organization of artillery fire within the Ukrainian armies. It is also possible that Kyiv favors shots with less stress on the tube, to extend its lifespan.

However, it is more likely that this is a constraint linked to the great diversity of shells accepted by the CAESAR, leading it to be described by the Ukrainians as an "omnivorous artillery system", while certain shells, such as the American shells designed for the 109-caliber M39, may impose limitations, concerning the power of the explosive charge in the 52-caliber tube.

Automatic loading systems require significant additional maintenance, leading to a 40% increase in downtime

Popular before the conflict by Western armies, the automatic loading systems, which notably equip the German Pzh2000, the Swedish Archer and the Slovakian Zuzana, proved to be more fragile than expected during intense operational use.

In fact, these three systems display particularly low availability rates within the Ukrainian armies, around 25% to 30% for the PZH2000, the Archer, and even less for the Zuzana.

Conversely, the semi-automatic or manual loading systems show a better availability, around 50% for the British AS90, and the M109, and even more for the Polish Krab. The Caesar, for its part, with its semi-automatic loading system, achieves an availability 60% higher than that of the Pzh2000.

It turns out that these automatic systems significantly complicate maintenance procedures and prove to be a significant weakness in combat. Paradoxically, they do not offer superior performance in combat. Thus, the record for the number of shots fired in one day for a single system is jointly held by the Pzh2000 and the CAESAR, with 160 shots.

Artillery under casemates represents a weakness against drones, without significant added value in terms of protection.

Another certainty, undermined by the lessons of the war in Ukraine, is that the casemate protecting artillery pieces and crews does not seem to provide any significant increase in protection or survivability.

Indeed, the losses recorded for systems equipped with casemates, such as the M109 with an attrition rate of around 20%, the Krab, for an attrition rate close to 30%, just like the Zuzana, are all higher than those of the system without casemates, with an attrition rate of less than 10%, in public data.

In particular, artillery under casemates tends to isolate the crew from its direct environment, which often prevents it from detecting the characteristic noise of attack drones and loitering munitions, allowing it to anticipate the threat.

To date, only the Pzh2000 has not suffered any losses. However, it is much less present on the line of engagement, and its high price leads the Ukrainians to use it less in high-intensity areas. It is therefore difficult to draw reliable conclusions from this.

Rearmament and crew training deadlines, two new critical needs

If the expressions of needs, before the war in Ukraine, focused mainly on the automation of the firing chain, and the passive protection of the crews and the artillery piece, new, critical factors were highlighted during it.

Thus, the time and ease of rearming the system have become major criteria today for assessing the effectiveness of a mobile artillery system. Many losses have, in fact, been recorded during this phase which mobilizes several vehicles, and which is therefore easily detected, seen from the sky, by a reconnaissance drone, or a loitering munition.

The other factor, more specific to Ukraine, concerns the ease of use, and the training times required to make a crew operational, on board the system. Thus, it takes only one week to transform a crew on CAESAR, and less than two weeks, to train a crew composed of conscripts, on the French system, which was precisely designed, to lighten all the technical operations, in particular in terms of firing.

Mobility, compactness and discretion, key parameters for the survival of mobile artillery systems

If the armour does not provide the expected added value in terms of survivability, the combination of three criteria - mobility, compactness and discretion of the vehicle - has proven its effectiveness in Ukraine.

These allow, in particular, to quickly leave a firing zone, before drones, or even enemy counter-battery fire, arrive on the scene. In addition, a compact vehicle is much easier and faster to camouflage, or to hide under the canopy or in the vegetation, again, to avoid detection by drones.

The discretion sought today goes well beyond the visible spectrum alone, and applies equally to the infrared spectrum and to electromagnetic emissions, which can reveal the position of the artillery system.

Caesar Outclasses Other Western Artillery Systems in Ukraine

It is clear from the above that the ordeal of fire in Ukraine has significantly changed the perception of the needs for mobile artillery for many armed forces.

Thus, the French CAESAR, which was largely perceived as an artillery system that was too light and too poorly protected for high or very high intensity engagement, has demonstrated unique qualities of its own, making it one of the most effective weapon systems in Ukrainian hands today, and the most feared by the Russian armies.

The CAESAR's performance in Ukraine has not gone unnoticed, beyond the Ukrainian and French armies alone. In recent months, the system has been selected by two Baltic countries, Estonia and Lithuania, by Croatia, Armenia and Belgium, while other countries, including Finland and Spain, are taking a close interest in it, to modernize or harden their artillery, in an almost exclusively high-intensity context.

The best compromise in terms of on-board technologies and rusticity

Thus, what could initially appear as a weakness, such as the semi-automatic loading system, turns out, in use, to be a very effective arbitration in terms of on-board technologies, while respecting the essential rusticity of front-line systems, which cannot evolve in a preserved environment, such as during tests in firing ranges.

Obviously, the CAESAR was designed to be used intensively in combat, accepting a wide range of munitions, and automating what could be automated, without complicating the maintenance of the system.

Thus, if the Pzh2000 can be presented as the Tiger of modern artillery, the Caesar is much more similar to the T-34/85 in this area, a system offering very high performance, but great rusticity, to withstand the difficult conditions of use in combat, over time.

A precise, mobile system, easy to conceal and implement

The balance of the CAESAR design finds its application especially in the effectiveness of the system in combat, which has absolutely nothing to envy the Pzh2000, a system which is nevertheless 4 times more expensive and 40% less available.

Not only is it as precise, and has a range and real rate of fire equivalent to the German artillery system, but its mobility and compactness allow it to be used in danger zones where the PZH or the Archer would not venture.

The CAESAR's hardiness extends to its use, as it takes less than two weeks to train a crew of conscripts, which is a key criterion for the Ukrainian armies, which are facing significant tensions in the area of ​​training their human resources, mainly composed of conscripts and mobilized men.

An economical and effective alternative to the inevitable withdrawal of towed artillery

Because the last indisputable advantage of the CAESAR over other Western systems is none other than its price. With a unit price of around €3 million for the Caesar 6×6, or €4 million for the Caesar MkII, the CAESAR costs roughly the same as a complete towed system, such as the M777, with much more limited performance, and much less than other self-propelled guns, including those on wheels.

While the density of fire represents, once again, a strategic issue for land forces, the French system, like the systems inspired by it, such as the Israeli Atmos, and the Chinese PCL-181, can represent an economical and very effective alternative to replacing towed guns, which formed the bulk of firepower, until recently, for many armies, but whoseLow mobility will lead to the inexorable withdrawal in the coming decade.

Conclusion

It is clear that the French CAESAR is the most effective artillery system in Ukraine, whether compared to Soviet, Russian, Ukrainian or Western systems. These performances, and its very attractive purchase and use price, explain the renewed interest it has generated in recent months, including in Europe.

However, we should not expect a radical transformation of Western artillery, towards the paradigms inherited from the CAESAR experience. Indeed, as shown by the contracts currently being negotiated in Germany, Italy, Great Britain and even the United States, if the supremacy of the track is no longer absolute in this area, much heavier and more expensive systems, notably preserving the armoured casemate and the fully automated firing chain, continue to be popular with the major Western armies.

So, KNDS's new RCH-155, has already won over Germany and Great Britain, and is the favourite in other competitions, including for the US Army, even though it costs the same as 4 CAESAR NGs, and relies on the same automatic firing chain as the Pzh2000, which showed its weaknesses in Ukraine.

It is therefore likely that despite its operational effectiveness, the success of CAESAR will not extend to these large armies, at least not in the years to come, while feedback from Ukraine is being infused into the general staffs.

This may already be the case in Poland, with the CAESAR having positively impressed the Polish military during the evaluations carried out in the country a few days ago, by recording a successful precision shot at 42 km with a BONUS shell. Poles who are, moreover, on the front line to receive feedback from Ukraine…

Thibault Normand contributed to the writing of this article.

Article from October 23 in full version until December 7, 2024

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