Has a maskirovka, or disinformation strategy, been at work in recent weeks around the conflict in Ukraine? We can reasonably ask the question, noting the radical change in tone of Ukrainian and allied communication, regarding the military potential of Kyiv's armies.
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At the same time, the Kremlin, like its leader, Vladimir Putin, appears more confident than it has been since February 25, 2022, regarding the success of the Russian armies in achieving “the strategic objectives of the military operation special”.
However, a careful analysis of the situation could suggest a very different scenario, with a Ukraine which would try to push Russia into an offensive intended to be decisive and major, and attempt to reproduce the situation of March 2022, to restore the strategic balance, and possibly encourage Moscow to negotiate on favorable bases.
An accumulation of alarming revelations concerning the resistance of the Ukrainian armies
It is true that the flood of revelations of recent weeks, concerning the Ukrainian military potential present and future, is cause for concern. Between lack of ammunition which would cause the Ukrainian artillery to fire much fewer shells than their adversaries, the havoc that the Russian Lancet drones would wreak in the engagement zone, exhausted Ukrainian units, and the lack of volunteers to replenish the reserves, the picture could - could hardly be darker for Kyiv.
Yet it is! Because at the same time, Americans and Europeans claim that they are unable to further help the Ukrainian armies, that transferable arms stocks have dried up, and that Western industry is unable to deliver the shells. artillery and precision munitions to Kyiv at the required pace.
Thus, in recent weeks, the Ukrainian forces have not carried out these spectacular operations in the depth of the Russian system, to which they had accustomed us until now by striking the Kerch bridge, the naval base of Sevastopol, or air bases and command centers in Russia and Donbass.
In fact, for several days, there has been a palpable feeling of concern regarding a possible imminent collapse of Ukrainian defenses, if Russia were to go on the offensive by mobilizing the reserves that it was able to regenerate with the help of a remobilized defense industry and a country having chosen a real war economy.
Russia and the Kremlin in full confidence for several weeks
The message seems to have gotten across perfectly in Moscow. To be convinced of this, you just need to listen to Vladimir Putin on the subject in recent days. Far from the severe tone that has been his since April 2022 and the failure of the initial offensive, he appears affable, confident, and quick to reaffirm his confidence in the Russian armies, and in the imminent achievement of the objectives that he himself had set out for the special military operation, namely the de-Nazification of the country, the neutralization of its armies and its Finlandization.
Objectively, the Kremlin has reason to smile again. The efforts produced since the summer of 2022 have, in fact, made it possible to considerably remobilize the Russian defense industrial base, which now manufactures more armored vehicles, planes and munitions than were lost or consumed in Ukraine.
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Hello,
This article is very interesting and contrasts with the tone we are accustomed to lately. However, I find it a shame that you do not take into account the American elections which you have covered well in articles on the subject. Even if during a potential future Russian offensive losses favor the Ukrainians by a ratio of 1 to 5, can the country afford it? If, as with Bakhmut, Zelensky intervenes in military affairs to demand fierce defense of the terrain, this could have disastrous effects.
In summary, I am not sure that the Ukrainians have much to gain from such maskirovka, especially on the question of maintaining Western support.
cordially
From my point of view, the two subjects do not have the same temporality. The US elections are in November 2024, taking effect in January 2025. The Russian offensive would take place between January and March 2024, precisely to take advantage of the perceived weakness of the Ukrainians, but also to respond to the election deadline. Russian in March. This is why the US elections, although important, do not appear here.
Hello,
Especially since US institutions are really special and restrict the president enormously.
So really not sure that they really influence the rest of American operations. Without forgetting that the Americans are pragmatic and given the money that restarting the factories generates for them, they are not ready to stop (democard or not).
One last more than questionable point on the otherwise excellent subject, many corroborating sources do not relate the extreme positivism that you demonstrate on the subject of the Russian war economy. Many tanks recorded in production are only refurbishments of very old ones (military effect demonstrated given their low resistance on American 30 mm) without upgrade.
One last point that is essential for me, and coming from naval aviation you are rather concerned :), it is air support which for the moment is non-existent for Ukraine which will benefit from a big acceleration.
And without air support we see that waging a war is really complicated. Imagine the French army without the Mirage 2000 and the rafales in Africa. We would have had a hell of a lot of death.
On the subject of Russian tanks, it is very interesting to note that the number of T-72B3, T-80BV in obr.2022 version, and T-90M tanks, reported as destroyed monthly, has significantly decreased since September-October compared to May-August. We can naturally think that this is a production problem. But from my point of view, and in relation to what is written, it is above all linked to the reconstitution of a Russian maneuver corps. It should be kept in mind that OSINT only sees what is "open source", and that the analyzes are often biased according to what it wants to say. Thus, we could also argue that modern tanks having a longer firing range, they are less sensitive to enemy destruction than older tanks, which would therefore suffer more losses. Above all, being destroyed closer to the line of engagement, their destruction is more easily documented... I'm not saying that's it. I'm just saying hope for the best, but anticipate the worst. And from my point of view, there is nothing today to be optimistic about Russian industrial efforts.
Thank you for your answer, it's much clearer for me.