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EMBT, Leopard 3 or others...: what options and constraints for the future French interim tank?

Fabrice Wolf

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April 7, 2026

EMBT, Leopard 3 or others...: what options and constraints for the future French interim tank?

While the MGCS program remains uncertain, its schedule now reaches the deadline of 2045 and the French Leclerc tanks will have to be withdrawn from service from 2037, the Ministry of the Armed Forces has integrated the need for an intermediate generation tank to bridge the gap in the revision of the Military Programming Law 2024-2030, presented a few days ago.

This realization, which many specialists have been calling for for several years, is nevertheless only the first step in a complex and highly constrained process, within a deteriorating geopolitical, budgetary, and industrial landscape. The question now arises, therefore, as to the options available to French decision-makers to ensure a smooth transition away from the Leclerc line starting in 2037.

The replacement of the Leclerc tank in the French Army will begin in 2037.

The Leclerc tank, produced by Nexter (now KNDS France) from 1989, has been delivered to the French Army in 406 units. Approximately 200 remain in service equipping French armored regiments and have been undergoing modernization to the XLR standard since 2023, in order to remain in service until the end of the decade. Their withdrawal, starting in 2037, has recently been deemed inevitable by the Army General Staff, ruling out any further extension to bridge the gap to 2045 and the hypothetical start of MGCS deliveries.

Indeed, the Franco-German program is currently facing a triple threat simultaneously: the extreme tensions affecting the SCAF program, to which it is politically closely linked; significant remaining differences between the expectations of the Army and the Bundeswehr; and the German industrial trajectory which, with the Leopard 2A8, the KF51 Panther and the future Leopard 3, has a national offering to respond to the increase in threat, but also in the market, especially in Europe, over the next decade, and at least until 2045.

This situation is not new, strictly speaking. Many French experts have, in fact, for several years, pointed out the limitations of the XLR modernization of the Army's Leclerc tanks in the face of the evolving threat and called for the design of an intermediate generation model, both to respond to this threat and to ensure the preservation of French industrial skills in this field, pending the MGCS program.

For further :

KNDS is preparing the intermediate generation tank, including for France!

Until now, the strategy pursued by the Franco-German group KNDS, comprising the French company Nexter and the German company Krauss-Maffei Wegmann, could seem obscure, not to say artificial. Indeed, although brought together in a single entity, with the MGCS program at its core, the two…

In this respect, the announcement of the integration of an interim tank program into the 2024-2030 Military Programming Law (LPM) update represents a highly anticipated shift in the French position. However, it does not constitute a solid trajectory. Indeed, while the impetus to replace the Leclerc tanks starting in 2037 is included in the legislative update, no budget is allocated to this task until 2030, which obviously greatly limits its scope and reduces the window of opportunity by 30%, from 10 to just 7 years.

The MGCS program remains uncertain, but not before 2045

In this context, it is understood that the overall framework of this program will be marked above all by numerous and important constraints which must be taken into consideration in order to evaluate the options which are actually possible and realistic in order to respond to them.

The first constraint is obviously budgetary. Indeed, despite a further announced increase in the defense budget of €3,5 billion in 2026, and a budget target of almost €75 billion annually in 2030, the French Armed Forces budget remains under very strong constraints, between the armament and deterrence programs to be financed (SCAF, SNLE3G, PANG, MAWS, SCORPION, Rafale F4 and F5, combat drone…), the unprecedented effort of €8,5 billion for munitions announced a few days ago, and the introduction of a conscription halfway between volunteering and Scandinavian-style chosen conscription, backed by a national guard expected to increase from 40,000 to 80,000 men under the LPM.

We understand the lack of room for maneuver for the ministry in terms of budget until 2030, while the immediate objective is to recapitalize critical resources as quickly as possible (air and missile defense, artillery, long-range strike, drones and anti-drone warfare) to respond to a possible confrontation in the east, against the backdrop of the announced American disengagement from Europe.

The second constraint is industrial. Indeed, while the French land industry is still capable of major technological advances, such as with the ASCALON cannon, it has not assembled any tanks or heavy armored vehicles for 15 years now, since the delivery of the last Leclerc tanks from the United Arab Emirates. It no longer possesses a true industrial assembly line dedicated to heavy tracked armored vehicles.

Even worse, it has not designed any tracked armored vehicles since the Leclerc in the early to mid-1990s, and the industrial supply chain has also largely withered, causing several experts to doubt the national capacity to produce a chassis, and especially an engine and transmission for a heavy battle tank, one of the mechanical assemblies subjected to the most intense stresses ever designed.

Finally, the third constraint is none other than the timetable imposed by a deferral of investments from 2030, and a delivery deadline that must absolutely take effect in 2037, otherwise the Army would lose its ability to guarantee the permanent mobilization of an armored/cuirassier regiment of its operational contract.

Put together, these 3 constraints do not add up, they multiply because each one increases the other two, whether it is the budget which draws both the time constraint and limits the scale of investments, the schedule which will force us to turn to ready-made technological building blocks, and which will impose a certain sizing of the industrial tool to respect the necessarily compressed ramp-up, and finally, the industrial constraint, which imposes heavier investments, to reconstitute the line and supply chain, and longer delays, for the same reasons.

It goes without saying that baldness should be a major factor in selecting the Armament Engineer to whom this project will be entrusted. Because if he isn't already bald, there's no doubt he will become so, from tearing his hair out trying to solve this programmatic puzzle.

Fortunately for him, and also for the Army, solutions exist. To be precise, there are three, each with its own advantages, but also its constraints and consequences to bear.

Le Leopard 3 offers an economical and secure alternative to France, but the associated cost will be high

Addressing the three-pronged challenge of limited budgets, shortened schedules, and failing industrial infrastructure may seem insurmountable, especially from a French perspective. However, for many of its neighbors, this is simply a "normal" situation, requiring a well-known solution: international orders with local assembly or industrial offsets.

This is how Rome negotiated with Rheinmetall the domestic production of more than 200 Panther and almost a thousand KF-41 Lynx aircraft at Leonardo's industrial sites, and that is how Warsaw obtained significant technology transfers from Seoul to assemble the future K2PL and other K239 aircraft on site.

The subject had also been raised a few months ago by the previous Director General of Armaments, Emmanuel Chiva, when he did not hesitate to consider ordering Leopard 3 Germans assembled in France, with some industrial compensation from Berlin, to meet this need while respecting the constraints.

Indeed, such a solution has many advantages. First, it respects both the budget and the time frame, since the Leopard 3 will only be available in 2030, according to KNDS Deutschland, and all R&D is being handled by Berlin and German industry.

Next, pure industrial investments, particularly in the supply chain, will be limited. Finally, the Leopard 3 will undoubtedly become a de facto European standard, like the Leopard 1 and 2 before it, which will simplify the maintenance and upgradeability of the armored vehicle. It is precisely for these reasons that Norway, the Netherlands, Sweden and the Czech Republic acquired the Leopard 2A8 these last two years.

However, in the specific case of France, such an option also comes with numerous constraints and certain compromises. Paradoxically, among these constraints is budgetary sustainability. Indeed, while R&D costs and industrial investment are lower, the share of added value produced in France per armored vehicle delivered is also much smaller, probably around 30 to 40%, in the best-case scenario.

For further :

The " Leopard 3" is emerging as the real German interim tank for 2030

The highly anticipated "Leopard Will the 3" enter service with the Bundeswehr starting in 2030? That's certainly the trajectory outlined by Armin Dirks, head of operations for the MGCS joint project team, at the AIVC conference held in Farnborough. During the presentation…

Therefore, with a budgetary return—that is, the difference, for public finances, between investment and direct and indirect tax and social security revenues—of around 50% in France, the net residual state cost remains at 80 to 85% of the total cost, the remainder being absorbed by German industry and supply chains. Even worse, France will not be able to export the Leopard 3 assembled on site, which will deprive it of additional revenue.

It is worth recalling that the French defense industry exports on average more than 40% of its national production. Therefore, the cost to the State, representing 60% of the total, is largely offset by the 50% applied to 100% of national production, leaving a net visible State cost of only 10% of the total cost, or 17% of the national investment. It is thus clear why designing and manufacturing domestically is so advantageous, thereby minimizing the remaining cost.

KF51 Panther Rheinmetall Eurosatory 2024 exhibition — The KF51 Panther at the eurosatory 2024 exhibition

Beyond the budgetary aspect, turning to the Leopard A German third-party acquisition would constitute a more than serious threat to France's remaining industrial and technological expertise in the field of main battle tanks. If dependence on Berlin is politically validated through the MGCS and SCAF programs, within the framework of the Leopard 3, it would nevertheless be unilateral and not balanced by reciprocal dependencies, which could constitute a serious problem for France and its more interventionist profile than that of its neighbor across the Rhine.

Above all, France's legitimacy to participate in the MGCS program as a main partner, on equal footing with Germany, would be more than threatened, providing further ammunition to critics of this balancing act in Germany. Far from strengthening the Franco-German partnership, such a measure would instead tend to weaken it by widening the gap between the two defense industrial and technological bases, as well as in terms of addressable market.

The EMBT replaces the Leclerc Evo as the preferred national solution for the intermediate generation

The second option that could be considered in France to address this problem would be a national one, relying on the skills demonstrated by KNDS France and its partners to design the Leclerc Evo prototype, as well as the EMBT demonstrator, both presented at the Eurosatory trade fair in June 2024.

At that time, the Leclerc Evo could appear as a solution that could be mobilized in the short term to advantageously take over from the Leclerc by 2030, in the face of an operational need still largely erased by budgetary constraints and an international market less competitive than it is today.

The lack of response from the Ministry of the Armed Forces and the DGA (French Directorate General of Armaments) regarding the Leclerc Evo in 2024 has effectively doomed this prototype. Indeed, aiming for entry into service in 2037, it would be absurd to remain with this model, which is still heavily influenced by the paradigms of the original Leclerc. Fortunately, this is not the case with the second model, the EMBT.

The EMBT version 2024 already ticked many of the boxes framing the emerging intermediate generation of tanks, with the Leopard 3, the K2PL, the K3 or even the M1E3. It had, in fact, a fully robotic lowered turret, armed with an ASCALON 140 cannon much more powerful than the current 120 mm, an APS hard-kill/soft-kill for its protection, an automated turret coupled with a range of drones and pod missiles for drone and infantry threats, and a "vetronic" system coupled with SCORPION communication layers for a very advanced perception of the tactical environment.

For further :

To save the French tank industry, the United Arab Emirates and Egypt could be the preferred alternative for Paris!

A few days ago, Emmanuel Chiva, the French DGA (Directorate General of Armaments), indirectly opened the door to an intensification of relations between the French battle tank industry and its German counterpart, prior to the MGCS program, perhaps to equip the Army with the intermediate generation tank…

In practical terms, the EMBT only lacked hybrid-electric propulsion and enhanced multispectral stealth capabilities, achieved through active or passive means, to become the benchmark for this emerging intermediate generation. Therefore, the EMBT is clearly an excellent candidate for the Army's interim needs. Moreover, its domestic design significantly enhances its export and budgetary potential, following the same reasoning as previously established.

However, it too is not without its weaknesses and risks. Firstly, because, as mentioned earlier, the French defense industry and supply chain in this area will have a long way to go. It is also highly likely that, in this scenario, KNDS will be forced to turn to the German engine manufacturer MTU to equip its EMBT, and to RENK, also German, even though the products are manufactured in France, for the transmission.

This dependence will partially dilute the budgetary return, but should not pose insurmountable export difficulties. On the contrary, very aware of the limitations of the German image in certain countries, particularly in the Middle East and South America, KNDS and German industry may well see this French EMBT as the perfect complement to the Leopard 3 to expand the addressable market, at least until it sets foot on the European market.

Leclerc Evolution tank — Leclerc Evolution at the Eurosatory 2025 show (photo F. Dosreis)

But the biggest flaw in the EMBT option is above all the budgetary equation. Indeed, the investments in design, production, testing and trials, then the industrial investments necessary to deliver the first EMBT will necessarily be very high, amounting to several billion euros, an amount that will have to be amortized on only 200 units, since increasing the size is not on the agenda according to the Ministry of the Armed Forces.

The solution to improve this sustainability would have been to turn to a key partner, with the United Arab Emirates at the top of the list, as the sole export customer for the Leclerc tank, seeking industrial investment in the defense sector to diversify its economy, and possessing ample resources. Unfortunately, the failure of Franco-Emirati negotiations regarding the Rafale F5, centered around a program…

Changing paradigms: moving from MBTs to medium tanks to escape an unsolvable equation

There remains a third avenue that France could explore in this matter. Already mentioned on this site, it would be based on a paradigm shift, drawing on the lessons learned from Ukraine. Indeed, whether it concerns older generation tanks, such as the T-64 and the Leopard Ukrainian 1A5s or Russian T-72s, or more modern tanks, such as the Leopard 2A6, M1A1 and T-90M, all have shown a very high vulnerability to enemy drones, missiles and precision artillery strikes.

The heaviest tanks, like the Abrams, the Leopard The Challenger 2, or the Challenger 2, also demonstrated significant mobility limitations, whether in terms of movement over soft terrain, obstacle crossing, or rail transport. While a poorly protected tank's effectiveness is reduced, a tank that fails to reach the combat zone is simply rendered ineffective.

These lessons are already being taken into account by intermediate-generation tank programs. Thus, the Leopard The K3 and the M1E3 are both designed to be nearly 10 tons lighter than current models, weighing in at around 53 to 55 tons. The K3 has made stealth the cornerstone of its operational advantage, while all new models, including Russian and Chinese ones, now incorporate active protection systems, both soft-kill and hard-kill, to enhance their survivability.

China, for its part, presented last September a tank that pushed these paradigms of mobility, stealth and active protection even further in favor of survivability, and therefore armored maneuverability, with the Type 100. Indeed, the new Chinese tank is not to be classified in the category of battle tanks, or heavy tanks, but in that of medium tanks, with a combat mass listed between 40 and 45 tons.

This same observation could guide France's response to its current needs, particularly by drawing on the French land engagement doctrine, which emphasizes maneuver and mobility far more than firepower and passive protection. It was this same approach that gave rise to the Caesar howitzer in the early 1990s, even though everyone else, until recently, swore by tracked artillery in armored cases. The war in Ukraine, in fact, demonstrated the full relevance of the French model, which is now far more often copied than ridiculed.

Indeed, a medium tank, weighing 43 to 45 tons in combat, powered by a 1,200 hp hybrid engine, equipped with a robotic turret armed with a 120 mm Ascalon, drones and missiles for medium and long-range engagement, a high-performance volumetric APS system and advanced active and passive stealth, would offer the Army not only effective combat potential.

It would thus perfectly complement the capabilities of European allies, whether in Europe, thanks to discreet crossing and bypassing capabilities opening up spaces inaccessible today, or in more exotic theaters, to which it would be better suited to operate on soft and unstable terrain, from the African desert to the Himalayan slopes.

This original positioning would allow the French industry to explore new export opportunities, by approaching the MBT market saturated with offers, with a price argument and high operational potential that would not be unlike the competitive positioning of the Caesar against the PzH 2000, opening up new potential cooperation opportunities that are currently closed in the field of MBTs.

Finally, a lighter model would fit perfectly into the category of vehicles accompanying and supporting mechanized maneuvers, whether they be heavy infantry fighting vehicles, infantry engagement vehicles, armored support vehicles (ambulance, command, engineering, communication and electronic warfare) or even anti-aircraft and anti-drone defense vehicles.

The combination of a lower unit price, broader industrial potential, and a less competitive international market makes industrial investment far more sustainable and less risky, expanding the number of carrier-based systems for the French Army and its potential partners. Furthermore, and this is worth noting, while France's lack of MBT production over the past 15 years has put it at a disadvantage in the heavy tank market, the Caesar's commercial and operational success could influence such a program due to their shared paradigms.

Conclusion

As we can see, the announcement of the inclusion of an intermediate-generation tank program in the 2024-2030 Military Programming Law update, while confirming an awareness of the limitations of the Leclerc XLR in the face of evolving threats, is still far from providing a solution to this highly complex issue. Even worse, by not allocating any budget specifically for this requirement, defined for 2037, during the 2026-2030 period, this awareness ultimately only serves to further restrict an already limited timeframe, both industrially and financially, making its implementation even more challenging after this deadline.

Several options can be proposed to meet these demanding specifications, each with its own advantages, constraints, and risks. The acquisition of Leopard Three German tanks, possibly assembled in France, would probably be the simplest and cheapest solution in the short term, but it would significantly threaten the sustainability of the skills of the French industry in the field of tanks, and more broadly tracked armored vehicles, while definitively excluding Paris from this international market.

KNDS France's EMBT, presented in 2024 at the Eurosatory trade show, represents the most conservative response, respecting industrial, technological, and military capabilities, as well as France's position on the international stage. It is also the most expensive option and the most likely to fall outside the 2037 timeframe, at a time when certain international partnerships now seem out of reach for potential cooperation.

The last option, the least trivial, is based on a paradigm shift based on Ukrainian lessons, developing not an MBT but a medium tank, 10 tonnes lighter, much more mobile, stealthy and protected by APS, in order to open not only a new less competitive market — only the Chinese Type 100 being present — but also tactical opportunities to revive mechanized maneuver thanks to this unique combination of capabilities, to complement the traditional offering of European armies in this area.

It remains to be seen, now, where the balance of French arbitration in this area will tip, between European standardization amounting to an abandonment of sovereignty, conservatism in capacity and industry requiring higher resources, or originality and innovation, without any guarantee of achieving the same result as with the Caesar.

The Chinese J-35 and J-10 missiles are causing concern among military leaders, but are being shunned by export markets.

Fabrice Wolf

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April 7, 2026

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The Chinese J-35 and J-10 missiles are causing concern among military leaders, but are being shunned by export markets.

In recent years, and especially after the media offensive following Operation Sindoor, Chinese fighter jets like the J-10CE and the J-35 have regularly been in the international press, either for the threat they now represent in the eyes of the general staffs, or around the announced export successes, most often at the expense of American or European aircraft.

It must be acknowledged, however, that once the initial media frenzy subsided, Beijing's announcements in this area were sorely lacking in concrete results, while Pakistan remains the sole export user of the J-10CE, and the J-35 is still not offered for export. In this regard, a recent American report sheds light on the significant gap that persists between the perceived threat posed by the new Chinese fighters and the weakness of Chinese aircraft manufacturers' exports of combat aircraft.

The paradox of J-35: perceived threats and absent exports

Following Pakistani claims of multiple air victories by the J-10CE armed with PL-15E long-range missiles, including against Rafale Indians, during Operation Sindoor, in May 2025, Chinese fighter jets invaded the global media space, driven by a communication offensive from Beijing's plenipotentiary services.

Several sales were then announced within a few months. First, around the J-10CE, the " grand winner of Sindoor"According to a Sino-Pakistani narrative that subsequently proved highly dubious, having been announced in Egypt, Indonesia, Bangladesh, and even Libya. But also concerning the new 5th-generation J-35 fighter jet, presented as the Chinese F-35, with an order for around forty aircraft announced by Islamabad in June 2025."

While much of this information was widely reported by the international press, it is clear in April 2026 that none of these announcements have actually materialized, whereas, conversely, the American F-35A and F-16V, and the Russian Su-57E, Rafale French, Swedish Gripen, Typhoon Europeans and even emerging countries with the KF-21 Boromae have achieved real export successes in Europe, Algeria, India, South America, Turkey and Indonesia.

In an interview with the local press, a senior South American official summarized the weakness of the Chinese offering in this area by comparing it to buying a virtual product. Indeed, the actual performance of Chinese aircraft, as well as their equipment and ammunition, is documented only by Chinese manufacturers, without any consolidated information being provided to potential customers.

Thus, certain critical data, such as the guaranteed flight time of the J-10CE's WS-15 turbofan engines, or information on spare parts availability and maintenance cycles, are currently absent or insufficiently addressed in Chinese proposals, or are treated in a purely qualitative manner, without any legally binding industrial commitments. Even worse, the price argument, used to promote Chinese aircraft, often proves far less competitive once the exact specifications are aligned with Western, particularly European, offers. The question of total cost of ownership, meanwhile, is simply ignored in Chinese quotes.

To address these crucial questions, Beijing is attempting to increase its international exercises, particularly with potential partners, as was the case in Egypt in 2025. However, this has not yet been enough to convince Cairo to adopt the J-10CE missile, nor has it convinced Jakarta or Bangkok.

The Gyrfalcon has been offered for export for over 10 years without success.

In this context, the Pentagon published an unclassified report on the Chinese military on March 11, 2026. The document frames the export offering around three fighter jets proposed for international markets: the Shenyang FC-31 Gyrfalcon, presented as an export variant of the J-35A; the Chengdu J-10C; and the JF-17, developed in collaboration with Pakistan. This framework clarifies what is truly intended for export and what remains a priority for the Chinese armed forces, particularly for the People's Liberation Army Navy's carrier-based service.

The report indicates that as of May 2025, the FC-31 had not recorded any sales, despite reports citing interested customers, including Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates. This is despite the fact that Shenyang has presented the aircraft as an exportable solution since 2016, following a redesign of the aircraft to address the performance and stealth shortcomings of the initial version. As of May 2025, no official order has yet been placed by an international air force, despite media reports of "signs of interest."

Regarding the J-10C, the report mentions only one confirmed customer, Pakistan, with twenty units delivered since 2020, and sixteen additional units ordered three years ago. Islamabad recently announced an order for 60 more aircraft, following China's refusal to fulfill its order for 40 J-35As announced in June 2025, after Sindoor.

Regarding the J-10CE, the American report does not provide any new consolidated public data on cost per flight hour or availability rates, a point that intersects with the sustainability concerns of potential buyers. The overall picture remains descriptive, without any new information to resolve the maintenance and supply uncertainties that impact the total cost of ownership.

J-35A Zhuhai Air Show — J-35A at the Zhuhai Airshow in November 2024

Finally, the Sino-Pakistani JF-17 light fighter appears to be the most affordable offering in the Chinese aircraft manufacturers' portfolio, aimed at budget-constrained markets, with sales recorded in Nigeria, Myanmar, and Azerbaijan, and talks mentioned elsewhere. This positioning, however, illustrates the difficulty in convincing forces with broader options and requirements closer to NATO standards, in a context where political and logistical support risks are factored into the decision-making process very early on.

Furthermore, the lack of impact of the Pakistani JF-17s during Sindoor, even though the aircraft is presented as an alternative to increase the mass of combat aircraft at a lower cost, can no longer be ignored by world air forces that might be tempted by the Sino-Pakistani fighter, or by equivalent aircraft such as the Indian Tejas or the South Korean FA-50.

In fact, far from the avalanche of orders expected at the last Paris Air Show for the JF-17 Block IIIc, the offer remains very constrained and limited to specific cases, such as the settlement of a $2 billion Pakistani debt contracted with Saudi Arabia, with Riyadh considering accepting repayment with a fleet of JF-17s.

The lack of visibility on performance and ownership costs is hindering Chinese aircraft

This international disenchantment with Chinese fighter jets contrasts with the perceived threat, probably rightly so, by international military leaders, especially those who might have to deal with these aircraft, such as India, Japan, South Korea or, of course, the United States.

The causes of this, however, are perfectly known, ranging from a lack of visibility on the flow of spare parts to uncertainties concerning implementation costs or the availability of devices, metrics which, precisely, are now widely used by air forces to size their fleets and resources.

This perceived lack of transparency is compounded by a political risk that extends beyond purely technical considerations. Beijing's growing support for Moscow in the war in Ukraine has fueled calls for Western sanctions, particularly from European countries and the United States, and this signal is a significant factor in the purchasing decisions of countries subject to control regimes. Such a context may encourage nations with options to favor offers backed by established alliances, which provide interoperability, political protection, and more transparent service references.

Furthermore, it is observed that a growing share of international contracts in the field of combat aircraft is now accompanied by industrial agreements and technology transfers, areas in which Chinese aircraft manufacturers lack flexibility in the face of the strict framework led by Beijing, the PLA and the CCP.

Therefore, media exposure, however omnipresent, is not enough to convert curiosity into contracts, even with international exercises that broaden the audience. Without tangible answers regarding costs and availability, the demonstration effect remains limited, as military leaders prioritize predictable budget trajectories and guarantees of operational readiness.

Beijing prioritizes the modernization and expansion of the PLA's air and naval forces.

This market restraint is compounded by a clear prioritization of Chinese aircraft manufacturers' production for the expansion and modernization of the Chinese air and naval forces. Thus, after positive signals in June 2025 for the rapid acquisition of around forty J-35As, Islamabad announced in recent weeks an order for 60 to 70 J-10CEs, arguing that the planned J-35As could not be delivered for the next three or four years. The Pakistani Ministry of Defense, for its part, recently dismissed the announcements concerning the Pakistani J-35As as media speculation.

Indeed, China has launched an industrial ramp-up primarily focused on its domestic forces, while the PLA still fields several hundred older-generation fighters, including 200 JH-7 attack aircraft and 450 J-11s and Su-27s. The annual production capacity of Chinese combat aircraft could reach approximately 400 advanced fighters by 2027, with the expansion of the Chengdu plant by about 3 million square feet to target more than 120 J-20s per year. Three other sites have added more than 8 million square feet of footprint, demonstrating a domestic focus that mechanically reduces short-term export opportunities.

It is noted, therefore, that even taking into consideration the 150 combat aircraft of the Chinese naval air forces which also need to be replaced, the total replacements in constant format of PLA combat aircraft does not exceed 600 aircraft, or less than 2 years of production of the new industrial tool.

In this context, it is easy to anticipate that the Chinese air force is at the beginning of a major metamorphosis, going from a total combat fleet of 2500 aircraft to more than 4000 by 2035, simply by taking into account a need for 70% dedicated to the domestic market in the next 10 years, with the replacement of the J-10A, S and B, J-11, JH-7 and Su-30.

Therefore, we can extrapolate that such a sizing has only two potential uses, given that increasing an air force from 2500 to 4000 combat aircraft, and even more, proportionally speaking, in terms of support aircraft, infrastructure, and personnel, is in itself a colossal undertaking over 10 years. The first use is geared towards exports, around 1200 combat aircraft, thus an average of 120 aircraft exported per year, more than the United States currently exports. The second is combat attrition, with an overall rate of 400 aircraft per year, or 1,2 new fighters per day.

In any case, this new Chinese industrial sizing opens up a restructuring of the global supply of combat aircraft, regarding which the difficulties described today may well be anecdotal, pending a realignment of production capacity, offers and the market.

Conclusion

It appears that the weakness observed in Chinese fighter jet exports in recent years stems from a combination of factors, including a lack of evidence, opaque operating costs, and perceived inferior after-sales support. The situation in 2026 illustrates this, with the J-35A remaining unsold, the J-10C limited to Pakistan, and the JF-17 sold sporadically to Nigeria, Myanmar, and Azerbaijan. The risk of sanctions linked to Beijing's support for Moscow, the attractiveness of allied bids involving technology transfer and local production, and the domestic focus that reduces lead times, all weigh on the decisions of solvent customers.

However, this immediate perception should probably not be interpreted as a sign of weakness in the Chinese offering, and even less so as a lack of performance in the new fighter jets. Moreover, the military leadership is well aware of this, no longer underestimating the PLA's air and naval forces in the years to come.

Above all, the expansion of the industrial base for producing new, modern fighter jets, with an estimated capacity of 400 aircraft per year, will not only transform the PLA in the coming years, but will also mark the true start of China's commercial offensive in this field on the international stage, once production, supply, and demand are aligned. It remains to be seen whether the weaknesses that currently hinder Chinese aircraft on the international stage will also be addressed in the same process.

The Geran-2 is evolving into a smart, versatile, and much more dangerous munition…

Fabrice Wolf

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April 3, 2026

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The Geran-2 is evolving into a smart, versatile, and much more dangerous munition…

Imported in the hundreds from Iran in the summer of 2022 to compensate for the depletion of ballistic and cruise missiles in the Russian arsenal, the Shahed 136 attack drone, named Geranium 2, or Geran-2, in Russia, has become one of the symbols known to all of the Russo-Ukrainian war.

Today, the Russian factory in Alabuga is reportedly able to produce nearly a thousand of these rustic, inexpensive but effective attack drones every day, while new, much more advanced versions, carrying anti-radar seekers, satellite data links and even FPV drones or mines, have appeared in the last year, transforming the role of this drone which is now being copied all over the world, including… in the United States.

The Alabuga factory structures the mass production of Geranium attack drones

In the summer of 2022, in the midst of its retreat following the failed offensive in Kyiv and Kharkiv, Russia deployed the Iranian Shahed-136 attack drone, known in Russian service as the Geran-2, for the first time. Initial deliveries took the form of assembly kits, with unit prices exceeding $370,000, then $290,000 for orders of 2,000 units, and $193,000 for 6,000 units. This initial dependence on external supplies framed the Russian effort, which initially relied on the local integration of supplied components before embarking on a much more extensive industrial localization strategy.

The shift occurred with production almost entirely localized in Russia at the Alabuga site, where design and manufacturing were simplified. By 2025, the unit cost was estimated at around $70,000 depending on the configuration, significantly reducing the financial burden compared to the imported kits of 2022. This price reduction enabled a strategy of steady saturation, substituting sustained volumes of drones for salvos of missiles that were considerably more expensive and more difficult to replace at the same rate.

Geranium-2 attack drone factory — Mass production of Geranium drones in Russia

This trajectory relied on a documented ramp-up of production at Russian sites. According to CNN, the Alabuga factory in Tatarstan produced 2,738 units in 2023, marking an initial milestone in industrialization. In May 2025, Ukrainian intelligence confirmed a daily production rate of approximately 170 drones. By the end of that month, monthly production had reached around 2,700 Shaheds, supplemented by some 2,500 decoys, designed to overwhelm defenses and complicate the management of engagement priorities on the Ukrainian side.

The increase from a weekly production rate of approximately 200 units in September 2024 to over 1,000 in March 2025 reshaped the scale of the salvos. On the night of June 29, 2025, the Ukrainian Air Force recorded 537 deployed platforms, including more than 250 Geran-2s, accompanied by various types of ballistic and cruise missiles. This mobilized Ukrainian aircraft, surface-to-air defenses, electronic warfare capabilities, and unmanned aerial vehicles. The choice of a lower-cost volume, significantly less than that of cruise missiles, allowed for repeated offensives in terms of both number and duration.

This momentum was met with a rapid increase in countermeasures, particularly the rise of interceptor drones. By January 2026, these systems accounted for approximately 70 percent of Shaheds destroyed, following Ukrainian production of 100,000 units in 2025. Despite this pressure, increased deliveries, the use of decoys, and the gradual improvement of navigation and resilience subsystems maintained costly attrition for the Ukrainian defense, while preserving a financial advantage for prolonged saturation campaigns.

The Geran-2 adopts an anti-radar seeker to hunt down opposing anti-aircraft defenses.

The industrial base thus established opened the door to a qualitative evolution, illustrated at the end of March 2026 by the addition of a passive seeker. On March 29, 2026, the Russian military began equipping the Geran-2 with passive radar seeker warheads, transforming the munition into a lower-cost version of an anti-radiation missile. This evolution altered the threat compared to earlier models that followed more basic navigation profiles, giving the missile the capability to autonomously detect and track radar emissions during flight.

Physical evidence has supported this development. A sensor unit detached from a downed or shot-down drone was offered for sale on the Ukrainian military auction site Reibert. The guidance device includes an antenna module from the Lyra-VM system, serial number 125AE02 CIVR.464651.015, belonging to the national unified radar identification system ES GRLO. The use of components from a national standard suggests sustained production of these modules, driven by a logic of controlled costs and robust industrial integration.

In terms of capabilities, the architecture relies on four directional antennas, allowing the drone to autonomously track and identify the source of an enemy radar emission during flight. This capability generates a pursuit behavior that does not require external illumination in the terminal phase. It mechanically increases the pressure on radar operators, who must decide between preemptive shutdown and maintaining air cover, with the risk of being hit by a low-cost munition.

Compared to a conventional anti-radiation missile, adding a seeker to a significantly less expensive delivery system opens the door to repeated and distributed SEAD suppression of enemy air defenses. Radar emissions become potential bait for numerous expendable munitions, shifting some of the burden toward spectrum management and sensor mobility. The integration of a national standard module furthers this trend, enabling the use of multiple seeker warheads in salvos and expanding the range of low-cost mission profiles.

The emergence of captured units, offered for around $3,200 on an online marketplace, increases the risk of reverse engineering off-front lines and the diffusion of the technology. This exposure facilitates independent analysis of antenna designs and software interfaces, and can accelerate the circumvention of simple countermeasures. Finally, it underscores the level of maturity achieved, with sub-assemblies produced in sufficient volume to appear in secondary circuits while also fitting into the already massive mixed salvos observed as early as 2024.

Whether carrying FPV drones or mines, the Geran becomes versatile.

Beyond radar targeting, new operational methods now distinguish the Geran from the 2022 versions. On March 10, the Anti-Shahed Darknode Battalion of Ukraine's 412th Unmanned Systems Brigade detected and destroyed a Geran-2 carrying two FPV (First-Person View) drones in Ukrainian airspace. According to the unit, the payload was unusual, with two drones mounted on the platform. This deployment extends the chain of effects beyond the single impact of the main munition, by dispersing additional payloads near sensitive targets.

Standard FPV drones typically have a range of ten to twenty kilometers, limiting their short-range effectiveness when launched from the front. However, when carried by a Geran-2, they can appear unexpectedly over logistics areas, air bases, or air defense positions located hundreds of kilometers behind enemy lines. This combination expands operational depth and allows for the exploitation of local vulnerabilities, with coordinated strikes delivered as close as possible to the target.

To support these long-range profiles, Russia has installed commercial fourth- or fifth-generation cellular modems and SIM cards from Ukrainian operators, enabling it to use adversary cell towers and transmit live video over public networks. This practice complicates detection and interdiction, as drone traffic blends in with that of civilian users. Geran variants also carry SIM cards, low-resolution cameras, and NVIDIA Jetson-type computers, enhancing navigation, control, and resistance to electronic warfare countermeasures.

Simultaneously, Geran drones began conducting temporary aerial mine-laying operations. KPTM-3 cassettes containing PTM-3 anti-tank mines were dropped behind Ukrainian lines, up to fifty kilometers beyond the border, with a video documenting the deployment process. Each drone releases eight mines using round containers mounted under its wings. A PTM-3 is armed in sixty to one hundred seconds, operates for sixteen to twenty-four hours, and then self-destructs, thus disrupting movement without creating lasting contamination beyond the operational window.

The Geran-5, halfway between a missile and a drone

These developments have reshaped defensive priorities, especially with the emergence of new variants. In January 2026, the Geran-5 was reported with a cruise missile configuration, a Chinese-made turbojet engine, and an air-launched capability from Sukhoi Su-25s. This architecture altered the speed-to-altitude ratio that prevailed with the initial delta wing. It exposes defenses to faster profiles that are more difficult to intercept for fighter drones optimized against slow-moving, piston-engine targets.

As mentioned above, interceptor drones shot down the majority of Shaheds in January 2026, following a very high production rate in 2025. Jet-powered Gerans capable of significantly higher speeds are testing these interceptors. This tactical constraint necessitates diversifying the layers of engagement and reconsidering the allocation of surface-to-air munitions, in addition to deep strikes against the industrial infrastructure that sustains the production rate and the technical adaptations observed since 2024.

The pressure is also quantitative. In 2025, Russia launched more than 54,000 Gerans and decoys, or about 4,500 per month, with this rate expected to be exceeded by early 2026. By March 2025, approximately 110 Shaheds or Gerans were hitting their targets each week, ten times more than the previous year. This trend is part of a surge in weekly production, which rose from around 200 units to 1,000 between September 2024 and March 2025, enabling sustained attrition campaigns.

The technological hardening has amplified these effects. Observations from 2024 and 2025 show the integration of the Russian global satellite navigation system GLONASS, a large number of CRPA or Kometa-M controlled radiation pattern antennas, as well as SIM cards, cameras and NVIDIA Jetson computers.

The addition of the passive radar seeker provides a more autonomous terminal phase, less susceptible to jamming by global GNSS satellite navigation systems. This combination complicates neutralization by electronic warfare and increases the offensive value of a delivery system that remains relatively inexpensive compared to cruise or ballistic missiles, which are available in smaller quantities.

Combined salvos ultimately necessitate simultaneous defensive orchestration across multiple layers. During the June 29 attack, the deployment of 537 vehicles, including over 250 Shaheds, required coordination between air power, ground-to-air missiles, electronic warfare capabilities, unmanned units, and Ukrainian mobile fire groups. The reliance on a large volume of expendable effectors supports the frequency of salvos and covers the use of missiles with significantly more destructive warheads. This, however, puts a strain on interceptor stocks and multiplies prioritization dilemmas, from the near field to the rear.

Conclusion

It is clear from the above that the key difference between 2022 and 2026 lies in Russian industrialization and the integration of new subsystems on the Geran-2. Starting from an imported, satellite-guided, slow-flying, low-altitude, and jam-sensitive effector, the aircraft is now produced locally at around $70,000 per unit, at production rates enabling salvos of 537 aircraft. The progressive addition of anti-jamming antennas, hardened navigation systems, and, on March 29, 2026, a passive radar seeker, transforms the platform into a low-cost tool for suppressing enemy air defenses and alters the defensive landscape.

In this context, the Ukrainian defense faced a sustained influx of over 54,000 Gerans and decoys in 2025, with approximately 110 devices reaching their targets each week in March 2025 despite massive interceptions. The introduction of the jet-powered Geran-5 in January 2026, the use of FPV drones, temporary aerial mining, and the exploitation of 4G or 5G networks further complicate prioritization, munitions allocation, and radio-electric warfare. The potential diffusion of captured modules and the prospect of satellite data links, onboard artificial intelligence, and automated swarm coordination, anticipated for future iterations, will determine the balance between expendable volume and available countermeasures.

Could the F-47 delay put the US Air Force at a disadvantage against the Chinese Air Force?

Fabrice Wolf

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April 3, 2026

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Could the F-47 delay put the US Air Force at a disadvantage against the Chinese Air Force?

A few months ago, the US Air Force issued a report estimating that 1558 aircraft would be needed to address a low to moderate global geopolitical risk, while its planning is capped at 1400 aircraft by 2040. The gap between the estimated need, in an environment far more unstable and dangerous than that considered by the report, implies an increased role for the technological and capability advantage of the American air forces to keep its geostrategic competitors like China in check.

In this context, the recent announcement of the likely postponement of the entry into service of the 6th generation F-47 fighter, intended to replace the F-22 Raptor, beyond 2030, and more probably in the middle of the next decade, is therefore causing a noticeable upheaval in the evolution of the global balance of power in this area.

At the same time, the Chinese J-20 fighter fleet is expected to reach 1000 aircraft by 2030, supported by some 250 to 350 J-35As, more than the theoretical parity in 5th generation, bringing to light the unthinkable just a few years ago: the American air force could lose its global ascendancy in the next few years.

The US Air Force aims for 1,400 fighter jets by 2030

The Pentagon report submitted to Congress in November 2025 set a target of 1,400 piloted tactical aircraft for the US Air Force by 2030, but also specified that 1,558 fighter jets would be needed to meet anticipated requirements based on a low global geopolitical risk (for the United States). To achieve these objectives, the report emphasized adherence to budget authorizations and a consistent, transparent, and continuous financial trajectory.

In a constrained scenario, such as a lack of sustained authorizations, the US Air Force risks failing to meet its target and finding itself in a difficult position to fulfill all its needs. However, budgetary considerations are far from the only potential risk to this trajectory, which, it should be noted, assumes a relatively stable geostrategic environment—something that is far from certain for 2030 today.

American Defense Manufacturers F-35 Lockheed Martin

The production of new aircraft, such as the Lockheed Martin F-35A or the Boeing F-15EX, also represents a key parameter in this equation, whether in connection with the late multi-year release of credits by Congress or the Pentagon, but also in connection with compliance issues, as has been the case, on several occasions in recent years, concerning the F-35A in connection with the TR3 standard which is still not fully achieved, this having led to the suspension of deliveries for many months by the Pentagon.

Finally, the ability to deploy the aircraft represents the other end of the vulnerability chain in this matter. For two decades, the US Air Force has struggled to stabilize its numbers of flight personnel, as well as maintenance personnel, which leads to a decrease in the optimal availability of the fleet, on which, precisely, the needs estimates in the aforementioned report were based.

On the other side of the Pacific, the main strategic competitor of the United States, the People's Republic of China, could have an annual production capacity of 300 to 400 new fourth and fifth generation fighter jets as early as 2027, resulting from very significant investments in the expansion and modernization of the industrial infrastructure of the country's two main aircraft manufacturers, Chengdu (J-10, J-20) and Shenyang (J-15, J-16 and J-35).

By comparison, Lockheed Martin produces approximately 156 F-35s per year, while Boeing's St. Louis plant delivers 30 to 50 F-15s and F/A-18E/Fs annually. The Chengdu plant, meanwhile, has been expanded and modernized, and is expected to assemble more than 120 J-20s per year, accelerating the development of a modern fleet.

For further :

The US Air Force aims for 1400 fighter jets by 2030, but will need 1558 aircraft by that time.

The report submitted to Congress sets an ambitious course for the US Air Force, targeting nearly 1,400 manned tactical aircraft by 2030, and 1,558 to reduce the risk level. The wording remains conditional, as it explicitly refers to the authorization of funding. The issue is all the more sensitive…

In terms of 5th generation fighter jets, the only aircraft currently produced by the American aerospace industry is the F-35. According to Lockheed Martin, restarting production of the F-22 Raptor, which remains a perfectly capable 5th generation aircraft, would be inconceivable without a massive order, and this with costs and deadlines inconsistent with the needs.

This situation underscores the US Air Force's reliance on an existing and aging fleet of just over 120 combat-ready F-22s, whose thirty years of service now necessitate modernization to maintain availability. Finally, despite ongoing acquisition reforms within the US Air Force, and more broadly, the Pentagon, aimed at correcting the contractual excesses observed in the F-22 and F-35 programs, the benefits of increased competition among American aircraft manufacturers are not expected for several years, likely a decade.

The F-47 fighter jet's entry into service has been pushed back to the mid-2030s.

Within this constrained context, a major shift is impacting the future air superiority potential of the US Air Force, with the postponement of the entry into service of Boeing's F-47, the future 6th-generation fighter jet from the Next Generation Air Dominance (NGAD) program, awarded to Boeing a year ago, until the mid-2030s. Indeed, while the messaging surrounding the aircraft's first flight remains chaotic, with some reports indicating 2028 and others claiming the aircraft is already flying, a consensus now seems to be emerging to dismiss the hypothesis of an entry into service in 2030 or shortly thereafter, put forward by the US administration, and to establish 2035 as the likely entry-into-service date for this program.

One of the factors that led to this delay is very likely the two-year delay announced concerning the design of the two next-generation propulsion prototypes, being developed by General Electric and Pratt & Whitney to equip the F-47, with the end of development not expected before fiscal year 2030 according to confirmation from the US Air Force.

Budget documents have shifted the target date from the fourth quarter of fiscal year 2027 to the second quarter of fiscal year 2030, inevitably leading to a delay in the user program. A spokesperson indicated that this updated timeline reflects supply chain challenges. These obstacles increase the likelihood of a postponement in the selection of the model that will equip the future U.S. fighter jet, and with it, subsequent milestones, necessitating a reassessment of priorities.

The unavailability of the F-47 at the beginning of the next decade delayed the arrival of significant operational advantages, including all-around stealth, greater range, and native and extended cooperation with collaborative combat drones from the Collaborative Combat Aircraft (CCA) program. This combination aimed to shorten the sensor-to-gun cycle and improve responsiveness in contested environments, specifically to detect the adversary earlier, react faster, and engage them further away, making the F-47 and its drones, if not a force multiplier, at least a multiplied air force.

Therefore, the 2030-2035 period will rely on legacy F-15 and F-16 platforms, and incomplete capability building blocks on board 5th generation fighters, such as the F-35A and the F-22, while the carrier-based fighters of the US Navy and the USMC will be in the same situation with their F/A-18 E/F and F-35B/C, the 6th generation carrier-based F/A-XX program not being planned to enter service before 2040.

The F-47 development timeline coincides with the emergence of China's sixth-generation fighter jets after 2035.

However, when we put into perspective the technological shift caused by the delays of the F-47 and the limitations of industrial planning, on the American side, and the trajectory of the rise to power of the military aeronautical industry and the Chinese air force, it appears that the two leading air powers in the world will see their fighter fleets cross paths in 2030, in the field of 5th generation fighters, even though the American forces will not be able to rely on the F-47 to technologically compensate for the emerging numerical gap.

Even worse, this crossover of curves might not be a temporary anomaly, but rather a structural trend in the medium and long term. Indeed, while the F-47 and F/A-XX are not expected to enter service with American fighter units until between 2035 and 2040, it is easy to anticipate that the same will be true for China's 6th-generation fighter jets, two models of which, dubbed J-36 (Chengdu) and J-50 (Shenyang) by the press in the absence of an official designation, have been observed in flight since December 2024.

J-36 Chengdu — One of the clearest photos of the J-36. It is not known for certain whether the F-47 is already flying, or if it will fly for the first time in 2028. The Chengdu J-36 trijet heavy fighter, which sports all the external attributes of the 6th generation, has been flying since December 2024, for certain.

In other words, we can anticipate, without great risk, that at least one of these two new generation fighter jets will be operational and in unit by this same deadline of 2035. In other words, where the United States had obtained undisputed air supremacy for more than 25 years, thanks to the F-117 first, then the F-22 and F-35, from 1990 to 2015, before the entry into service of the first 5th generation fighter jet in an operational unit, in this case, the Chinese J-20.

However, technological superiority is an integral part of American military strategy and its doctrine of use. Being deprived of it could lead to situations reminiscent of the difficulties encountered in the early 60s in Vietnam, when Century Series fighters proved vulnerable to the anti-aircraft defenses of Vietnamese MiG-17s and MiG-19s, resulting in terrible losses throughout the conflict.

It is certainly possible to argue that the greatest added value of 5th or 6th generation fighter jets lies in their onboard electronics, communications systems, and munitions, and increasingly, in their ability to operate in cooperation with combat drones. And in this area, the United States maintains a clear lead over China.

Nevertheless, it must also be noted, even admitting this last postulate, that the Chinese dynamic is significantly more sustained than that of the United States, having managed to catch up, today, technologically with a majority of the equipment in service in the US armed forces, whereas just 30 years ago, at the end of the 90s, the PLA was implementing technologies essentially comparable to those of the 60s in the US armed forces.

In other words, in 30 years, China has made up for 30 years of military technological lag. It is therefore necessary to wonder what the situation will be in 10 years, especially when one observes the numerous programs for combat drones, autonomous ground robots, unmanned ships and submarines, but also sensors and communication systems based on very advanced technologies, which do not suggest any future technological decline in any field.

Conclusion

Taken together, these observations paint a deeply concerning picture, particularly for the US Air Force, which has been at the heart of US military power since World War II. First, it appears that the trajectory followed by the US Air Force, in terms of its fighter fleet, for 2030 is 8% lower than the Pentagon's most optimistic risk estimates for that year. And who can believe, today, that the 2030s will be free of significant, even strategic, risks?

Added to this is the trajectory traced by the rapid rise of the Chinese military aeronautics industry, which begins, in 2025-2026, with 350 to 400 combat aircraft produced each year, including at least 120 J-20s, the same upward trajectory that was that of Beijing's naval industry in 2015. Ten years later, the Chinese Navy is unanimously considered the main threat to American naval supremacy in the short term.

An aggravating factor is that the NGAD program and its 6th generation F-47 fighter, intended to give the US Air Force the same technological and capability advantage that the F-22 conferred on it in its time, and for 20 years, will not enter service until 2035, which is the same probable timeframe as the Chinese J-36 and J-50, so that the leveling of American air power by Chinese air power seems to be a long-term trend, and not an isolated, temporary phenomenon.

Together, these three observations are enough to trace a most worrying trajectory, as Washington now seems to be following a more isolated power trajectory, whereas targeted and solid alliances had been at the heart of the strategy to limit Soviet influence during the Cold War.

Without taking into account the real risks that are emerging, and a reorientation of equipment and alliance policies, the United States could well see its hegemonic military position inherited from the end of the Cold War undermined by Beijing, not in the medium term, beyond the horizon of events as perceived by continuous news channels and social networks, but in a much more compressed sequence, which could even be felt on the scale of an electoral term…

The design of the successor to the European Meteor launched by Paris and London

Fabrice Wolf

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April 2, 2026

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The design of the successor to the European Meteor launched by Paris and London

Boosted by the European success of the Meteor air-to-air missile, which entered service in 2016 on Typhoon et RafaleLondon and Paris have launched a study of a successor for long-range engagements. A Franco-British memorandum of understanding sets a twelve-month timeframe to characterize future threats, identify critical technologies, and prepare for integration with users already equipped with Meteor.

Anchored in the Lancaster House 2.0 treaty, the cooperation includes a joint complex armaments office to coordinate industrial priorities, roadmaps, and delivery interfaces. But while the very long-range air-to-air missile seems destined to become the key effector in future air combat, can this Franco-British program form the common foundation of a European kill web?

The Meteor missile sets a European standard for integration and performance.

Entering service in 2016, the Meteor equips, among others, the Typhoon of the Royal Air Force and the Rafale of the Air and Space Force, with six European nations using it. This widespread adoption created a rare industrial and operational base for a long-range air-to-air missile, as well as common standards for its use and support. It is now widely recognized as one of the best, if not the best, in its class, its performance frequently highlighted by specialized analyses. This foundation of experience and users sets very high standards for its successor.

Weighing 185 kg and measuring 3,65 m in length, the Meteor falls into the same size category as the American AIM-120 AMRAAM and the Russian R-77, making it easy to deploy on many fighter aircraft. It is also more compact and lighter than the Chinese PL-15, which weighs around 230 kg, while offering comparable range and speed. This balance between mass, size, and performance explains its adoption by diverse fleets without requiring significant structural modifications. Controlling its size will undoubtedly remain a key parameter for the future missile.

KF-21 Meteor — While cooperation between Jakarta and Seoul regarding the KF-21 has been chaotic, the aircraft has undergone an intensive qualification program at the hands of South Korean pilots. Here, separation from the European long-range METEOR missile.

The Meteor was chosen by fourteen nations to arm Typhoon, Rafale and the Gripen, which constitutes a decisive advantage for the competitiveness of European aircraft. In some cases, aircraft acquisitions have been linked to the simultaneous delivery of advanced weaponry, illustrating the importance of the ecosystem in decision-making. This export leverage establishes de facto interoperability between customer air forces and supports coordinated incremental developments on an already shared standard.

Outside of Europe, Korea Aerospace Industries announced the integration of the Meteor and MICA missiles on the FA-50, with a view to a future extension to the KF-21 Boramae. This approach aims for greater autonomy in the face of difficulties obtaining licenses for the American-made AIM-120 AMRAAM. It extends the use of the Meteor beyond the European sphere of influence, with shared operational and industrial benefits. The missile thus acts as a building block of sovereignty for operators seeking to diversify their capability dependencies.

For further :

How does China structure its very long-range kill web around D-20?

The announcement of a J-20 upgrade, centered on new radars, more powerful engines, and the integration of artificial intelligence tools, has repositioned the aircraft at the heart of a complete combat system rather than as an isolated platform. This evolution highlights an approach where sensors, communications…

In this context, the successor will likely be designed to integrate with Typhoon, Rafale and among other current operators, in order to capitalize on the installed base, while becoming a key component of the next-generation aircraft currently under development, with the GCAP and SCAF programs. The integration architecture and interfaces must limit costs and deadlines, while preserving payload capacities and support chains. The announced joint governance should promote capability continuity between generations on an already established European foundation.

The Lancaster House 2.0 treaty triggers the joint study of the successor.

Building on this network of operators and strong export momentum, France and the United Kingdom have signed an agreement to launch a study for a new-generation air-to-air missile intended to succeed the Meteor. The protocol provides for a twelve-month joint study to examine future air combat threats and the technologies necessary to maintain air superiority. This phase is designed to consolidate a shared understanding of requirements and define realistic industrial objectives, within a timeframe conducive to rapid decision-making.

The study falls within the broader framework of the Lancaster House 2.0 treaty, which deepens Franco-British defense cooperation. This political foundation strengthens the credibility of a joint air superiority missile project and facilitates the convergence of military requirements prior to technical choices. We are strengthening the capabilities of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and European security by working with France on the next generation of air-to-air missiles " according to Luke Pollard, at the British Ministry of Defence.

A joint office for complex weapons programs will be established to coordinate missile programs and align national priorities. This structure, centered around the missile manufacturer MBDA, is intended to minimize duplication, accelerate the alignment of roadmaps for propulsion, sensors, and data links, and orchestrate collaboration between industry and technical authorities to converge on common architectures. It is also designed to accommodate additional partners as the projects mature.

For further :

Israeli Rafael announces the imminent arrival of a long-range air-to-air missile competing with the European Meteor

The Israeli manufacturer Rafael has just announced the upcoming arrival of the Sky Spear, a long-range air-to-air missile that competes with the American AMRAAM and the European Meteor. The Israeli defense industry does not produce combat aircraft or helicopters, nor frigates or submarines. However, it…

The twelve-month timeframe must define the threats, prioritize technological advancements, and clarify fleet integration options to guide upstream studies. It should result in a shared roadmap that reduces duplication between European programs and strengthens the export advantage. The objective is to maintain competitiveness against rivals and accelerated innovation cycles by producing choices that can be quickly implemented by capability decision-makers.

The PL-17 missile provides very long range in air superiority.

The agreement comes as new missiles impose unprecedented ranges and speeds in air combat. In China, the PL-17 entered service in 2022, with a reported range of 350 to over 400 km, satellite-calibrated inertial navigation, a bidirectional data link, and combined active radar and infrared terminal guidance. Speeds exceeding Mach 4 are being discussed, imposing significant constraints on adversary defenses. This qualitative leap targets adversary air force multipliers, such as tankers and early warning aircraft, and considerably expands the interdiction bubble.

Recent photographs show J-16s in an air superiority configuration carrying a PL-17 missile on an external pylon. One aircraft photographed carried four PL-10s, four PL-15s, one PL-12, and one PL-17 in a heavy air-to-air configuration. This combination illustrates a layered engagement strategy that includes a very long-range strike capability. It also confirms the operational maturity of carrying the PL-17 on already deployed platforms, which underscores the urgency of a coordinated European response.

J-16 PLAAF armed with the PL-17 long-range air-to-air missile — PLA Air Force J-16, armed with the PL-17 long-range air-to-air missile

Publications from 2024 also indicate that the PL-XX program has reached a decisive milestone in materials development for hypersonic flight. Engineers used an arc heating wind tunnel simulating extremely high-temperature airflow to validate the strength of the materials and onboard electronics. The PL-XX is projected to maintain hypersonic speed throughout its flight, with a range of 700 to 800 km. This level of ambition doubles the range targeted by the PL-17 and shifts the dynamics of air interdiction.

On the Russian side, the R-37M boasts a claimed range of 400 km and a speed of Mach 5, with a mass of 600 kg and a length of 6 m. Designed to replace the R-33 on the MiG-31BM, it entered service in 2018. Its dimensions limit its carriage to heavy platforms such as the Su-35S and the MiG-31, but this operational missile illustrates the pressure exerted on very long-range missiles.

Initially envisioned by NATO primarily as a threat to support aircraft before 2022, the R-37M has demonstrated long-range interception capabilities against Ukrainian Su-25 fighter-bombers in recent years, making it the most feared air-to-air system for Ukrainian pilots today.

For further :

China's new PL-17 air-to-air missile, with a range of more than 350 km, would be operational

Recent photos released by the People's Liberation Army show J-16 heavy fighter jets armed with the new PL-17 long-range air-to-air missile. The arrival of this missile could significantly alter the tactical reality of this theater, pushing back aircraft by several hundred kilometers…

In the United States, the US Air Force confirmed that a recently published rendering of the AIM-260A accurately reflects the design of the Joint Advanced Tactical Missile, intended to replace the AIM-120 AMRAAM. The missile has reportedly been delivered in small batches to certain units, though no further information was provided. Meanwhile, in Israel, Rafael announced the upcoming arrival of the Sky Spear, a direct competitor to the Meteor and the AIM-260. This convergence of announcements and capabilities necessitates rapid adaptation from European actors, both commercially and operationally.

The AIM-260A missile illustrates a quest for speed and range compatible with the fleet.

Faced with benchmarks placing the range between 350 and over 400 km, the development of the Meteor's successor must prioritize energy range and propulsion optimization. JATM renderings suggest a longer rocket engine and a low-drag design, within a footprint compatible with internal integration. This approach aims for higher speeds and greater range without compromising integration. The Franco-British framework will need to make decisions based on similar principles to maximize energy delivery while maintaining compatibility with the existing fleet.

To reduce flight time, very high speed regimes become crucial, with a hypersonic ambition mentioned for the PL-XX at 700 or 800 km, but also the Russian R-37M already in service, although, for the latter, hypersonic speed would now only be during the transit phase towards the target, before slowing down for the activation of the seeker.

The combination of extreme speed and late homing activation reduces the target's reaction window. It also complicates the use of decoys and evasive maneuvers at the end of the trajectory, as illustrated by hybrid guidance systems. These requirements necessitate high-temperature resistant materials and reinforced electronics, designed for harsh thermal environments.

For further :

Russian long-range R-37M air-to-air missile combined with Su-35s more effective than expected in Ukraine

Developed in the 80s based on the R-33 (AA-9 Amos) heavy missile, the R-37 (AA-13 Axehead) heavy air-to-air missile, which led to the R-37M design, was intended to give aircraft lacking the powerful radar of the MiG-31 the ability to engage long-range aerial targets. To achieve this,…

Networking is essential for very long-range engagements, with multi-source guidance, robust data links, and multi-mode seekers. The evolution of the J-20 into a networked combat node, with new radars, more powerful engines, and the integration of artificial intelligence tools, illustrates this shift toward a lethal aerial web. Variants equipped with advanced sensors and extensive information sharing are changing long-range tactics. The future missile must therefore be designed to be network-ready and capable of collaborative targeting.

Compactness will remain key for seamless integration on Typhoon, Rafale and among current Meteor operators, but also to integrate into the bomb bays of future European stealth fighters. The successor must fit into these ecosystems without major modifications, in order to limit qualification times and adaptation costs. This continuity will preserve the overall force structure by allowing a gradual build-up, in line with existing payload capacities and support capabilities.

The hunter Rafale strengthens the attractiveness of European armaments for export.

The identified technical priorities call for robust cooperation, now structured by the Lancaster House 2.0 Treaty and the Joint Office for Complex Armaments. This framework organizes the alignment of Franco-British priorities and the coordination of missile programs. It provides for openness to partners once technical and capability milestones are reached, while anchoring the effort in a common governance conducive to shared architectural choices.

This coordination increases the likelihood of broader multinational cooperation within NATO and better alignment of roadmaps. Establishing a joint structure demonstrates a commitment to aggregating converging requirements, anticipating common interfaces for data links and sensor interoperability, and providing industry with a signal of stable requirements by limiting duplication. Conversely, maintaining binational control until the requirements are defined will prevent the accumulation of national requirements, sometimes driven more by industrial and economic considerations than by proven operational needs.

GCAP Tempest Program Royal Air Force Farnborough 2024 — To be fully effective, the Meteor's successor must not only strike far and fast. Above all, it must be integrated into a necessarily European kill web, deployed simultaneously across the various European future fighter aircraft programs, such as the British Tempest of the GCAP program.

In the markets, the Meteor, chosen by fourteen nations, remains a cornerstone of influence and competitiveness for European aircraft. However, the anticipated arrival of the Israeli Sky Spear as a direct competitor to the Meteor and the AIM-260 intensifies the pressure. The study also aims to secure the export advantage by anticipating the next generation, rather than suffering commercial erosion. This dynamic requires high performance and controlled integration within fleets, in faster innovation cycles.

The kill web approach, essential for engaging long-range aerial targets, requires standardization of networking components and collaborative guidance capabilities to ensure inter-platform interoperability. Thus, a network-ready, post-Meteor missile would facilitate the convergence of European combat systems, such as GCAP and SCAF, while the gradual opening to partners would pave the way for the Europeanization of network components, and therefore the combat cloud, now at the heart of the 6th generation of fighter jets.

For further :

Is China developing a hypersonic air-to-air missile with a range of 800 km?

For the past few weeks, specialized Chinese social media has been abuzz with talk of the development of a new, very long-range air-to-air missile, reportedly twice as powerful as the brand-new PL-17, with its 400 km range. Indeed, according to information published in magazines…

In the short term, the twelve-month study is expected to produce a roadmap clarifying techno-operational priorities and reducing industrial duplication. It is based on an examination of future threats and the definition of fleet integration options, in accordance with the memorandum of understanding. Key risks relate to propulsion and range, high-temperature materials, and the integration of sensors and data links. Work on materials for hypersonic flight sheds light on these challenges, which are crucial for maintaining the target speeds and ensuring the robustness of the onboard electronics.

Conclusion

It is clear from the above that the Meteor has established a European operational and export benchmark in the field of long-range air-to-air missiles, with fourteen customers and proven integration on Typhoon et Rafale since 2016. The range of the PL-17 of 350 to 400 km, the R-37M operating at Mach 5 and the American acceleration on the AIM-260 nevertheless require anticipating a jump in range, speed and guidance logic.

The Franco-British memorandum of understanding and the twelve-month study under the Lancaster House 2.0 treaty will help to define the framework for threats and fleet integration, with a joint office aligning propulsion, sensors, and data links to reduce duplication. The objective is to maintain the export advantage against the Israeli Sky Spear, the American AIM-260, and Japanese and Turkish projects, but also to regain the range advantage against Chinese and Russian systems.

To this end, faced with the arrival of missiles like the Chinese PL-XX and its 800 km range powered by a kill web articulated by the J-20, a compact and network-ready post-Meteor missile must make it possible to create the essential gateways between future European combat aircraft programs, towards a European kill web, provided that interfaces are standardized and integration costs and times are controlled in current fleets.

Deprived of the J-35, Pakistan is once again turning to the J-10CE in the face of new Rafale india

Fabrice Wolf

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April 2, 2026

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Deprived of the J-35, Pakistan is once again turning to the J-10CE in the face of new Rafale india

In early 2026, Islamabad was expected to enter the final phase of approval for the acquisition of 60 to 70 additional Chinese J-10CE fighter jets, in order to reinforce the 20 aircraft ordered in 2023 and engaged against the Indian Air Force in May 2024, and the 16 additional ones already ordered.

While the 40 J-35As announced for 2025 cannot be fulfilled for another 4 years, and while New Delhi is finalizing negotiations around 114 Rafale In addition, the Chinese J-10CE fighter jet and its PL-15E long-range missile, once self-proclaimed stars of Operation Sindoor, now represent the only credible alternative for Pakistani air forces in need of modernization and long-range engagement capabilities.

S-400 and Rafale impose on the Pakistani Air Force the reinforcement of long-range engagement after Sindoor

The exact consequences of the Indo-Pakistani air battles during Operation Sindoor in May 2025 remain widely debated, depending on the sources considered. It quickly emerged that victory communiqués issued by Islamabad, claiming multiple victories by the Pakistani air force and their new Chinese J-10CE fighters against the Rafale Indians, have been greatly overestimated, whereas beyond the first engagement on May 7, Indian air superiority appears to have been almost total over the engagement areas.

On the Indian side, the two technological victors of this conflict have been clearly identified through accelerated negotiations for increased resources. Thus, a few days ago, New Delhi confirmed an order for five additional S-400 batteries from Moscow, the Russian anti-aircraft system having been credited with several victories, including one against a Pakistani Saab 2000 Erieye AWACS. At the same time, negotiations are underway regarding the acquisition of 114 Rafale to the F4 and F5 standards, including 96 in local production, seems close to its conclusion.

Rafale AASM — Rafale in heavy strike configuration with two A2SM Hammer 1000 powered guided bombs, two medium-range MICA EM and two short-range MICA IR, as well as two 2000 L subsonic tanks, allowing the aircraft to strike at over 1000 km.

On the Pakistani side, after initial reports claiming a major victory against the IAF, the PAF (Pakistani Air Force) became much more discreet. It appears that several key Chinese systems in the Pakistani air defense apparatus did not achieve the expected performance, such as the HQ-9 anti-aircraft system, but also the J-10CE and its long-range PL-15E missile, intended to be the equivalent of the European Meteor.

Thus, Islamabad's first major post-Sindoor announcement was not to order more HQ-9s or J-10CEs, but rather to turn to the Chinese J-35A, the land-based version of the new Chinese carrier-based medium fighter, first unveiled at the Zhuhai Airshow a few months earlier. According to Pakistani statements in June 2025, Islamabad was going to order 40 Chinese stealth fighters, an announcement that already implicitly confirmed two weaknesses encountered during Sindoor: vulnerability to India's integrated air defense system, and the lack of air-to-air performance of the J-10CE and its PL-15E missile against the RafaleIndian Mirage 2000 and Su-30MKI.

The Chinese J-10CE single-engine aircraft to extend Pakistan's long-range interception

Because the greatest lesson from Sindoor will not have been about the respective qualities of the aircraft, airborne munitions and anti-aircraft defense systems on either side, but concerning the extension of engagement distances in air warfare.

And in this area, the Indian armed forces seem to have gained a clear advantage over their Pakistani counterparts, not only during Sindoor, but also in the announcements that followed, with the strengthening of the S-400 network, the acquisition of Kh-47M2 missiles for the Su-30MKI, some of which will be upgraded to the "Super Sukhoi" standard, and of course, the 26 Rafale M commanded by the Navy and the 114 Rafale B/C is about to be by the IAF.

Following the postponement of the J-35A order, now slated for delivery in 3 to 4 years, it was therefore urgent for the PAK to rapidly bolster its long-range engagement capabilities. And the only aircraft available from its Chinese ally for this purpose remains the J-10CE and its PL-15E missile, which, while not performing as well as initially anticipated during Sindoor, nonetheless represented the best response to India's strike capabilities comprised of... Rafale armed with SCALP-ER missiles and Hammer rocket-propelled bombs, and Su-30MKIs dropping their Brahmos at longer ranges.

For further :

Beijing has postponed the delivery of the J-35A fighter jet promised to Pakistan by four years.

While the announcement in 2025 of the sale of J-35As to Pakistan was widely reported after Operation Sindoor, new statements call these claims into question and now suggest, without further concrete evidence, a four-year delay before Islamabad receives its first fighter jet…

The Pakistani decision thus aims to quickly meet a mass need beyond visual range by relying on the active electronically scanned array radar and the PL-15E missile of the J-10CE, the Chinese aircraft appearing to have been the most capable against the S-400 and the Indian fighter.

In this regard, it should be noted that Pakistan's gamble on the modern Sino-Pakistani JF-17 Block IIIc light fighter appears to have been largely unsuccessful. The aircraft, despite being presented as well-equipped and capable, and with over a hundred examples available to the PAF (Palais des Aires Français), has not been able to provide the expected increase in firepower to close the numerical gap with the IAF (Indonesian Air Force), whether due to its insufficient range, limited payload capacity, weaknesses in BVR (Battle Range) combat, or a combination of all three.

Pakistan's decision is not without obvious budgetary constraints for Islamabad, as the estimated unit cost of the J-10CE, between 40 and 50 million dollars, makes a realistic increase in production possible, but also political constraints, since neither Russia, nor Europe, nor even South Korea seem ready to sell their Su-35s, Gripens, Typhoon or other Boramae to a direct adversary of New Delhi, without even mentioning the Rafale French. Washington, for its part, still maintains tense relations with the Pakistani authorities since the Afghan episode and the country's shift towards Beijing.

Finally, while the Chinese air force is now turning massively to the J-20, the J-35 and the J-15 and J-16, the production capabilities around the J-10 probably allow for faster deliveries, unlike the case of the J-35 which, obviously, must quickly supply the first units of the naval aviation and then the Chinese air force.

The Pakistani PL-15E missile versus the Indian Meteor and Kh-47M2

The J-10CE active electronically scanned array (AESA) radar and PL-15E missile system form the core of Islamabad's beyond-visual-range combat architecture. The May 2025 engagements resulted in interceptions from significant safe distances, validating the operational use of this sensor-effects suite. The resulting engagement doctrine involves a greater separation between detection and engagement phases, with a volume of fire projected earlier into space.

The key player in this approach remains the forward air surveillance aircraft, better known by its acronym AWACS, such as the KJ-500, capable of detecting targets hundreds of kilometers away and providing data links to fighter jets and their missiles. The J-10C can then conduct the interception with its radar switched off or in low-emission mode, only activating its transmission at the precise moment of confirmation and firing. This sequence reduces the electromagnetic signature before engagement, thus limiting early exposure to adversary detection and jamming systems.

J-10C PL-15 & PL-10 — Pakistani J-10CE armed in long-range air-to-air configuration with two fuel tanks, 4 PL-15E long-range air-to-air missiles and 2 PL-10 short-range air-to-air missiles.

Several Chinese units recently conducted high-intensity exercises with J-10Cs in complex electromagnetic environments, including beyond-visual-range engagements, medium-range firing, and close-quarters combat. Crews alternated between tracking and locking onto aircraft, followed by high-intensity maneuvers, with the aim of increasing tactical survivability and mission continuity. These regular joint exercises incorporate coordination with early warning assets, ground defense, radar, and electronic warfare units—precisely what appears to have been partially lacking in the PAF (Patient Air Force) in May 2025.

However, transposing Chinese doctrine to the Pakistani Air Force is not straightforward. Firstly, because the two forces do not have the same resources, particularly in terms of support aircraft (AWACS, tankers, SIGINT aircraft, etc.), but also in the field of space-based intelligence. Furthermore, a significant portion of the PAF's air fleet is of Western origin, including the two remaining Erieye AWACS, as well as the fleet of F-16s and Mirage IIIs still in service, representing half of Pakistan's fighter fleet.

This inevitably creates numerous frictions in the optimal use of the fleet, particularly in employing the J-10CE while applying the doctrine advocated by the PLA. Therefore, it will be necessary to closely monitor any discussions between Islamabad and Beijing concerning the entire operational technosphere likely to surround the future J-10CE, especially regarding early warning aircraft, tankers, and also the Loyal Wingmen and MALE drones, capable of laying an extensive kill web that can fully exploit the capabilities of the aircraft and its missile.

Conclusion

It appears that the unavailability of the J-35A for export, combined with the losses and lessons learned from Sindoor, has led Islamabad to rapidly mass-produce the J-10CE. The final approval, targeted for early 2026, for 60 to 70 aircraft at $40 to $50 million each, seeks a level of engagement beyond the readily available visual range. Islamabad's status as the sole export customer for the Chinese aircraft allows for the possibility of accelerated deliveries. This trajectory should enable the French Air Force (PAF) to manage the influx of new aircraft. Rafale and Indian S-400s.

However, numerical parity alone will not suffice if electronic warfare, crew training, and the integration of surveillance and command capabilities do not progress at the same pace. The repositioning of surveillance aircraft and tankers lengthens the chain from detection to gunner and increases reliance on data links, with the Chinese industrial agenda and unsigned contracts impacting production rates and support. The ability to contain Rafale Better protected Indians with deep strike capabilities will depend as much on hardened communications and electronic warfare synchronization as on simply increasing the number of J-10CEs.

The Chinese Academy of Sciences presents a counter-rotating Ramjet capable of accelerating from 0 to Mach 6

Fabrice Wolf

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April 1, 2026

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The Chinese Academy of Sciences presents a counter-rotating Ramjet capable of accelerating from 0 to Mach 6

The Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS) announced a few days ago the validation of a prototype Contra-Rotary Ramjet hypersonic engine capable of operating continuously from zero speed to Mach 6. Its twin-rotor design eliminates the need for guide vanes and promises a shorter and lighter machine with equivalent compression ratio, according to Dr. Xu Jianzhong, after thirty years of research.

This milestone contrasts with supersonic combustion ramjets (scramjets) requiring external acceleration, as exemplified by the X-43A in 2004. Chinese developers are considering...'éequip with missiles and, by projection, fighters of this new engine, opening the way to speeds far exceeding the Mach 3 ceiling of turbojets, to Mach 6, which raises the question of a lasting hypersonic advantage for Beijing.

The X-43A demonstrator demonstrates the initial dependence of scramjets on external acceleration

Twenty years of testing have shown that hypersonic flight most often relies on aspirated air engines, which are difficult to implement. In 2004, NASA's X-43A, a small unmanned aircraft launched from a B-52 and then accelerated by a Pegasus rocket, reached Mach 9,6 using a scramjet. This campaign confirmed that a scramjet could not be ignited at low speeds and required prior acceleration by a rocket engine or carrier aircraft to reach the minimum ignition speed.

This constraint obviously complicates the integration of such systems and has heavily impacted the development of high supersonic (Mach 3,5 to Mach 5) and low hypersonic (Mach 5 to Mach 7) airborne systems to date. At the same time, the added value of hypersonic technology has become essential in armed forces, partly driven by Russian declarations in 2019, but also due to the renewed risk of symmetrical confrontations between major technological powers: once again, it was necessary to gain a technological advantage over a capable adversary with significant scientific resources, and the hypersonic threshold was identified as a means to achieve this.

Indeed, developments in this field have accelerated considerably in recent years. In the United States, a launch from the Space Force Station at Cape Canaveral on March 26 was associated with a hypersonic weapon test over the Atlantic. The observed characteristics have been compared to the Dark Eagle program, which uses a maneuverable glider deployed by the U.S. Army and Navy. Reports indicate a range of approximately 2,780 kilometers and speeds exceeding Mach 5 for this high-wing-effect system. The combination of the glider's maneuverability and long range complicates the interception of strikes launched from areas of wide-angle trajectory.

Russia also boasts a strategic hypersonic portfolio with the Avangard hypersonic glide vehicle, launched by ballistic missile and reportedly capable of speeds of Mach 20 to 27 (unconfirmed figures). The system is believed to have been produced in only about a dozen units, limiting its use to very high-value targets, despite Moscow's often enthusiastic pronouncements in this area.

In Europe, France conducted the first test flight of the VMAX demonstrator on June 26, 2023, over Biscarrosse. This FS-1 flight was launched on a three-stage rocket carrying the French hypersonic glider for the first time. This milestone is part of a broader trajectory that includes the ASN4G hypersonic missile, successor to the supersonic ASMPA, expected to enter service from 2035 onwards. Rafale F5. Europe therefore remains in the demonstration and maturation phase before commissioning.

The Chinese Academy of Sciences approves a Contra-Rotary Ramjet operating from Mach 0 to Mach 6

While recent architectures combine carriers, boosters, and gliders, the Chinese Academy of Sciences has announced the validation of a continuously operating, aspirated air-driven engine capable of speeds from zero to Mach 6. This prototype Contra-Rotary Ramjet Engine is designed to cover the entire subsonic to hypersonic range without any impulse, interruption, or change in propulsion. Indeed, such a leap forward was conceived to eliminate the propulsion sequences imposed by forced-ignition systems and to pave the way for single-propulsion vehicles for aeronautical and missile applications.

The principle employed by the Chinese researchers relies on two rotors spinning in opposite directions, eliminating the guide vanes between stages and significantly shortening the engine. This compactness is accompanied by a reduced mass while maintaining compression efficiency comparable to much longer engines. Shock waves are used to prepare the air before combustion. This design aims to maximize the compactness and mass ratio without compromising the compression system.

The research director of this program has positioned this breakthrough as the culmination of more than thirty years of effort. He claims a breakthrough that goes beyond performance measured solely on test benches and in wind tunnels. This research, which has lasted more than 30 years, represents a strategic step towards breaking the technological monopoly of Western jet engines " he declared. The political significance of this statement accompanies the technical ambition displayed by the Chinese scientific community.

The program's proponents present this technology for future hypersonic missiles, with smaller launch vehicles and increased range for a given mass. They also envision fighter jets capable of taking off from conventional bases and then reaching the stratosphere at speeds of up to Mach 6. Such a trajectory would concentrate the propulsion system around a single engine rather than heavy and complex hybrid assemblies. The anticipated end of reliance on dual-propulsion systems would, if confirmed, represent a major shift in Chinese aircraft architectures.

The Chinese Academy of Sciences is banking on compactness to extend range and payload

The claimed ability to operate seamlessly from Mach 0 to Mach 6 directly addresses the mode-switching risk that plagued scramjet programs. Since these programs do not operate at low speeds, the X-43A exemplified their reliance on an initial booster to achieve ignition. By eliminating this step, the Chinese engine would reduce failures related to flow instabilities at the transition speed thresholds. The propulsion sequence would be simplified, thereby reducing a major and critical portion of the complexity inherited from multimode architectures.

Saving weight and dimensions frees up volume and mass for fuel or an increased payload in both missiles and aircraft. With the same launch vehicle, the expected effect is a longer range or a heavier payload, thus enhancing long-range military effectiveness. These theoretical gains stem from the architectural choices described by CAS researchers.

VMAX trajectory Biscarosse June 2023 — Flights of the French hypersonic glider VMax over Biscarosse in 2023

Counter-rotating the blades maintains lower absolute speeds for a given compression, thus limiting mechanical stresses. This margin reduces the risk of structural failure at the extreme speeds reached by moving components. Durability and maintenance requirements could therefore be improved under intensive operating conditions in harsh thermal environments. This enhanced robustness would improve in-service viability, a crucial factor for the industrialization of hypersonic aircraft.

For the People's Liberation Army, the combination of compactness and continuous propulsion would result in smaller missiles offering greater range for the same mass. On an aeronautical scale, the option of conventionally launched fighters capable of reaching Mach 6 in the stratosphere would broaden engagement profiles and operational footprint without relying on external launchers or additional propulsion systems. These promises, however, remain contingent on representative flight tests and system integration before any implementation in the battle order, which will likely require several years.

The Dark Eagle program maintains operational pressure in the face of Chinese ambitions.

Indeed, the potential benefits will only become significant once the classic gap between prototype and representative flights is bridged, as demonstrated by American experience. Hyper-X achieved its objectives with the X-43A in 2004, but the subsequent X-43C and X-43D versions failed, leaving a gap in flight validation. Conversely, progressive demonstration campaigns, exemplified in Europe by the VMAX FS-1 flight in 2023, help to mature the critical components. The transition to complete systems will require a series of tests, from wind tunnel testing to operational environments, to establish robustness and repeatability.

American competition remains very active, with frequent and little-publicized tests, a sign of controlled progress toward operational capability in a sensitive context. The March 26 launch from Cape Canaveral is part of this dynamic. Dark Eagle combines a solid-propellant rocket motor that accelerates the C-HGB hypersonic glide body before separation, with high maneuverability and thermal resistance. Its range of approximately 2,780 kilometers and maneuverable glide capability enhance its deflection effect and penetration potential against defenses.

S-500 Prometheus — The Russian S-500 is designed to intercept descending hypersonic vehicles such as hypersonic gliders and MARVs.

It should be noted, however, that Western advances in this field are primarily linked to either anaerobic systems or aerobic systems using a lifting platform or dual engines. To date, no system has been announced capable of covering the Mach 0 to Mach 6 range with a single engine, neither in the West nor, for that matter, in Russia. Therefore, if the Chinese announcements were to materialize operationally within a short timeframe, there is no doubt that the PLA would then possess a significant technological and capability advantage, potentially capable of influencing the balance of power in its competition with the United States.

Countermeasures are also under development, whether in the United States (SM-6, Golden Dome), Europe (Aster B1NT, Hydis/HYdef), Russia (S-500, S-550), or even China (HQ-19). However, while these systems will indeed be capable of engaging, intercepting, and destroying maneuvering hypersonic vehicles such as hypersonic gliders or ballistic missiles equipped with MARVs, the possibility of a true airborne hypersonic missile capable of maneuvering and high speed variation would undoubtedly complicate the task of these systems considerably.

Conclusion

It is clear from the above that the Chinese Academy of Sciences' validation of a contra-rotary ramjet engine operating from Mach 0 to Mach 6 represents a break with architectures still reliant on external acceleration, as exemplified by the X-43A. The compactness and lightness resulting from contra-rotating rotors, with equivalent compression efficiency, limit propulsion transitions and free up mass and volume for fuel or payload, with plausible gains in range and military effectiveness. The deployment of conventionally launched fighters capable of reaching Mach 6 broadens the range of potential applications, but China's advantage will depend on representative flights and system integration before any lasting superiority can be achieved.

While advanced hypersonic programs exist in the West, in the United States as well as in Europe or Japan, in Russia and elsewhere, and while countermeasures are also being designed to intercept hypersonic gliders and ballistic MARVs, the added value conferred by a hypersonic air-launched engine capable of autonomous takeoff could well change the balance of power, both tactically and strategically.

Nevertheless, China, and its research institutes, are also known for making announcements that are, if not outright false, at least sometimes exaggerated, particularly in the field of defense technologies. These announcements offer the advantage of avoiding critical scrutiny from international peers upon publication. This does not necessarily mean that these Chinese announcements are purely propaganda, but it does call for a degree of caution in interpreting their potential consequences.

With the MQ-28 drone, Germany is expanding its combat drone programs.

Fabrice Wolf

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April 1, 2026

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With the MQ-28 drone, Germany is expanding its combat drone programs.

On March 31, 2026, Rheinmetall and Boeing Australia announced a partnership around the MQ-28 Ghost Bat, which Berlin envisions as a Loyal Wingman combat companion to support the Eurofighter fleet. This development comes as the Luftwaffe's requirement for collaborative combat aircraft (CCA), planned for 2029, is hampered by the retirement of the Tornado and a multi-track approach with the XQ-58A and the German-British stealth combat drone announced in the Trinity House agreements.

The accumulation of announcements and programs in this area is creating some confusion in the perception of the German trajectory regarding Loyal Wingmen, while the SCAF program no longer seems to appear in Berlin's industrial and strategic objectives.

The Eurofighter Typhoon The Luftwaffe's systems must be supported from 2029 onwards by a stealthy, collaborative combat drone.

The requirement to deploy collaborative combat aircraft by 2029 stems from the planned retirement of the Tornado and a pressing need to bolster combat aviation. Turnkey adoption of the MQ-28 Ghost Bat had been considered and then postponed, according to Hartpunkt, triggering new market assessments. The timeline remains tight for achieving a credible initial capability by 2029, putting pressure on each pathway for integration and initial qualification.

Airbus Defence and Space is establishing a training facility in Manching for two XQ-58A Valkyrie aircraft supplied by Kratos, with the aim of integrating them into sovereign European mission systems. These aircraft are intended to support the Eurofighter fleet by 2029, building on the first flight of the European variant scheduled for late 2026. The MARS Multiplatform Autonomous Reconfigurable and Secure mission system and the MindShare software are designed to coordinate swarms and share the workload with the Eurofighter.

Airbus DS combat drone — Model of the combat drone proposed by Airbus as part of the Trinity House agreements.

On October 23, 2024, in London, Boris Pistorius, the German Minister of Defense, and John Healey, the UK Secretary of State for Defence, signed the Trinity House agreement, committing Germany and the United Kingdom to a precision strike capability with a range exceeding 2,000 km and to the joint development of a combat drone. No public details regarding funding or a common doctrine have been shared since. Nevertheless, the cooperation sets an ambitious course that will require fundamental choices in terms of architecture and technological maturity.

For further :

Trinity House seals a German-British axis around a 2,000 km strike and a combat drone

Signed in London on October 23, 2024 by Boris Pistorius, German Minister of Defence, and John Healey, UK Secretary of State for Defence, the Trinity House Agreement, described as unprecedented by the British Ministry of Defence, places deep strike at the heart of a German-British agenda…

On land, Berlin is already pursuing a multi-pronged strategy with three parallel programs for a new-generation tank. It is simultaneously running the Franco-German MGCS program, the MARTE program funded by the European Defence Fund, and a national program for the successor to the Leopard 2. This experience demonstrates the feasibility of parallel approaches under time constraints. The iterative evaluation of the Loyal Wingman solutions and the European trajectory around the XQ-58A reinforce this preference for competing paths before 2029.

Boeing's MQ-28 Ghost Bat, supported by Rheinmetall, offers a rapid response with potential industrialization in Germany.

In this context, Rheinmetall and Boeing Australia announced a strategic partnership around the MQ-28 on March 31, 2026.Presented as a significant step in the Bundeswehr's combat aircraft reconfiguration, Berlin envisions the Ghost Bat as the Loyal Wingman for the Eurofighter fleet. The announcement positions the Australian platform at the forefront of a rapid response to the 2029 deadline, while also opening the prospect of local industrialization under German leadership.

The MQ-28 has surpassed 150 flights and successfully completed an AIM-120 AMRAAM firing in December 2025 on the third prototype. This level of maturity allows for a favorable integration pace in line with the schedule. Technological risks appear to be mitigated by a substantial body of existing tests, making it a credible candidate for initial capability in Germany in the short term.

xq-28 firieng AMRAAM — Shot of an AIM-120 AMRAAM by an Australian MQ-28 Ghost Bat.

The Ghost Bat's architecture is based on proven modularity with rapid replacement of the frontal section to reconfigure the payload. The Australian government has contracted Block 2 and Block 3 variants, the latter featuring an internal weapons bay. The combination of a proven airframe and flexible mission options brings the platform closer to an adaptable series design, conducive to frequent incremental upgrades and updates to mission systems.

This announcement revives a turnkey option that had been shelved in favor of further evaluations. Armin Papperger, CEO of Rheinmetall, anticipates revenues of several hundred million euros and asserts that the project will make Germany a European industrial hub for CCA technologies. The equation combines a tight timeline, potential industrialization in Germany, and a transfer of systems know-how, which strengthens the political and industrial appeal of the MQ-28 option in the short term.

The Kratos XQ-58A Valkyrie, presented by Airbus, supports a triple CCA pathway under evaluation

Two CCA pathways are active: the European integration of the XQ-58A by 2029 and the revival of the MQ-28, while Trinity House is leading a joint development of a combat drone. The precise classification of this third pathway, between strike UCAV and combat companion, remains to be defined in the absence of a detailed public doctrine. The hypothesis of a three-pronged approach in the short term remains consistent with ongoing projects and the requirement to have credible options before 2029.

Airbus is aiming for a first flight of the European variant of the Valkyrie by the end of 2026, with Loyal Wingman integration by 2029. Achieving a credible initial capability will depend on the speed of assessments and selection, following the postponement of the turnkey option. Any further delay would put the schedule under pressure and give an advantage to platforms that already have extensive test experience.

xq-58A Vlakyrie kratos F-35 USMC — The Valkyrie was accompanied by two F-35Bs from the US Marine Corps.

Australia is exploring the integration of British weapons into the Ghost Bat and hopes to extend this to the European weapons family. "We are looking to expand the capability to include the European weapons family," said Australian Defence Industry Minister Pat Conroy on February 23. He also indicated that trials at Australian firing ranges would involve a long-range system without specifying the missile's specifications, implying further integration and testing work before any adoption by European partners.

The lack of public funding and a shared doctrine on Trinity House could delay industrial maturation and operational integration. This uncertainty complicates the prioritization of strike CCAs and UCAVs for the period 2026 to 2029. German decisions regarding the MQ-28 program and the European integration of the XQ-58A will therefore influence the actual configuration of a potential third program, beyond mere political announcements.

Defense industrial partnerships increase industrial options but do not extend German strategic autonomy.

To support parallel production lines, the industrial apparatus must accelerate and secure upstream and downstream partnerships. Rheinmetall sealed a European production agreement with Anduril for Barracuda missiles and Fury combat drones at the 2025 Paris Air Show, while also producing F-35A fuselages for the Luftwaffe since 2023. The company aims to become the European leader by 2030 with €40 billion in revenue, thanks to strong investments, the rapid production of proven equipment, and sustained external growth.

The increasing number of partnerships with allied ecosystems, including Boeing Australia, Lockheed Martin, and Anduril, can accelerate the availability of CCA solutions. However, it also increases technological dependence on the United States and fuels questions about European strategic autonomy. The trade-off between speed of integration and sovereign control of critical supply chains will therefore remain crucial for any ramp-up between 2026 and 2029.

For further :

Is Rheinmetall's industrial strategy an example or a danger for Europe?

At the Paris Air Show 2025, the German group Rheinmetall, more accustomed to the Eurosatory trade fair, announced the signing of a strategic partnership with the American company Anduril, concerning the production and marketing in Europe of Barracuda cruise missiles and combat drones…

The previous terrestrial system with MGCS, MARTE, and a national successor to the Leopard Figure 2 shows that a multi-track strategy is possible, but susceptible to cost and time overruns. In the short term, the coexistence of CCA and UCAV tracks can support domestic industrialization and exports, prior to consolidation driven by performance, costs, and interoperability. Maintaining industrial flexibility provides assurance against the doctrinal and contractual uncertainties observed in some collaborations.

Securing multi-year volumes and orders is essential for investment and ramping up production on the lines. Without predictability, the sustainability of the three routes remains fragile and sensitive to political cycles. The milestones expected between 2026 and 2029, including the first European flight at the end of 2026 and the test campaigns already underway on Ghost Bat, make it likely that development will continue in parallel until the pre-series stage, followed by consolidation guided by cost, performance, and interoperability objectives.

Conclusion

Germany now has two active CCA pathways and a UCAV co-development program, making a third pathway conducted in parallel plausible. The latest example, the MQ-28 Ghost Bat from Boeing Australia and Rheinmetall, combines more than 150 flights, an AIM-120 AMRAAM demonstration, and localizable industrialization with Rheinmetall, supporting a credible initial capability by 2029.

The European XQ-58A project from Airbus and the American Kratos aims for a first flight by the end of 2026 and integration of the Loyal Wingman system on the Eurofighter by 2029, subject to rapid evaluation and selection processes. Finally, the Trinity House agreements commit London and Berlin to the joint development of a combat drone and a strike capability beyond 2,000 km, without any public funding or doctrine clearly defining priorities and budgets.

The simultaneous maintenance of all three production lines up to the pre-series stage between 2026 and 2029 appears likely, before a consolidation guided by cost, performance, and interoperability. With defense spending increasing from €39 billion in 2022 to over €150 billion projected for 2029, the German Ministry of Defense can simultaneously fund research, development, and accelerated industrialization.

The lack of a massive expansion of the Bundeswehr's structure directs these resources towards research, industrialization, and rapid production, in line with the multi-stakeholder strategy already proven successful with tanks. Rheinmetall's partnerships with Anduril, Lockheed Martin, and Boeing Australia, along with the target of €40 billion in revenue by 2030, accelerate availability but increase technological dependencies.

The fact remains that the sustainability of a three-pronged approach requires secure multi-year orders and clear governance; otherwise, the cost and delays observed in the past could recur, or even worsen. Above all, while this three-pronged approach may indeed offer certain short-term industrial options, it in no way guarantees the expansion of German strategic autonomy. It is therefore understandable that it might satisfy Rheinmetall or Airbus, but it is important to remember that ultimately, Berlin will pay, and will still be dependent on American technologies for its defense.

Faced with the uncertainties surrounding MGCS, France is considering an intermediate-generation tank for 2037.

Fabrice Wolf

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April 1, 2026

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Faced with the uncertainties surrounding MGCS, France is considering an intermediate-generation tank for 2037.

In the field of heavy armored capabilities, France has based its planning since 2017 on the Leclerc XLR tandem and then the Franco-German MGCS program, expected then for 2035. But while the withdrawal of the Leclerc is to begin in 2037, MGCS production is not expected before 2045 if the program survives the Franco-German industrial tensions between now and then.

In this context, the French Ministry of the Armed Forces acknowledges a risk of capability gap, which highlights the now urgent need to find an intermediate-generation tank to replace the Leclerc XLR as early as 2037, or perhaps even sooner. While Berlin is making progress in the European market with new production of Leopard 2A8 and then, from 2030, a Leopard With 3 in preparation, the French room for maneuver in terms of deadlines, budget and partners is now limited.

The Leclerc XLR tank should gain in survivability with a hard-kill APS.

Until now, France's strategy for modernizing its tank fleet relied on upgrading the Leclerc XLR by 2030, pending the arrival of the MGCS. However, given the rapidly evolving operational, technological, and military landscape, the Ministry of the Armed Forces has stated that the Leclerc's retirement should no longer be delayed beyond 2037.

The same ministry also mentions the need to address the risk of a capability gap, outlining a now clearly defined framework for the Army's acquisition of at least 200 intermediate-generation tanks, serving as a capability and technology bridge until the entry into service of the MGCS program armored vehicles, now postponed to 2045 by a German industry that intends to preserve its potential market. Leopard 3, expected by 2030.

To ensure continuity of service, the French Army has opted for the Leclerc XLR standard, which offers a digitized system and enhanced protection, including the integration of SICS, CONTACT radios, and the BARAGE jammer. It also features a remotely operated 7,62 mm turret, the PASEO sight, and the ACE AI for decision support. Finally, it is preparing for the use of the KNDS France SHARD armor-piercing fin-stabilized discarding sabot (APFSDS) round, while an anti-drone cage is already fitted to the turret.

However, in light of the lessons learned from Ukraine, the survivability of the French tank still needed improvement, particularly against missiles, rockets, and light drones. This will indeed be the case, with the confirmation of the addition of an active protection system (APS), combining hard-kill and soft-kill effects, as indicated by the Ministry of the Armed Forces following a parliamentary question. This capability, absent from the initial XLR program, is now the subject of a national directive.

The solution that will equip the Leclerc has not yet been detailed, but it is naturally assumed that to the DIAMANT system and its hard-kill Prometeus system from Thales, which is to equip other French armored vehicles such as the Griffon, the Jaguar and probably also the VBCI, even if the structure of this APS does not make it particularly suitable for anti-drone warfare, which will then have to be delegated to another capability, such as coupling the Passer with dedicated kinetic means.

On the successor side, the MGCS program is progressing slowly and facing numerous obstacles, not least the industrial tensions between France and Germany, as well as the often divergent needs of the two countries' armed forces. At this stage, the presentation at Eurosatory 2024 of the EMBT demonstrator, combining an automated turret and a 140mm ASCALON cannon designed by KNDS France, illustrates relevant building blocks but still far from series production capability, confirming the previously noted gap.

The budgetary framework, for its part, will likely require significant adjustments, particularly with the update to the 2024-2040 Military Programming Law planned for this spring by the government. The 2024 bill had, in fact, ruled out funding for an intermediate-generation main battle tank and reinforced expectations for the MGCS despite its delays, postponing the replacement effort until after 2030. We can now expect a restructuring of French planning in this area, given contextual changes that leave little room for pro-European dogmatism.

Le Leopard 2A8 outlines an intermediate option in the face of a French decision expected in 2026

The Ministry of the Armed Forces now indicates that a decision on intermediate capabilities could be made as early as 2026. Given the constraints of the study, acquisition, integration, and commissioning cycle, any delay would postpone the operational impact beyond the fleet transition, creating not only a capability gap but also a disruption of the Army's operational experience in this area. The Ministry has, moreover, mentioned several options for intermediate capabilities, thus formalizing a very short-term decision under time and industrial pressure.

On this subject, the former Director General of Armaments, Emmanuel Chiva, had hinted, in early 2025, at the possibility of a German-designed intermediate tank assembled in France. This option, which has generated little enthusiasm among either the military or industry, would certainly offer a rapid response, but would pose a significant risk of eroding French design capabilities if it were to replace domestic development. However, at present, there is no indication that such an option is still being seriously considered by the Ministry of Defense.

While Paris remained stuck in its strictly European framework, Berlin, for its part, anticipated its own transitional phase, with the design and then the new production of the Leopard 2A8, an evolution of Leopard Hungarian 2A7HU incorporating certain developments linked to the Ukrainian RETEX of the first months of the conflict.

Leopard 2A8 KNDS — Leopard 2A8 of KNDS Deutschland

Deliveries of the 2A8 are expected as early as 2027, with the first units slated to be fully operational before the end of the decade, ensuring a short-term, up-to-date logistical, doctrinal, and industrial base for the Bundeswehr. This timeline provides Germany with a robust capability net, while a complete replacement remains a distant prospect for MGCS and its partners, and also offers the KNDS an effective response to the South Korean K2 in the European market, following Germany's setback in Poland.

The gamble paid off, precisely, since the 2A8 has won over 6 other European armies since its presentation, only two years ago, and the K2 has not achieved any more European successes except with the Polish armies.

Above all, the German industry, bringing together KNDS and Rheinmeltall, is now developing the Leopard 3 for 2030, a true intermediate-generation tank with a lightweight architecture, a crew reduced to 3 members, a fully robotic turret, open vetronics and which natively integrates drones and cooperative engagements.

The two German manufacturers are simultaneously leading the MARTE program, funded by the European Defence Fund, with broad government and industry participation, to design a future European main battle tank, thereby confirming Germany's lack of strategic dependence on the MGCS. The existence of a national alternative and an upstream European platform has thus profoundly transformed the Franco-German cooperation equation in this area, as well as its timeline.

Therefore, the intermediate capability option is no longer hypothetical for France. On the contrary, it has become the realistic, and indeed predictable, path forward for several years to avoid a capability gap between the XLR and a delayed MGCS. The coupling of a decision in 2026 with German deliveries between 2027 and 2030 creates an asymmetry of opportunities. Hence the imperative for industrial and capability arbitration, in order to frame a solution compatible with SCORPION and preserving margins of military, technological, and industrial sovereignty over critical protection and armament components.

The United Arab Emirates as an alternative for the French intermediate-generation tank

Once the option of assembling a Leopard In France, the need for a national, modular intermediate tank based on MGCS components is a natural one, especially as it leverages French expertise. The ASCALON weapon system would be a component to be integrated early on, with expected gains in range and terminal effects. However, other less visible or publicized areas have also seen significant progress by French industry, in the fields of composite armor, combat and cooperative engagement systems, missiles, sensors, and drones.

For further :

To save the French tank industry, the United Arab Emirates and Egypt could be the preferred alternative for Paris!

A few days ago, Emmanuel Chiva, the French DGA (Directorate General of Armaments), indirectly opened the door to an intensification of relations between the French battle tank industry and its German counterpart, prior to the MGCS program, perhaps to equip the Army with the intermediate generation tank…

There remains, of course, the budgetary obstacle, far from easy to overcome, even though the budget of the French armed forces has doubled since 2017, while other critical funding needs, in the munitions sector, in the naval or anti-aircraft sector, and of course, in the SCAF file, continue to emerge.

Faced with this, the option of an industrial and technological coalition with the United Arab Emirates, or even with Egypt, mentioned in an article published on this site just a year ago, would aggregate needs exceeding 1,000 units, which would radically change the industrial and financial scale of the program.

Leclerc United Arab Emirates — Leclerc Asur Emirates in Yemen

Indeed, the United Arab Emirates currently has 354 Leclerc tanks and associated recovery vehicles, while Egypt has massive modernization needs for its armored fleet still equipped with M60s, which may justify a joint program mutually beneficial to the three countries, their armies and their respective defense industries, while preserving a design role in France.

The choice must incorporate explicit criteria relating to industry, budget, exports, and sovereignty. France has the expertise to lead such development, but financing remains the key constraint in the short term. A limited domestic production volume necessitates an export-oriented approach to offset non-recurring costs, regardless of the option chosen. The decision must also reconcile the gradual integration of domestic protection and armament components with the time constraints set by XLR and the withdrawal process beginning in 2037.

The ASCALON gun structures an incremental increase in lethality within a networked medium tank

However, this interim program, whether Franco-Emirati or Franco-French, could also be an opportunity for France to once again demonstrate its often initially misunderstood but undeniably effective innovation in weaponry. Just as the Mirage III defied the US Air Force's Century Series with a compact, lightweight, yet high-performance fighter, or as the Caesar more recently proved in Ukraine that it was not the mere gadget for foreign operations as it was perceived, but the most effective and resilient Western artillery system in the conflict, France could design a successor to the Leclerc that would not be a heavy battle tank, but a medium tank.

Indeed, recent experience shows how the mass of traditional MBTs has become a handicap on an ultra-dynamic battlefield saturated with drones and sensors, leading to a significant trend towards reducing mass in favor of mobility and distributed survivability. The project Leopard 3, but also the American M1E3, highlight a lightweight architecture for greater mobility and low consumption, while remaining well above 50 tonnes.

The Chinese ZTZ 100, presented in September 2024 during the PLA parade in Beijing, illustrates, on the other hand, another approach by serving as a tactical communication node in an interconnected system, with automation, advanced protection and optimized mobility, translating the same movement towards embedded network effects.

The available French building blocks make it possible to structure this target right now, by combining the experience acquired by the land defense industry in light and medium armored vehicles, on the one hand, and the experience acquired by the Army in mechanized mobility.

Thus, lethality and reconnaissance can be increased by integrating remotely operated munitions. KNDS already offers to add four tubes for the Mataris MT 10 munition to the Leclerc tank. The MT 10 is silent, offers immersive piloting, carries a 550-gram MW FRAG warhead, has a thirty-minute endurance, and a ten-kilometer range. It transmits real-time video until impact via a jam-resistant link and is designed to neutralize lightly armored targets or critical points.

The arrival of the ZTZ 100 also reinforces the value of a phased industrialization approach, focused on validating network architectures and automation under real-world conditions. This program initially serves as an experimental platform to test these innovations in an operational setting, closely aligned with actual needs, while providing an immediate response without having to wait for the complete design cycle. This approach reduces technical risks and structures maintenance around open vehicle electronics, before expanding capabilities on a larger scale within armored and mechanized units.

For further :

China's New Type 100 Tank: Capability Revolution or Publicity Stunt?

On September 3, 2025, the Chinese People's Liberation Army unveiled a new main battle tank designated ZTZ-100, or Type 100, during the military parade commemorating the 80th anniversary of the victory over Japan. While this public presentation was in itself a strategic event, it…

The French target format would thus benefit from early integration of weapons, protection and digitization modules, such as ASCALON and a national APS, on a chassis lighter than that of previous generation MBTs, in order to quickly capitalize on measurable tactical gains, while focusing on mobility, stealth and cooperative engagement rather than passive armor, to ensure the survival of the armored vehicle in combat, and thus, regain the maneuver spaces that drones and anti-tank missiles have annihilated in Ukraine.

An incremental approach, linked to an export coalition with the United Arab Emirates and Egypt, would, in this context, offer sustainable financing, a broader industrial base, and a solid global market. It would also allow for the integration of an initial wave of robotic systems into a resilient architecture, while preserving French design capabilities for the subsystems critical to operational effectiveness.

Conclusion

It appears that aligning the Leclerc's retirement from 2037 with the MGCS's serial production no earlier than 2045 creates a now-acknowledged risk of capability gaps. The decision window opening in 2026 comes in the face of accelerated German development driven by deliveries of Leopard 2A8 between 2027 and 2030, a Leopard 3 targeted for 2030 and national management via PSM. The announced volumes and calendar milestones reinforce the emergence of a de facto German standard, which makes an intermediate generation capacity necessary for France in order to preserve continuity and margins of sovereignty.

Within this framework, three concrete trajectories exist, each with explicit constraints: purchasing a German solution assembled in France, developing a modular national system based on components like ASCALON, and an export coalition with the United Arab Emirates and Egypt for over 1,000 units. This latter option presents the opportunity to develop a networked medium tank, as demonstrated by prototypes like the EMBT and the Chinese ZTZ 100, rather than entering a market already largely dominated by the... Leopard 2/3, the KF51, the K2 or even the M1E3.

The Scorpene returns to India with a possible order for 3 additional submarines

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April 1, 2026

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The Scorpene returns to India with a possible order for 3 additional submarines

In India, the Scorpène issue has returned to the forefront following the sixth annual India-France Defence Dialogue held in Bangalore on February 17, 2026. Negotiations opened four years ago for three additional units, publicly confirmed in Paris in July 2024, are nearing government approval.

This prospect comes as the Kilo and Type 209 submarines approach retirement, creating a potential capability gap for the Indian Navy. It also aligns with the timeline of ThyssenKrupp Marine Systems' Project 75 India P75I, based on a longer-development, independent air-independent propulsion system, and with the industrial continuity of Mazagon Dock Shipbuilders Limited, despite the lack of an announcement at the end of March.

Mazagon Dock Shipbuilders Limited preserves India's submarine capability

As part of Project 75, the Indian Navy commissioned six Scorpène-class submarines, locally designated Kalvari class, from Mazagon Dock Shipbuilders Limited (MDL) in Mumbai, with assistance from Naval Group. The last of the series, the INS Vagsheer, marked the end of the first production line, raising the prospect of an industrial lull if no replacement was quickly established. This phase established an industrial base and a skilled workforce dedicated to this submarine design, as well as supply chains and processes that are now well-established at the Indian shipyard.

As the Kilo and Type 209 classes approached the end of their service lives, the risk of a temporary shortage of submarine availability became more pronounced, exacerbated by the entry into service of new Chinese Type 039 AIP submarines within the Pakistani navy.

Hence the pressure for a solution that was already proven and could be deployed without long delays. The skills acquired through technology transfers and the infrastructure ready for the Scorpène family made a rapid restart credible, with up to 60% local content and the integration of a combat system from Bharat Electronics Limited as a lever for public acceptance.

tkms type 209 india — Type 209 of the Indian Navy.

In July 2024, Prime Minister Narendra Modi announced in France an order for three additional Scorpène submarines for the Indian Navy. The estimated value of around 35 to 36 trillion crore rupees (€3,4 billion) included significant technology transfers and design improvements compared to the initial units. The information provided indicated that the three ships would be built by MDL over approximately six years, leveraging a standard already familiar to Indian crews.

In parallel, Project 75 India (P75I) has awarded a contract to Germany's ThyssenKrupp Marine Systems for six new-generation Type 214 air-independent propulsion (AIP) submarines, with a budget of approximately 50 trillion rupees (€4,7 billion) according to the authorities. This program represents a generational shift and a more ambitious AIP integration, with inherently longer lead times before entry into service. The two approaches thus address distinct timeframes and diversify the technological options available to the Indian fleet.

In this context, the option of additional Scorpène submarines serves industrial continuity and capacity smoothing, while limiting integration risks. It benefits from the learning curve of the six units already delivered and supported, and avoids the pitfalls of a completely new design, as Eric Balufin of Naval Group pointed out, while offering an intermediate technological step compatible with the goal of indigenization.

Naval Group awaits the order for the 3 additional Scorpene submarines announced for 2024

In Bangalore, the sixth annual India-France Defence Dialogue on February 17, 2026, provided clear political support, with maritime security at the heart of the discussions, as both countries are fully engaged in a potential strategic rapprochement around the RafaleFrench Armed Forces Minister Catherine Vautrin met with her counterpart Rajnath Singh to expand submarine cooperation, putting the three additional units back at the top of the bilateral agenda.

However, despite converging signs that New Delhi was close to approving Project 75 Additional, the initial commercial milestones were not met. Negotiations between the government and Mazagon Dock Shipbuilders were supposed to conclude in early 2025, a deadline long since missed without public confirmation. A final agreement was anticipated by the end of March 2026, but it has not materialized, indicating that external factors are still influencing the decision.

The official relaunch, however, outlined a short path to signing by leveraging MDL's existing industrial infrastructure. Supply chains, expertise, and production lines inherited from the P75 would allow for a near-immediate start after the contract is signed. If the contract is signed, construction would follow an accelerated schedule, reducing the time between agreement and production launch—a significant advantage for a fleet under strain.

For further :

Will the Indian Navy turn to the Scorpene Evolved for its 3 new submarines?

While Jakarta has just announced an order for two Scorpene Evolved submarines, negotiations between Paris and New Delhi regarding arms programs have accelerated since the Indian parliamentary elections and Narendra Modi's latest victory. Following reports…

This sustained pace would mitigate the risk of a capability gap before the arrival of the first P75I submarines. The bridge-solution function of the additional Scorpène submarines stems from the difference in maturity between the two programs and the experience already gained in India. It thus aligns with the next-generation ambition of the P75I, without competing with it.

As of the end of March 2026, no contracts had been signed. New Delhi even temporarily suspended its plan to order three Scorpène aircraft for approximately 36 trillion crore rupees due to budgetary constraints. The substantial financial commitment of the P75I program, now estimated at 72 trillion crore rupees (€6,8 billion), is impacting the sequential allocation of resources. Other defense or industrial decisions could also delay approval.

The Scorpene submarine fills the capability gap before the P75I program

Operationally, the P75I represents an upgrade with an air-independent propulsion (AIP) system to extend its diving endurance, but its longer development period is delaying the arrival of the first units into service. Three additional Scorpènes fill the gap, ensuring crew training and continuous at-sea presence, and maintaining a constant level of conventional deterrence in the Indian Ocean.

From an industrial standpoint, Mazagon Dock Shipbuilders Limited's facilities can be immediately deployed for this architecture, thus minimizing integration risks and delays. Infrastructure, a skilled workforce, and processes derived from the P75 standard facilitate rapid production, controlled ramp-up, and consistent quality, while preventing skills erosion due to a downturn in activity.

INS Vagir Kalvari-class Scorpene-MDL Mazagon-Naval group — Launch of the INS Vagir in June 2024.

The planned upgrades strengthen technological sovereignty, with the integration of the indigenous AIP system developed by the DRDO. This system should allow for up to two weeks of continuous immersion on diesel-electric submarines, significantly improving stealth and endurance. As mentioned above, the high level of indigenous development and the integration of a BEL combat system support this autonomy, while a slightly larger design opens up room for future upgrades.

For further :

Germany's tKMS takes over India's P75i AIP submarine programme

Indian authorities have just announced the winner of the P75i competition, for the local construction of six new submarines equipped with air-independent propulsion (AIP). Unsurprisingly, the German company tKMS, in partnership with the Mazagon Shipbuilding shipyard in Goa, has been selected…

Performance gains are also expected with new energy solutions mentioned in the Indian press, compatible with the adoption of lithium-ion batteries. This option extends range and enhances operational capabilities without restarting a lengthy development cycle. The timeline for three units at MDL remains approximately six years, which strengthens industrial visibility and eliminates the capacity cliff effect while awaiting the first P75I deliveries.

Towards a Franco-Indian strategic rapprochement in the field of the defense industry?

Naval cooperation is part of a broader maritime focus within the strategic partnership between Paris and New Delhi. The annual defense dialogue in Bangalore placed maritime security at the forefront, providing a coherent political framework for the Scorpène program. The ministerial meeting fostered prospects for expanding submarine cooperation and consolidated a bilateral agenda combining operational capabilities and industrial co-development.

The Franco-Indian industrial architecture proposed for the Scorpène submarine combines a high level of local content with already extensive technology transfers. Naval Group is aiming for up to 60% indigenization and the integration of a BEL combat system, which will consolidate autonomy. These transfers broaden the scope for future iterations designed and integrated in India, strengthening the credibility of more economical and rapidly industrializable follow-up units.

The expected externalities extend beyond the fleet itself and benefit the entire Indian industrial ecosystem. According to Eric Balufin of Naval Group, this partnership could make India a central maintenance, repair, and overhaul base for Scorpène submarines across the Indo-Pacific, as Indonesia considers ordering four additional Scorpène EVO submarines, following the two ships ordered in 2025. Choosing a proven solution avoids lengthy and costly development processes, creates skilled jobs, and fosters lasting learning among local subcontractors.

The selection of TKMS for the P75I program simultaneously establishes a second submarine technology hub in India, enriching but also complicating program management. This overlap will necessitate careful management of schedules, budgets, and localization objectives. The ability to sequence workloads while preserving operational priorities will be crucial to avoiding poorly coordinated internal industrial competition.

The lack of a contract signing announcement by the end of March 2026 serves as a reminder that decisions remain open and that interdependencies could alter the timeline. The temporary suspension of the plan due to budgetary constraints provided a glimpse of this. Despite the significant role of the P75I program in resource allocation, the contractual window for the three additional Scorpène aircraft remains identified, provided that political and industrial factors align.

Conclusion

It follows from the above that three additional Scorpène submarines constitute a solution to prevent the availability gap caused by the retirement of the Kilo and HDW classes. They build upon the legacy of Project 75 at MDL, where six Kalvari submarines consolidated production lines and expertise, while the ThyssenKrupp Marine Systems P75I requires a longer development time.

The integration of the DRDO's indigenous AIP, offering two weeks of immersion, and a BEL combat system with up to 60% local content, enhances autonomy and endurance. The availability of lithium-ion batteries and a six-year production cycle for three units support a timeline ahead of the first P75I deliveries. Furthermore, the lack of an announcement by the end of March 2026 points to the alignment with the MRFA, the Indian Air Force's Multi-Role Combat Aircraft tender, and the trajectory Rafale M, including an option for 31 aircraft assembled in India in anticipation of likely delays to the Twin Engine Deck Based Fighter. A

No decision is expected before the final status of the Future Combat Air System is clarified, which is anticipated following the announced political mediation and the mid-April deadline set by Berlin. In this context, Dassault Aviation holds a 26,59% stake in Thales, and Thales holds a 35% stake in Naval Group, thus reinforcing Dassault's influence on industrial convergence and a potential joint sixth-generation fighter program.

MetaDefenseMore than defense news

MetaDefenseMore than just Defense News

MetaDefenseThere is More about Defense

The replacement of the Leclerc tank in the French Army will begin in 2037.

The MGCS program remains uncertain, but not before 2045

Le Leopard 3 offers an economical and secure alternative to France, but the associated cost will be high

The EMBT replaces the Leclerc Evo as the preferred national solution for the intermediate generation

Changing paradigms: moving from MBTs to medium tanks to escape an unsolvable equation

Conclusion

The paradox of J-35: perceived threats and absent exports

The Gyrfalcon has been offered for export for over 10 years without success.

The lack of visibility on performance and ownership costs is hindering Chinese aircraft

Beijing prioritizes the modernization and expansion of the PLA's air and naval forces.

Conclusion

The Alabuga factory structures the mass production of Geranium attack drones

The Geran-2 adopts an anti-radar seeker to hunt down opposing anti-aircraft defenses.

Whether carrying FPV drones or mines, the Geran becomes versatile.

The Geran-5, halfway between a missile and a drone

Conclusion

The US Air Force aims for 1,400 fighter jets by 2030

The F-47 fighter jet's entry into service has been pushed back to the mid-2030s.

The F-47 development timeline coincides with the emergence of China's sixth-generation fighter jets after 2035.

Conclusion

The Meteor missile sets a European standard for integration and performance.

The Lancaster House 2.0 treaty triggers the joint study of the successor.

The PL-17 missile provides very long range in air superiority.

The AIM-260A missile illustrates a quest for speed and range compatible with the fleet.

The hunter Rafale strengthens the attractiveness of European armaments for export.

Conclusion

S-400 and Rafale impose on the Pakistani Air Force the reinforcement of long-range engagement after Sindoor

The Chinese J-10CE single-engine aircraft to extend Pakistan's long-range interception

The Pakistani PL-15E missile versus the Indian Meteor and Kh-47M2

Conclusion

The X-43A demonstrator demonstrates the initial dependence of scramjets on external acceleration

The Chinese Academy of Sciences approves a Contra-Rotary Ramjet operating from Mach 0 to Mach 6

The Chinese Academy of Sciences is banking on compactness to extend range and payload

The Dark Eagle program maintains operational pressure in the face of Chinese ambitions.

Conclusion

The Eurofighter Typhoon The Luftwaffe's systems must be supported from 2029 onwards by a stealthy, collaborative combat drone.

Boeing's MQ-28 Ghost Bat, supported by Rheinmetall, offers a rapid response with potential industrialization in Germany.

The Kratos XQ-58A Valkyrie, presented by Airbus, supports a triple CCA pathway under evaluation

Defense industrial partnerships increase industrial options but do not extend German strategic autonomy.

Conclusion

The Leclerc XLR tank should gain in survivability with a hard-kill APS.

Le Leopard 2A8 outlines an intermediate option in the face of a French decision expected in 2026

The United Arab Emirates as an alternative for the French intermediate-generation tank

The ASCALON gun structures an incremental increase in lethality within a networked medium tank

Conclusion

Mazagon Dock Shipbuilders Limited preserves India's submarine capability

Naval Group awaits the order for the 3 additional Scorpene submarines announced for 2024

The Scorpene submarine fills the capability gap before the P75I program

Towards a Franco-Indian strategic rapprochement in the field of the defense industry?

Conclusion

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